

The Chinese Diaspora: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Trends

Daniel Goodkind
Demographic and Economic Studies Branch
International Programs
Population Division

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U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
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Introduction

This report examines key demographic elements of the global Chinese diaspora. Although the focus here is on recent levels and trends, the history of Chinese international migration traces back hundreds, if not thousands, of years. We present a demographic portrait of the Chinese diaspora through an examination of various quantitative data sources, paying close attention to differing definitions of who is included in these sources. After examining the geographic scope and trends of the diaspora by region and country of residence, we consider key social characteristics, such as distributions by age, sex, and religion. To better illuminate these patterns, we explore and identify the distinct categories of people among the first generation of the diaspora, as well as their enduring ties to China as evidenced through remittances, family migration, and other factors. Given recent attempts by China to mobilize overseas Chinese communities as a transnational resource for its own development (Nyíri, 2005; Liu, 2005), we also consider briefly how recent trends in the Chinese diaspora may relate to that dynamic in both China and destination countries (Vertovec, 2005; Kuehn, Louie, and Pomfret, 2013; Lee, 2017).

Defining and Measuring the Chinese Diaspora

A broad definition of the present day Chinese diaspora includes those people living outside of China who were born in China or who otherwise identify as Chinese based on the language they speak and/or their ancestry. Of course, as is often noted in literature on this topic, that broad definition contains a multitude of subgroups (e.g., Poston and Yu, 1990; Sheffer, 2003; Brubaker, 2005; Poston and Wong, 2016; Liang and de Toledo Piza, 2017; Miao and Wang, 2017). Sometimes it only refers to those who were born in China and have moved to another country for temporary or permanent settlement (e.g., the first generation ‘foreign born’ immigrants from China in the host country). Sometimes it refers to those of Chinese ethnicity and born abroad who now reside in a host country (e.g., the foreign born from China as well as from anywhere else – Singapore, Taiwan, Brazil, etc. – where people identify themselves as Chinese). These two categories include only the first generations of Chinese migrants, not their children or other descendants who identify as Chinese yet were born in the host country. These definitional differences have enormous implications for our assessment of the size of “the Chinese diaspora.” For instance, as will be shown shortly, the current United Nations estimates of the China-born is roughly 10 million, whereas other estimates have run to some 45 million under a broader definition that includes second generation and longer-settled Chinese populations.

Wang (1991; as cited in Poston, Mao, and Yu, 1994) proposed several typologies to describe Chinese international migrants of centuries past: *Huashang*, *Huagong*, *Huaqiao*, and *Huayi*. The word *Hua* in each typology refers to people of Chinese heritage, while the latter part refers to the type of migrant. *Huashang* denotes the Chinese mercantilists who

travelled abroad to conduct trade and business, an emigrant pattern that has existed for hundreds of years. The most notable destination for *Huashang* was Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines), where millions of their descendants still speak Chinese and/or consider themselves to be Chinese. *Huagong* refers to Chinese international migrants who provided labor, typically in construction or mining industries. An example includes Chinese laborers who worked in the railroad industry in 19th century America. *Huaqiao* denotes the well-educated and highly skilled professional who sojourned abroad, typically from the late 19th century onward, to learn about the world outside China and who typically returned to China after a period of time. *Huayi* refers to Chinese living outside of China (typically *Huashang*) who migrate to yet another overseas destination. This latter category is particularly prevalent among the large populations of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia.

The newest members of the Chinese diaspora which we examine in this report fit fairly well within Wang's (1991) traditional typologies, although the categories have evolved somewhat in the present day. For example, with China's economic growth and opening to the world, *Huagong* workers have become more numerous, but their out-migration in recent years has leveled out and become increasingly circular, temporary, and well monitored. Overall, the relative share of the lesser skilled and lesser educated within the Chinese diaspora has decreased – more than 80 percent of recent emigrants from China are highly educated, wealthy, or both (Xiang, 2016). Indeed, the diasporic group that has grown disproportionately includes the soon-to-be-highly-educated students (e.g., Spencer-Oatey, et al., 2017, who might be analogous to *Huaqiao* undertaking an extended sojourn). A steady portion of these students has remained overseas after their studies, and the annual number of students from China who travel abroad for their studies has yet to peak. There are also elements of mercantile *Huashang* involved in family or corporate businesses, a portion of whom may obtain permanent residency in other countries by investing a certain amount of money that contributes to host country economies (Miao and Wang, 2017).

Two other types of recent Chinese international migration are worth noting. The first are family members who join those already resident abroad. In some countries, such as the United States, family reunification migration accounts for the majority of residency permits (green cards) issued to those born in China (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). The second involves a new subgroup of migrants – straddling all traditional typologies – who travel abroad to foster China's interests, often with state sponsorship. Such migrants include diplomats, certain business people, and some students on government scholarships.

Data on the Diaspora

In addition to the differing definitions involved in measuring the Chinese diaspora, attempts to measure it are further complicated by the fact that there is no ongoing repository of data that offers both estimates of the magnitude of the diaspora across time as well as estimates of the various types of migrants who constitute that diaspora. That said, there are a surprising amount of empirical data available which, when compiled together and compared, provide a rich accounting of the demographic dimensions of the diaspora. Organizations which provide international data on the Chinese diaspora include the United Nations Population Division (UNPD), the Overseas Community Affairs Council (Taiwan), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank, and various ministries of the Chinese Government, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor. We supplement these datasets with data from censuses and surveys available from key host countries. We begin our review of such compiled data sources by describing the overall size and trends of the Chinese diaspora, keeping in mind the definitional ambiguities identified earlier.

Global Trends in the Chinese Diaspora – Perspectives from Three Key Data Sources

The United Nations (UN) publishes a matrix of their estimates of international migrant stocks by both country of origin and destination. Matrices are available for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2017. These estimates refer to those residing in each country who were born elsewhere (first generation international migrants), not the children or descendants of those migrants who may continue to identify with the country of their ancestral origins. Given limitations on data availability for some countries, coupled with the fact that the matrix in each year must be in balance worldwide (e.g., the outflows from each country have to correspond to aggregated inflows from that country to all other countries), the UN estimates may not fully reflect the presence of all international migrants in each country, nor their correct place of origin (for instance, the UN migrant stock grid implies that there are no Chinese-born in Tanzania or Cote d'Ivoire, despite the fact that they are known to reside in those countries; a point made in Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, 2017).

The countries estimated by the UN to contain the most Chinese immigrants as of 2017 are shown on Table 1, and the overall distribution of such migrants by world region is shown on Table 2. Of the nearly 10 million Chinese residing abroad as of 2017, almost half of them are in either the United States (2.4 million) or Hong Kong (2.3 million). Rounding out the top ten destination countries or areas – each of which is estimated to be home for 200 thousand or more Chinese immigrants – are Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Macau, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Overall, the population of overseas

Chinese has more than doubled between 1990 and 2017, a numerical increase of more than 5.5 million. Yet the growth of this population has varied across countries and regions. The most rapid growth has occurred in Oceania, where Chinese migrants have more than quintupled over this time interval, as well as North America and Africa, where their numbers have nearly quadrupled. Among the subregions of these continents, there is also considerable variation in growth of Chinese migrants. In general, however, the largest numerical and proportional increases in Chinese migrants have been within more developed areas.

It is important to recognize that other estimates of the Chinese diaspora may differ substantially from that of the UN. For instance, according to the Overseas Community Affairs Council of Taiwan, the population of overseas Chinese was estimated at 42.5 million as of 2014 (Table 3), more than four times the estimate by the UN for 2015. The reason for the discrepancy is that the Overseas Community Affairs Council estimates include second and latter-generations of the original cohorts of migrants from China who may be long settled and/or still identify as Chinese. For instance, the Overseas Community Affairs Council estimates the overseas Chinese population in Indonesia to be 8.4 million as of 2014, whereas the UN estimated stock of China-born in Indonesia was less than 100 thousand in 2015. Estimates for other countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and Malaysia, show similar discrepancies, due to the predominance of long-settled Chinese communities in these countries. Their estimate for the United States is also about 2 million higher than that by the UN. Many of those included in the estimate for the United States may not speak Chinese, but may continue to identify as ethnically Chinese, as suggested by census or survey data.

With this caveat in mind, one helpful feature of the Overseas Community Affairs Council data is that they provide annual estimates of the (broadly defined) overseas Chinese population by region stretching back to the founding of the People's Republic of China (Table 4 and Figure 1). Due to the centuries old pattern of migration from China to Southeast Asia, the overall concentration of the Chinese diaspora is within Asia. In recent decades, however, the Chinese diasporic population has grown far more rapidly in other world regions. The annual proportional change in the Chinese diaspora by region is shown in Figure 2. Overseas Community Affairs Council data suggest that the Chinese diaspora population grew fastest in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, in Oceania in the 1980s, and in Africa over the past decade. Of course, such rapid growth reflects, in part, the relatively smaller populations of Chinese in those areas.

Another source of data on the China-born population residing abroad is the OECD (see Table 5). The OECD numbers differ from both those of the UN and the Overseas Community Affairs Council. For instance, as of 2016, the number of China-born in the United States was only about 2.1 million according to the OECD, well below the UN estimate of 2.4 million. One explanation for this is that the OECD data – which are provided to it by member states – specifically identify those born in China (as opposed to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or other areas). Although the UN attempts to isolate the China-born as well, the

variety of country data sources it uses to construct its international migration matrix may not always reflect a uniform definition (e.g., some data reflect the foreign citizens of particular countries rather than those born in that country).

The OECD also provides data on annual net migration (inflows vs. outflows) from China since 2000. Figure 3 shows such levels and trends for Australia, the United States, and the aggregate for the six other destination countries which supply such data to the OECD for the full interval from 2000 to 2016 (Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden). The United States received roughly 140 thousand more migrants from China than returned to China in both 2015 and 2016. Net flows to Australia far exceeded those to the other six OECD countries combined despite having a population less than a third of the sum of those six countries.

The OECD also publishes information on asylum applications. Here again, the United States seems to be the most popular destination country. After a sharp increase over the past decade, the number of asylum applications in the United States from Chinese citizens reached 20 thousand in 2016, far more than applications made to all other OECD nations combined (Figure 4).

All in all then, the major sources of international data on the Chinese diaspora – the UN, the Overseas Community Affairs Council, and the OECD – each provide different estimates (and underlying definitions) of that population, the relative value of which will vary depending on the specific interests and questions asked by the observer.

Social Characteristics – Sex Ratios, Age Structure, and Culture

The characteristics and complexities of categorizing the Chinese diaspora across the globe become clearer as we delve into the demographic, socio-economic, and cultural dimensions of overseas Chinese (Miao and Wang, 2017; Zong and Batalova, 2017). Below we examine some of these key dimensions, including sex ratios, age structure, birthplace/citizenship, language, religion, and education. The countries considered below are those for which we were able to locate data across the key dimensions identified. It is not surprising that the patterns we find in each society are closely tied to historical, legal, and other factors that influence migration.

Sex Ratios

Prior to the 20th century, the Chinese diaspora was dominated by males, as migratory streams were primarily traders and industrial laborers (Skinner, 1957). In the present day, although a few frontiers of Chinese international migration are disproportionately composed of men, over the past quarter century both levels and trends indicate a feminization of the Chinese diaspora.

A key source of evidence for this conclusion is the United Nations migration database, which contains estimates of international migrants from China by sex in key years since 1990. Worldwide, an estimated 8 percent excess of males among Chinese migrants in 1990 was followed in 2010 and 2017 by an excess of females of 12 percent and 15 percent, respectively (Figure 5). That feminization was mirrored in both more developed and some less developed countries, although the least developed among the latter showed a consistently masculine excess of migration. Most geographic regions of the world showed the same pattern. Several factors may help explain this feminization of Chinese migration. First, most of the 120 thousand children adopted from China in the 1990s and early 2000s brought on by strict enforcement of China's birth planning policy were female. Second, transnational intermarriages among citizens of China typically involve Chinese wives and non-Chinese husbands (a pattern suggested by the notably feminine sex ratio of China-born adults who reside in Western countries: Statistics Canada, 2008; Statistics New Zealand, 2018; Statistics Sweden, 2018). Third, among Chinese students abroad there has been a relative increase in undergraduates compared to graduate students (Institute of International Education, 2017), and the former tend to show less masculine – or even more feminine – sex ratios. Fourth, given greater longevity among females, the number of migrants who survive to older ages tend to be female.

In addition to the UN estimates, we assembled sex ratio statistics from censuses or surveys for nine countries for which a Chinese population could be identified (Table 6). Comparisons of the sex ratio between the country data and the UN estimates should be undertaken with caution because the ratios sometimes refer to different populations (e.g., the census in Singapore counts the long-settled Chinese population whereas the UN estimates refer only to first generation Chinese migrants residing in Singapore). Nevertheless, the findings from individual country censuses and surveys tend to mirror the UN estimates. Three of the countries shown (Chile, Malaysia, and Burma) have sex ratios that match or exceed China's masculine population sex ratio (e.g., sex ratios at or above 1.06), while six are more feminine than China. The Chinese populations of Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia have sex ratios ranging from 0.79 to 1.01, suggesting a relative dearth of males.

Age Structure

The age structure of Chinese diaspora populations vary from country to country. Table 7 shows broad age distributions in several countries for which age data in recent years were readily available – under age 15, 15 to 64 years, and 65 and older. The proportion of Chinese diaspora populations below age 15 ranges from 6 percent in the United States to 23 percent in Indonesia. In contrast, at the other end of the age spectrum, the proportion at or above age 65 ranges from only 4 percent in Sweden to 19 percent in Canada. These differing distributions reflect any number of factors: 1) different levels of fertility, 2) differing composition among various types of migrants (e.g., students, laborers, chain

migration of relatives) for whom age distributions are distinct, and 3) legal or other frameworks that affect migratory levels and trends. Some cross-country variation may also be due to the differing dates of the estimates. For instance, the share of Singapore's Chinese population under the age of 15 was 16 percent according to the 2010 census, but given the sharp drop in Singapore's fertility during the prior decade, that proportion has fallen since then. According to the Census Bureau's International Data Base (IDB), the proportion of Singapore's total population under age 15 fell from 14.8 percent in 2010 to 12.8 percent in 2018.

These differences having been noted, some features of age structure are fairly consistent. For instance, the proportion at ages 15-64 (from 70 to 83 percent) varies less than the proportions at the youngest and oldest ages. Moreover, the average age distribution of Chinese across the countries shown is similar to that for China as a whole, where the proportions below age 15 and ages 65 and over were 17 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Thus, although local factors may drive migratory and demographic patterns among Chinese diasporic populations, their overall age patterns seem very similar to that of China itself.

Cultural Characteristics: Language and Religion

Some of the most notable social differences across the Chinese diaspora population involve religious affiliation (Table 8). In Malaysia, more than 80 percent identify as Buddhist, 11 percent as Christian, and most others as 'Confucian/Traditional'—less than 1 percent say that they have no religion. In Singapore, 57 percent are Buddhist/Taoist, 20 percent are Christian, and most of the remaining 24 percent express no religion. In marked contrast, 73 percent of Chinese in Australia say they have no religion, with only 11 percent professing Buddhism and 6 percent identifying as Protestant or Catholic.

As to language, there is diversity across – and even within – destination countries, both in terms of the ability to speak English and the Chinese dialects spoken. In Australia, fewer than 3 percent of Chinese people report speaking English only (many of whom are likely older children), while 66 percent report speaking English well or very well in addition to Chinese. Of the foreign born from China residing in the United States and who speak Chinese at home, only 45 percent say they speak English very well (American Community Survey 2016; note that this is a stricter bar of English proficiency than used in the Australian tabulations). As to dialects spoken, in Canada 35 percent of Chinese speakers use Cantonese at home, 23 percent speak Mandarin, and 40 report speaking "Chinese" without further clarification of dialect.

Labor and Financial Aspects of the Chinese Diaspora

As mentioned in Wang's (1991) typology, two categories of Chinese overseas migration in centuries past were *Huagong* (migration to work on labor projects) and *Huashang* (migration to develop trade and commercial businesses). The current Chinese diaspora evinces elements of both of these traditional categories of migration, although the forms and destinations have, of course, changed. This section provides an overview of key features of such migration.

Contract Labor Migration

China's Department of Overseas Labor Service Cooperation, under the Ministry of Commerce, is in charge of administering the limited-term overseas migration of workers for contracted projects and labor services cooperation.¹ Figure 6 shows the annual stocks of overseas laborers in each of these categories, as well as both categories combined, beginning in 1984. The combined stock of overseas laborers increased steadily for three decades, reaching a plateau of about one million in 2015, and it has hovered near that level since then. Additional data from the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017; Table 11.21) indicates that about half a million laborers have departed China annually since 2015, and the stability of the overall stock implies a circular migration through which a roughly equal number have returned to China (see also Xiang, 2016, p. 9). At the end of 2016, more than 48 percent of these overseas laborers were concentrated in five locations: Macao, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017; Table 11.22) – among the first four of these, overseas laborers were overwhelmingly employed on projects contracted by Chinese companies, while about three quarters of those in Saudi Arabia were providing labor services to non-Chinese companies. Monthly data in recent years suggest a modest temporary dip in overseas labor stocks in January and February, which may reflect a seasonal pattern in contract work and/or the desire among some laborers to complete their contracts in time for the lunar New Year holiday.²

Family and Small Business Entrepreneurs

Reminiscent of the commercially oriented migration of Chinese family businesses to Southeast Asia over the past three centuries, there have been fresh waves of *Huashang* in

¹ As described by Ma (2012, p. 18), the Department of Overseas Labor Service Cooperation recognizes distinct categories of contract labor. The first major category involves migrant labor for Chinese companies who have contracts for overseas projects. The second is migrant labor organized by Chinese labor export companies who provide workers as per contracts signed with foreign partners. The Chinese companies involved are supervised by the Department of Labor.

² We also reviewed data from the International Labor Organization (ILO) gridded database on transnational laborers, but they did not contain details on China-born laborers.

recent years. We focus here on one of the newest destinations for mercantile migration and one that has experienced the most rapid diasporic growth (Figure 2) – Africa, a continent rich in the natural resources that China desires to build its economy (Dollar, 2016; Mourdoukoutas, 2018).

According to Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri (2017) there are currently about 10 thousand Chinese-owned businesses and trade ventures in Africa, 90 percent of which are composed of small and/or family-oriented businesses. As to the exact number of Chinese people in Africa, estimates range widely from 250 thousand to two million – an informal range of eight fold (Postel, 2016). Estimates of the number of Chinese in Africa have sometimes sparked debates. For instance, according to the *Lusaka Times* (2007), the former President of Zambia quoted estimates of 80 thousand Chinese residents to highlight concerns by some about immigration flows. A year-long investigation of the actual number of Chinese in Zambia focused on the visa permits that are required for extended residence, and it concluded that the more likely number was between 13 and 22 thousand (ibid.). The higher estimate of 80 thousand might have originated not from political concerns but from a confusion between stocks and flows. That figure might represent the annual sum of those receiving extended residence visa permits – but the current stock must be calculated by subtracting from that figure the sum of annual outflows.

There is similar uncertainty about the number of Chinese living in South Africa, the African country with the largest number of overseas Chinese. Estimates there range from 350 to 500 thousand (Kuo, 2017). The uncertainty of such estimates are further complicated by a recent downturn in the South African economy – a decline in the South African Rand and increased competition from South African traders and entrepreneurs who have forged their own ties with suppliers back in China. Such factors have contributed to an outflow of Chinese traders from South Africa. All in all, it is plausible that the rapid increase in Chinese migration to Africa in recent years (Figure 2) may stabilize, or even reverse.

Investor Emigrants from China

Another notable category of recent migrants in the Chinese diaspora are those who have sought investor visas. Many countries provide such opportunities for individuals to obtain permanent residence if they make investments that stimulate the economy and/or create jobs in the host country. For instance, between 2012 and 2015, some 28 thousand Chinese citizens obtained EB-5 investor visas from the United States, more than 85 percent of all EB-5 visas granted (Miao and Wang, 2017; p. 18, citing data from the U.S. Department of State, 2015). Among all China-born citizens obtaining permanent residence in the United States, the proportion doing so based on investor visas increased from less than one in 20 in 2010 to more than one in three in 2015 (Miao and Wang, 2017; p. 28). Canada, which was another extremely popular destination for investor migrants, recently cancelled its nationwide program due to the overwhelming interest in, and backlog of, such applicants, especially those from China (ibid.) Other popular migratory destinations for Chinese

citizens seeking investor visas include Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom (ibid., p. 23).

Remittances

Remittances by overseas residents to their country of origin provide a sense of the economic ties associated with international migration. According to the World Bank, as of 2017 more than US\$ 60 billion was remitted to China from abroad through official channels.³ The increase in annual remittances was particularly large starting in 2006 through 2011 (Figure 7), a period which parallels the most rapid growth in China's GDP per capita. Remittances to China dwarf those which flow out of China to other countries, the total of which was less than 3 billion in 2017 (Table 9).

As to regional patterns, World Bank estimates for 2017 indicate that both the United States and Hong Kong SAR each account for about one quarter of all remittances to China (Table 9). The next largest sources of remittances to China are Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, and Singapore, each of which accounts for 4-6 percent of official remittances to China. The amount of such remittances reflect both the number of China-born who reside in these countries (note the parallels between Table 1 and Table 9) as well as local economic conditions. The top 25 country sources of remittances to China account for more than 95 percent of all remittances to China.

Student Migration

One of the most prominent migration streams of the Chinese diaspora in recent decades has involved students. Among the four typologies of Chinese migration abroad identified by Wang (1991), current student migration seems closest to his concept of *Huaqiao* – the extended sojourn of an already well-educated professional. Of the some 10 million members of the Chinese diaspora who were born in China (Table 1), at present roughly one in ten is a student who currently studies abroad (and a much larger portion are former students who remained abroad after their studies). Indeed, the recent migratory diaspora from China is dominated by the recently skilled, as well as the soon-to-be-highly-skilled students. The emigration rate of China's highly skilled is currently about five times that of the overall emigration rate (Xiang, 2016). Although the number of Chinese students studying overseas continues to grow, there are possible signs of an eventual slowdown or a reshuffling of destinations of choice, both of which depend in part on economic and policy decisions in China as well as destination countries.

³ Official channels include bank wire transfers. Additional amounts may be remitted through informal channels; however, the World Bank does not attempt to measure these flows.

Patterns and Trends in Student Outflows from China

The increase in the number of students who have departed China to study abroad has been particularly sharp in recent years (Kennedy, 2018a). In 2000 and before, fewer than 100 thousand students from China departed annually for study overseas (Xiang, 2016). Thereafter, annual student departures more than tripled to almost 300 thousand in 2010 and doubled thereafter to over 600 thousand in 2017 (Figure 8). The annual increase in student departures has been almost linear, as has the accumulating stock of Chinese students residing abroad, which was estimated to be over 800 thousand as of 2015 (Figure 9). Based on available migratory flow data since then from both China and receiving countries (e.g., Figure 8), the stock of Chinese students abroad, including those staying after completion of studies, likely surpassed one million in 2017.

The main destination for Chinese students is the United States, where 291 thousand students resided in 2015 according to UNESCO data (Figure 10; that number exceeded 350 thousand in the 2016/17 school year according to more recent data from the International Institute of Education – see Table 10). UNESCO data show that over one-third of Chinese students studying abroad in 2015 were in the United States (35.8 percent), 12.0 percent were in Australia, 11.2 percent were in the United Kingdom, and 9.7 percent were in Japan (Figure 10).

Students from China in the United States studying for a graduate degree outnumbered those studying for an undergraduate degree by five or six to one from the 1990s through 2003 (Institute of International Education, 2007; cited in Li, 2010). However, due in part to the increasing wealth of Chinese parents since then (and in line with other international students in the United States) more students from China are now enrolled in undergraduate degree programs than graduate programs. As of 2017, some 40 percent of Chinese students are enrolled in undergraduate programs, 37 percent are enrolled in graduate programs, 6 percent are enrolled in non-degree programs, and 17 percent are in the one-year practical training period allowed after degree programs end (Institute of International Education, 2017).

China is the number one country of origin for international students in the United States, surpassing 350 thousand in the 2016/17 academic year and accounting for one in every three international students (Table 10). India was a distant second country of origin with 186 thousand international students, followed by South Korea with 61 thousand.

Countervailing Forces? – Return Migration of Students to China and Flows of International Students to China

Recent articles in the popular press stress the increasing number of Chinese students who return to China after their studies abroad (e.g., Huang, 2016). For instance, the gap between Chinese students departing to study abroad vs. those returning to China exceeded 150 thousand annually in 2010, but by 2016 there was a decline in that excess along with

an annual increase in the number of students who returned to China (Kelly, 2018). Indeed, many students and others working abroad have incentives to return to China. According to a non-random survey taken by Peking University, the four major reasons for return migration include: their comparative advantage in their professional field, the growing domestic market in China, their ability to exploit that growing market, and a desire to be reunited with family (Miao and Wang, 2017; p. 57).

That having been said, the recent numerical increase in Chinese students who return to China is in part due to the increasing numbers who had left earlier to study abroad, which increased the pool “at risk” of returning. In fact, after a decline in the net outflow/inflow gap of Chinese students in 2013, from 2014 to 2017 the excess outflow has held steady at about 100-120 thousand annually (Figure 8). In other words, there is an ongoing net outflow of students from China for higher education abroad, and a portion of that outflow remains abroad after their studies. One reason for the ongoing net outflow from China is that more than 90 percent of students are self-funded (Luo, 2017), and Chinese families are willing to invest in their children’s overseas education. Some observers suggest that annual student departures from China will peak at between 700 and 800 thousand per year around 2022 (ibid.).

In addition to the increasing numbers of Chinese students abroad, there has also been an increasing number of international students coming to study in China. It is helpful to keep the latter dynamic in mind, as it helps us to separate China’s unique diasporic dynamics from more general forces of globalization that accelerate international mobility everywhere. International students in China increased from under 100 thousand between 2001 and 2003 to almost 400 thousand by 2015 (Figure 9). This increase is due in part to the growth of exchange programs between universities in China and abroad as well as the increasing number of scholarships available to foreign students from the Chinese government. Such scholarships in 2015 covered 10 percent of all foreign students in China – over 40,000 international students, up from 26,000 students in 2011 (Zhao, 2016) and now similar to the proportion of Chinese students studying abroad on scholarships (Luo, 2017) – and help to explain the increased proportion of international students enrolled in degree programs in China. In contrast to students from China, whose primary overseas destinations are English-speaking countries in the West (e.g., the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom) and Japan, most international students who study in China have traditionally come from Asia. Although the share of China’s international students from Asia has declined in recent years, 60 percent still come from Asia. In contrast, students from Africa and Europe have shown the largest proportional gains over the past decade and a half. The combined share of international students in China from these two continents has risen from 10 percent in 2003 to 30 percent in 2015 and 2016.

On balance, however, the flow of students from China to abroad continues to exceed the flow of international students to China. The excess stock of Chinese students abroad (compared to international students in China) has risen annually from 2001 to 2015

(Figure 9) and the ratios between the two stocks have remained almost unchanged since 2008).

Family Migration

An additional aspect of the current Chinese diaspora that has received less attention in the recent literature is family migration. This often involves the awarding of residence to relatives of those who were born in China and currently reside in, or are citizens of, other countries. The share of family migration within the Chinese diaspora is actually quite substantial, both historically (Skinner, 1957) and in the present day. In the United States, for instance, about 55-60 percent of all China-born receiving permanent residence in the United States have qualified as either immediate relatives of China-born citizens of the United States or other family members of such citizens who receive preferential consideration (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Yearbooks, 2014-2016). Between 2010 and 2015, the UN suggests that the stock of Chinese in the United States rose by about 420 thousand (Table 1), slightly above the number of all China born who were awarded permanent residence, and roughly half of those so awarded were family members of U.S. citizens who were born in China (ibid.). In Australia, 17 percent of all those receiving family visas in 2013-2014 were born in China, with 42 percent of such visas going to parents and 52 percent going to partners (Xiang, 2016).

Summary of Findings, and Future Considerations Regarding the Chinese Diaspora

We begin this summary of our report with a recap of estimates regarding the major components of the Chinese diaspora. According to the United Nations, there were about 10 million people born in China residing abroad as of 2017 – the first generation of Chinese migrants. According to the Overseas Community Affairs Council (Taiwan), the Chinese diaspora around the same time numbered about 45 million people. Based on these two estimates, it would appear that about 35 million people are the children, grandchildren, and latter-generation descendants of the original generations of Chinese international migrants.

Below is a rough sketch of the contribution of various categories of migrants to the Chinese diaspora. These numbers are rounded very broadly – to the nearest half million. The categories of first generation migrants are cascading and mutually exclusive (those shown for each successive category are assumed to not belong to any of the prior categories). Prior evidence suggests that the current stocks of laborers and students from China both number about 1 million (each about 10 percent of the first generation migrants). The estimate of 2-3 million former students who have remained abroad is based in part on flow figures. An annual average excess of 100 thousand students who leave China (compared to those who return) over the last 30 years would imply up to 3 million former students residing abroad, which, given mortality and other uncertainties, we assume could now be

as low as 2 million. The number of migrants presumed to have obtained residence permits (or citizenship) through investments, entrepreneurship, or other programs is presumed to number about half a million, similar to our estimate of those travelling abroad for trade or small-scale mercantile projects (e.g., to Africa). The largest category, presumed to number 4-5 million, are family members who go abroad to join relatives already residing abroad. This estimate emerges as a residual of all the other estimates and seems plausible based on the majority portion of residence permits to Chinese citizens that are given for family reunification in the United States.

1. *First generation international migrants from China (10 million)*
 - a. *1.0 million laborers*
 - b. *1.0 million current students*
 - c. *2.0-3.0 million former international students*
 - d. *0.5 million investors, entrepreneurs, or highly skilled migrants*
 - e. *0.5 million traders, mercantilists, or family-run businesses*
 - f. *4.0-5.0 million family-related migrants (formal reunification of immediate relatives, family preference, international intermarriage, etc.)*
2. *Second or latter-generation descendents of those born in China (35 million)*

In addition to these broad categories, we have identified three broad trends of note. First, there has been a feminization of the diaspora in recent years, due both to changes in the relative share of different types of migrants as well as sex-specific patterns of international inter-marriage. Second, international migrants from China are increasingly those who are wealthy, highly skilled, or soon-to-be highly skilled (e.g., students pursuing higher education). Third, although the net direction of international migration from China remains negative at present (e.g., outflows exceed inflows), there are countervailing forces which suggest an increasing circularity and globalization of migratory flows.

Lastly, concerns about Chinese emigration are felt in China as well as in receiving countries. The brain drain from China has been a major cause of concern for the Chinese government in recent years, but that exodus is now seen as a vast potential reserve of talent that it can draw upon for its own benefit. The Xi administration has been pursuing a variety of programs to try to attract such highly skilled “sea turtles” (*Hai-guei*) back to China through its ‘Thousand Talents Program’ (Kennedy, 2018b). Such skills are particularly valued given the already significant collaborative work between China-born scientists residing abroad and their non-Chinese counterparts (*Nature Index*, 2015). Legislation designed to protect national interests in host countries (and prevent the export of critical technologies) run the risk of backfiring by alienating Chinese migrants who are otherwise loyal to their host countries, as expressed by an open letter of concerned Chinese scientists in Australia (Asia and the Pacific Policy Society, 2018).

China attempts to convey its official views to those residing abroad through the purchase of print and television media (Heath, 2018). There are also softer programs intended to bring

Chinese youth to China to encourage a sense of belonging. For instance, China's Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, which is under the powerful State Council, has organized two-week trips for youth of Chinese descent since 1999. Beginning 2016, due to rising prosperity, such trips are now almost free of charge. More than 400 thousand youth have participated in such trips (Liu, 2016).

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Table 1. Population Born in China by Current Residence: 1990-2017

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
United States	773,939	1,058,487	1,348,465	1,607,654	1,922,950	2,345,208	2,422,998
Hong Kong	1,659,157	1,772,597	1,886,037	2,070,537	2,260,045	2,307,783	2,343,868
Japan	150,383	226,056	335,600	648,120	687,156	712,522	741,022
Canada	168,079	286,712	412,162	508,994	611,990	684,401	711,555
South Korea	19,827	48,299	92,142	242,958	490,028	609,333	614,012
Australia	97,526	108,346	144,710	227,610	371,590	451,084	472,931
Singapore	150,447	191,075	250,198	299,651	365,797	448,566	462,632
Macau	172,346	187,448	199,200	230,183	261,728	281,611	290,609
United Kingdom	23,384	83,030	144,073	147,321	162,564	197,182	207,278
Italy	32,172	53,519	74,865	137,633	200,400	200,434	203,959
Bangladesh	140,163	131,427	122,691	145,405	160,252	162,772	166,646
Spain	8,432	4,349	2,138	81,322	154,918	155,713	157,190
France	41,681	43,028	44,375	70,951	101,734	111,938	111,717
Germany	19,834	34,512	49,190	67,622	82,817	86,291	102,709
New Zealand	9,059	18,991	37,900	74,705	84,329	92,602	95,067
Thailand	58	116	200	33,311	68,811	74,411	76,595
Indonesia	258,310	170,906	83,502	72,094	65,307	72,302	73,971
Netherlands	20,779	26,141	32,395	43,937	52,904	62,708	67,085
Russia	67,405	64,969	60,177	58,247	55,119	56,171	56,210
South Africa	8,690	8,051	9,695	11,605	20,095	36,576	38,684
Philippines	53,792	72,391	88,418	71,566	35,398	35,952	37,083
Burma	72,413	55,637	44,999	38,118	35,082	33,656	34,276
Sweden	6,920	8,212	8,807	14,006	21,869	29,470	29,326
North Korea	19,668	19,590	19,511	22,740	25,969	28,594	28,877
Brazil	8,532	9,429	10,326	14,884	19,229	23,156	23,769

Note: Definitions vary by country. For most countries estimates are of those born in China (regardless of current citizenship). For other countries the estimates refer to citizens of China residing in their country. Ranked by 2017 population size.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, 2017.

Table 2. Population Born in China by Current Region of Residence: 1990-2017

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
WORLD	4,229,860	4,945,376	5,786,954	7,242,306	8,648,885	9,675,209	9,962,058
More developed regions	1,458,177	2,070,328	2,765,082	3,786,857	4,635,798	5,331,960	5,537,168
Less developed regions	2,771,683	2,875,048	3,021,872	3,455,449	4,013,087	4,343,249	4,424,890
Lesser developed regions	2,525,755	2,650,442	2,817,995	3,238,577	3,777,816	4,101,773	4,178,280
Least developed countries	245,928	224,606	203,877	216,872	235,271	241,476	246,610
High-income countries	3,393,997	4,212,157	5,147,234	6,584,778	7,967,157	8,933,699	9,201,838
Middle-income countries	790,296	684,208	592,456	609,810	629,318	686,404	704,705
Low-income countries	44,515	47,659	45,611	46,259	51,212	53,687	54,032
AFRICA	21,622	24,298	31,874	32,140	40,145	59,028	61,761
Sub-Saharan Africa	19,777	21,997	29,048	28,978	36,696	55,098	57,896
Eastern Africa	2,135	4,985	10,281	7,991	6,370	7,043	7,354
Middle Africa	390	455	623	471	899	1,148	1,170
Western Africa	1,255	1,208	1,163	1,419	1,709	1,932	1,991
Northern Africa	3,523	4,012	4,572	5,052	4,664	5,041	5,175
Southern Africa	14,319	13,638	15,235	17,207	26,503	43,864	46,071
ASIA	2,842,685	3,005,813	3,238,437	3,973,557	4,551,662	4,869,076	4,973,011
Southern Asia	181,183	171,335	155,727	175,428	192,052	193,890	197,423
Western Asia	2,655	11,236	19,700	23,806	27,850	26,756	27,778
Central Asia	1,539	1,814	2,085	2,240	2,392	2,482	2,528
Eastern Asia	2,023,030	2,255,811	2,534,503	3,219,530	3,733,471	3,949,216	4,028,071
South-Eastern Asia	634,278	565,617	526,422	552,553	595,897	696,732	717,211
EUROPE	259,106	371,607	486,073	719,510	957,429	1,045,782	1,093,238
Northern Europe	34,757	101,283	169,854	190,719	224,942	274,613	288,557
Southern Europe	42,031	61,441	82,148	229,878	371,501	373,487	378,654
Western Europe	103,807	128,670	154,379	217,295	278,008	307,888	331,078
Eastern Europe	78,511	80,213	79,692	81,618	82,978	89,794	94,949

Table 2. Population Born in China by Current Region of Residence: 1990-2017

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
NORTHERN AMERICA	942,103	1,345,328	1,760,799	2,116,912	2,535,294	3,029,970	3,134,910
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	50,447	57,549	66,830	82,072	99,448	118,956	122,327
South America	31,229	36,169	42,325	54,071	66,161	79,639	81,867
Central America	13,294	14,411	16,407	20,766	26,486	32,482	33,571
Caribbean	5,924	6,969	8,098	7,235	6,801	6,835	6,889
OCEANIA	113,897	140,781	202,941	318,115	464,907	552,397	576,811
Australia/New Zealand	106,585	127,337	182,610	302,315	455,919	543,686	567,998
Polynesia	830	986	1,130	1,325	1,452	1,422	1,436
Melanesia	1,301	1,301	1,265	1,259	1,310	1,329	1,341
Micronesia	5,181	11,157	17,936	13,216	6,226	5,960	6,036

Note: Definitions vary by country. For most countries estimates are of those born in China (regardless of current citizenship). For other countries the estimates refer to citizens of China residing in their country.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, 2017.

Table 3. Overseas Chinese Population Estimated by Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan): 2014

	Estimate
Total	42,500,000
Asia	31,010,000
Indonesia	8,360,000
Thailand	7,000,000
Malaysia	6,580,000
Singapore	2,870,000
Philippines	1,500,000
Burma	1,220,000
Vietnam	1,030,000
Others	2,440,000
Americas	8,110,000
United States	4,550,000
Canada	1,580,000
Peru	990,000
Others	980,000
Europe	1,760,000
France	500,000
United Kingdom	460,000
Others	800,000
Oceania	1,170,000
Australia	950,000
New Zealand	170,000
Others	50,000
Africa	470,000
South Africa	250,000
Others	220,000

Note: Estimates were reported in the source rounded to the ten thousands.

Source: Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC), Republic of China (Taiwan), 2015.

Table 4. Overseas Chinese Population Estimated by Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan): 1948-2016
(in thousands)

	World	Asia	Americas	Europe	Oceania	Africa
1948	8,721	8,379	209	54	64	15
1952	12,536	12,228	204	12	61	31
1953	13,330	12,988	236	12	63	31
1954	13,472	13,125	238	12	66	31
1955	14,127	13,745	266	14	69	33
1956	14,208	13,841	252	14	68	33
1957	14,358
1958	14,405	14,013	278	11	70	33
1959	14,472	14,074	278	12	70	38
1960	14,581	14,152	301	14	74	40
1961	15,385	14,880	406	16	42	41
1962	16,359	15,804	444	20	48	43
1963	16,897	16,316	450	34	49	48
1964	17,429	16,850	446	34	51	48
1965	17,563	16,981	450	34	51	47
1966	17,736	17,098	488	54	49	47
1967	18,118	17,422	539	62	45	50
1968	18,298	17,573	552	62	61	50
1969	18,800	18,008	603	68	64	57
1970	19,294	18,343	711	112	69	59
1971	19,834	18,880	711	112	69	62
1972	20,235	19,238	749	117	69	62
1973	21,063	19,999	790	141	69	64
1974	21,467	20,385	795	152	69	66
1975	22,025	20,759	926	197	75	68
1976	22,588	21,139	1,075	233	75	66
1977	23,203	21,558	1,221	279	77	68
1978	24,037	22,067	1,497	322	77	74
1979	24,473	22,250	1,517	524	108	74
1980	24,654	22,391	1,558	525	105	75
1981	25,584	23,202	1,613	544	148	77
1982	26,092	23,631	1,663	551	168	79
1983	26,196	23,665	1,705	567	179	80
1984	27,783	25,023	1,903	581	202	74
1985	28,124	25,300	1,955	583	214	72
1986	28,715	25,799	2,044	585	214	73
1987	29,325	26,226	2,167	532	326	74
1988	30,316	27,161	2,182	552	331	90
1989	31,134	27,894	2,241	567	340	92
1990	31,371	27,664	2,663	589	356	99
1991	33,875	29,484	3,356	559	392	84
1992	35,510	30,635	3,731	646	404	94

Table 4. Overseas Chinese Population Estimated by Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan): 1948-2016 (continued)
(in thousands)

	World	Asia	Americas	Europe	Oceania	Africa
1993	36,128	31,054	3,802	757	407	108
1994	37,144	31,752	3,976	869	432	115
1995	38,664	32,911	4,261	886	487	119
1996	39,042	32,984	4,542	899	498	119
1997	33,238	26,912	4,730	938	535	123
1998	33,726	27,071	5,020	945	564	126
1999	34,506	26,788	6,013	968	605	132
2000	35,045	27,363	5,959	955	631	137
2001	35,800	27,821	6,124	973	745	137
2002	36,722	28,352	6,501	983	742	144
2003	37,505	28,985	6,615	987	764	154
2004	38,083	29,344	6,807	1,003	775	154
2005	38,342	29,437	6,931	1,022	797	155
2006	38,698	29,803	6,835	1,039	866	155
2007	38,629	29,561	6,838	1,144	868	219
2008	38,688	29,589	6,781	1,189	910	217
2009	39,082	29,747	6,906	1,259	932	238
2010	39,568	29,815	7,255	1,317	945	236
2011	40,307	30,041	7,498	1,565	955	249
2012	41,357	30,723	7,690	1,608	1,066	270
2013	41,784	30,656	7,903	1,696	1,129	401
2014	42,504	31,008	8,105	1,756	1,169	466
2015	43,296	31,282	8,336	1,963	1,185	529
2016	44,623	32,028	8,669	2,153	1,206	566

Source: Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC), Republic of China (Taiwan), 2013; 2017.

Table 5. Stock of China-Born Population by Country: 2000-2016

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Australia	141,350	148,020	157,000	170,020	187,450	205,200	227,600	251,960	278,320	313,030	344,980	371,550	387,420	401,560	422,600	451,820	487,070
Austria	..	7,636	7,636	9,486	11,099	12,218	12,895	13,101	13,361	13,468	13,495	13,411	13,595	14,100	14,508	15,143	15,986
Belgium	5,569	5,569	7,125	8,986	10,138	10,959	11,535	12,373	14,537	15,010	15,600	17,072	17,372	18,421	18,969	19,048	19,452
Canada	..	332,825	466,940	545,535
Chile	1,653	1,653	4,589	4,589	5,208	5,873	6,569
Czechia	4,910	4,910
Denmark	7,493	7,493	8,221	8,506	8,642	8,561	8,824	9,399	9,953	10,611
Estonia	224	224	231	264	287	312
Finland	2,035	2,094	2,464	2,706	3,096	3,530	4,123	4,590	5,269	5,982	6,591	7,034	7,708	8,272	8,894	9,433	9,956
France	31,000	75,350	75,350	80,326	85,268	90,227	95,352	98,459	102,239	105,258	106,884
Germany	66,000	66,000	71,000	80,000	75,000	78,000	72,000	70,000	75,000	88,000	108,000	107,000
Greece	..	616	616	3,640	3,640	1,174	1,582	1,012	1,012	..
Hungary	2,638	3,527	3,600	3,770	3,874	4,200	4,476	4,738	5,040	5,372	5,632	10,933	8,987	9,890	11,104	14,829	18,193
Iceland	158	189	201	229	272	352	763	941	606	469	483	523	512	548	550	582	609
Ireland	5,599	5,599	11,022	11,022	11,458	11,276	11,262
Israel	1,040	1,040	1,030	1,050	1,090	1,110	1,130
Italy	195,742	195,742	194,677	193,549	191,967	191,272	197,090	200,372	212,173
Japan
Korea, South
Latvia
Luxembourg	..	1,013	1,013	1,869	1,869
Mexico	1,754	1,754	6,655	6,655	8,860	8,860
Netherlands	20,629	22,706	25,786	28,686	31,455	33,459	34,788	35,476	37,056	39,987	42,525	44,711	47,498	49,705	51,294	52,545	54,413
New Zealand	..	38,949	38,949	78,114	78,114	89,121	89,121
Norway	3,617	3,816	4,160	4,800	5,504	5,995	6,612	7,092	7,646	8,240	8,852	9,424	9,948	10,436	10,821	11,203	11,520
Poland	736	736
Portugal	..	2,287	2,287	10,887	10,887
Slovakia	1,643	1,643	611	611	1,026	1,074	1,135
Slovenia	912	912	905	963	1,033	1,038
Spain	19,000	27,589	37,522	51,091	62,257	86,964	104,789	108,258	127,802	146,353	154,917	160,987	163,727	160,457	155,677	155,713	158,717
Sweden	7,568	8,150	8,959	9,776	10,852	11,923	13,277	14,453	16,013	18,256	21,202	23,998	25,657	26,824	27,923	28,699	28,410
Switzerland	7,524	7,524	14,019	14,019	15,392	17,087	19,259	20,817	22,286

Table 5. Stock of China-Born Population by Country: 2000-2016 (continued)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Turkey
United Kingdom	80,000	104,000	120,000	86,000	118,000	148,000	98,956	116,000	118,000	114,000	114,000
United States	890,645	932,092	1,063,424	1,081,244	1,127,711	1,218,362	1,202,923	1,357,482	1,367,772	1,339,131	1,425,814	1,604,373	1,651,511	1,719,819	1,786,116	1,929,535	2,065,431

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2018.

Table 6. Chinese Population by Sex and Sex Ratio for Select Countries

	Total	Male	Female	Sex Ratio	UN Estimate of Sex Ratio	
					2010	2017
Australia: 2016 Census	509,557	224,148	285,409	0.79	0.83	0.81
United States: 2016 American Community Survey	2,716,548	1,203,431	1,513,117	0.80	0.96	0.94
United Kingdom: 2017 Annual Population Survey	216,000	96,000	120,000	0.80	0.94	0.91
New Zealand: 2013 Census	163,104	76,755	86,349	0.89	0.94	0.94
Singapore: 2010 Census	2,794,000	1,237,742	1,556,258	0.96	0.70	0.69
Indonesia: 2010 Census (ethnicity)	2,832,510	1,425,236	1,407,274	1.01	1.28	1.33
Malaysia: 2010 Census	6,392,636	3,289,411	3,103,225	1.06	1.05	1.11
Burma: 2014 Vital Registration	24,065	12,476	11,589	1.08	1.12	1.14
Chile: 2012 Census	3,491	2,002	1,489	1.34	1.23	0.73
China: 2015 population U.S. Census Bureau	1,367,485,388	703,439,493	664,045,895	1.06		

Note: Countries ranked by sex ratio.

Sources: Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2018; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a; United Kingdom Office of National Statistics, 2018. Statistics New Zealand, 2018; Singapore Department of Statistics, 2011; Arifin, Hasbullah, and Pramono, 2017; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b; Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2015; Myanmar (Burma) Statistical Information Service, 2015; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Chile, 2013; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, 2017.

Table 7. Age Structure of Chinese Population in Select Countries

	Population	Type	Percent Distribution by Age:			
			Under 15	15 to 64	65+	All Ages
Indonesia 2010 2010 Census, ethnicity	2,832,510	Self identified	23%	70%	7%	100%
Singapore 2010 Census	2,794,000	Self identified	16%	74%	10%	100%
United States 2016 2016 American Community Survey	2,716,548	Foreign born	6%	77%	17%	100%
Canada 2006 Census	466,940	Foreign born	8%	72%	19%	100%
New Zealand 2013 Census	163,104	Foreign born	19%	73%	9%	100%
Sweden 2017 administrative records	31,333	Foreign born	14%	83%	4%	100%
Sum for 6 countries Average for 6 countries	9,004,435		14%	75%	11%	100%
China 2015 U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base	1,367,485,388		17%	73%	10%	100%

Sources:

U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a.

Statistics Canada, 2008.

Singapore Department of Statistics, 2011.

Statistics Sweden, 2018.

Statistics New Zealand, 2018.

Arifin, Hasbullah, and Pramono, 2017.

U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b.

Table 8. Distribution of Chinese Population by Religion in Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia

	Chinese population:		
	Singapore 2010	Malaysia 2010	Australia 2016
Christianity	20.1%	11.1%	6.2%
Buddhism/Taoism	57.4%	83.6%	10.9%
Buddhism	43.0%		
Taoism	14.4%		
Islam	0.4%	0.7%	
Hinduism	-	0.2%	
Other Religions*	0.3%	3.7%	9.5%
No Religion	21.8%	0.8%	73.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Number	2,794,000	6,393,000	510,000

Note: *Includes Confucianism, a published category in Malaysia, but which may be considered "no religion" in Singapore and Australia.

Sources:

Singapore Department of Statistics, 2011.

Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2015.

Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2017.

Table 9. Top Destinations Sending Remittances to China, and Corresponding Remittances from China: 2017

	Remittance to China (US\$ millions)	Cumulative share of all remittances (percent)	Remittances from China (US\$ millions)
WORLD	63,860		2,828
United States	16,141	25	149
Hong Kong	15,548	50	4
Japan	4,238	56	295
Canada	4,144	63	20
South Korea	4,144	69	523
Australia	2,922	74	53
Singapore	2,763	78	0
Macau	2,141	81	5
Italy	1,177	83	18
Spain	1,075	85	29
Bangladesh	992	87	9
United Kingdom	977	88	11
Thailand	855	89	137
Germany	646	90	58
New Zealand	624	91	1
France	586	92	193
Netherlands	415	93	5
Indonesia	359	94	109
Malaysia	335	94	10
Russia	325	95	7
Burma	271	95	8
Philippines	206	95	536
Sweden	185	96	20
North Korea	157	96	0
Nepal	139	96	5
All Other	2,499	100	620

Notes:

These estimates are based on the methodology developed by Ratha and Shaw, 2007, "South-South Migration and Remittances," World Bank (www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances). The remittance data is for 2016, disaggregated using host country and origin country incomes, and estimated migrant stocks from 2013.

These are analytical estimates based on logical assumptions and derived from a global estimation of bilateral remittance flows worldwide. They are not actual officially reported data. The caveats attached to these estimates are: (a) the data on migrants in various destination countries are incomplete; (b) the incomes of migrants abroad and the costs of living are both proxied by per capita incomes in purchasing power parity terms, which is only a rough proxy; and (c) there is no way to capture remittances flowing through informal, unrecorded channels.

These estimates are based on the Bilateral Migration Matrix 2017.

Source: World Bank, 2018.


Table 10. Top 20 Countries of Origin of International Students in the United States: 2015/16 and 2016/17

Place of Origin	2015/16	2016/17	Percent of the total	Percent change
TOTAL	1,043,839	1,078,822	100.0	3.4
China	328,547	350,755	32.5	6.8
India	165,918	186,267	17.3	12.3
South Korea	61,007	58,663	5.4	-3.8
Saudi Arabia	61,287	52,611	4.9	-14.2
Canada	26,973	27,065	2.5	0.3
Vietnam	21,403	22,438	2.1	4.8
Taiwan	21,127	21,516	2.0	1.8
Japan	19,060	18,780	1.7	-1.5
Mexico	16,733	16,835	1.6	0.6
Brazil	19,370	13,089	1.2	-32.4
Iran	12,269	12,643	1.2	3.0
Nigeria	10,674	11,710	1.1	9.7
Nepal	9,662	11,607	1.1	20.1
United Kingdom	11,599	11,489	1.1	-0.9
Turkey	10,691	10,586	1.0	-1.0
Germany	10,145	10,169	0.9	0.2
Kuwait	9,772	9,825	0.9	0.5
France	8,764	8,814	0.8	0.6
Indonesia	8,727	8,776	0.8	0.6
Venezuela	8,267	8,540	0.8	3.3

Note: Countries ranked by 2016/17 totals.


Source: Institute of International Education, Inc. (IIE), 2017.

Figure 1. Estimated Size of the Chinese Diaspora (first and later generations) by Region:
1948 to 2016



Source: Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC), Republic of China (Taiwan), 2013; 2017.


Figure 2. Annual Proportional Increase in Size of Overseas Chinese Population by Region: 1960-2016



Note: To smooth out some annual fluctuations, we compare ratios of rolling three-year averages.

Source: Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC), Republic of China (Taiwan), 2013; 2017.


Figure 3. Net Migration from China to Australia, the United States, and Other OECD Countries: 2001-2016



Notes: Other OECD countries include only those for which annual data are available for the entire time period (Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden). Net migration is calculated as the difference between annual stocks of foreign born as reported by each member country.


Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2018.

Figure 4. Asylum Applications from Chinese Citizens to France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, and All Other OECD Countries: 2000-2016




Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2018.

Figure 5. Sex Ratio of China-born Residing Outside China by World Region: 1990 to 2017




Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, 2017.

Figure 6. Stock of Chinese Laborers Working Overseas on Contracted Projects and Labor Services: 1984 to 2016 (in thousands)



Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017.


Figure 7. Formal Remittances to China (1982-2017) and from China (1982-2014)



Note: 2017 data preliminary.


Source: World Bank, 2018.

Figure 8. Student Migrants from China
Annual Outflows and Return Flows: 2010-2016




Source: China Daily, 2017; Huang, 2016; and Kennedy, 2018a.

Figure 9. Stock of Students from China Studying Overseas vs. Stock of Overseas Students Studying in China: 2001-2015



Sources: Center for China and Globalization (CCG), 2012; China Power Team, 2017; United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2018.

Figure 10. Stock of Students from China Studying Overseas -
Top 20 Destinations: 2015



Source: United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2018.