Congressional on the sole source contract scandal

An another note, I retired from NASA in Feb 2006. At the time I was the Crew Survival Engineer for the Constellation Program. I didn't object to man-rating a solid, but I thought a liquid was also OK. I saw the trend to a very highly biased process to pick a solid. At the time I didn't understand it. I counseled Scott Horowitz and Marsha Ivins almost daily that they must at least have a fair bid on all possible designs, and if they picked a solid I would back them on the decision. I just found out that in April 2006 a sole source contract was let to ATK and about a year later another -- total value in the billions!!! Keep in mind Scott went to be a VP at ATK, came back to NASA to lead exploration, then back to ATK as a VP. Charlie Precourt was very high level at NASA (I think the initial Constellation Program Manager), then went to be a VP at ATK about the time the sole source contract was released. Possibly you could justify a sole source to ATK for the solid motor, but the contract was for design and development of the integrated first stage. This is design work ATK had never done before. The motor is only a part of the first stage. Designing a complete first stage is very, very different. If NASA wanted to sole source the motor to ATK, they should have bought it and made it Government Furnished Equipement (GFE) to a design shop -- and put out a Request For Proposal for the design and development of a complete first stage. DOD does this all the time. Lockheed, Boeing, Orbital, and ULA would have all been very capable of doing the first stage design -- certainly better than ATK that had only done motors up that point.

Even then, Areojet is an excellent company and they make very large solids. I am sure NASA owns the design of the solid motor and I don't understand why a proposal for Aerojet to make the motor first stage wasn't let. Even if the design is owned by ATK, Aerojet is very capable of developing an equivalent solid motor.

Taking a step back, I don't see how the decision for solids was so overwhelming, Lockheed and Boeing were not allowed to bit on the Ares first stage design and development. Both have flying hardware and Lockheed had the 3 core Atlas design fully complete based on a previous Air Force contract and all they had to do was turn the complete design over to their plant for construction. Boeing had the 3 core Delta flying and a firm contract in hand for a higher performance engine that would have made it capable of lifting Orion -- and this engine was going to appear, at no cost to NASA, before we needed it to lift Orion. Both the Atlas and Delta are fully capable of meeting all Constellation requirements, with the simple addition of an Emergency Detection System. Keep in mind, man-rating rockets was my primary job at the time. I literally wrote a great deal of the NASA requirement on man-rating a rocket and am very familiar with the two designs -- I was the Crew Survival Engineer for Orbital Space Plane, where we select them as the launch vehicle for the program. In Feb '04, O'Keefe announced the vision to the agency and said "no new rockets" -- except heavy lift.

Now I think I understand why the Exploration Program fabricated analysis that killed the already flying liquid rockets. An example is the complete myth of the Delta having blackzones. I was the analyst that generated this data. I showed a wing design had problems getting off the original high trajectories, a capsule never had a problem. Even then, it was a very simple matter for Boeing the lower the trajectory to something even a winged vehicle could handle -- it took them less than a day. Yet the myth of blackzones is still being use to not use the Delta. NASA used this myth at the Orion Preliminary Design Review press conference to once again say the Delta is not a viable choice.

There must have been some deal to turn ATK from a motor company into an integrated rocket company -- this is a very big step for a company like ATK. And I know from first hand knowledge the problems of SRB debris field was known the instant a solid design was present to the program. Ascent abort was my system in the program and I alerted all that this problem needed to be considered before the design was selected. Now Ares I is no-go because the 45th Space Wing will not let Ares I on their range because of the very large SRB debris field generated by their range termination system. And very high vibration is very well understood in any design of that uses a solid motor -- shuttle has many ways to handle this problem that are impossible for an inline configuration to implement. ATK and Marshal both knew this well. Now, several billion dollars later, these two very well understood problems are finally unmasked and we have a broken design with little hope of recovery. And all engineers are very familiar with the certainty of resonant modes in the upper stage interacting with the motor forcing function. Don't accept the current excuse this resonance problem wasn't known very early -- certainly before the sole source contract was let.

The problem with acoustics is caused by the very high maximum dynamic pressure profile Ares is flying. This is not inherent to a design that incorporates a solid motor. It is a product of the Ares I design being under-performing from the start. A very common way to increase performance is to lower the profile to be closer to optimum for performance. The problem is an increase in dynamic pressure. We had a limit of 800 psf in the program in early 2005. One of the reasons was acoustics and more so: safety. High dynamic pressure is very dangerous. The Ares high dynamic pressure was approved with out analysis at 1200 psf in the summer of 2005. By far and away a new worlds record for a launch vehicle. Now Ares I is broken due to acoustics and Orion is broken due to lack of rolling moments to fight the high dynamic pressure from its jets during an abort.

One last thing, Marshal Space Flight Center was very much opposed to man-rating a solid until Steve Cook entered the picture in the summer of 2005. He is the man that gave use the failed X-33 and the failed X-34. How many billions of dollars have been spent on funding his failed design efforts. He has a history of fabricating data to sell his large programs to congress. I have my emails and documents to confirm this.

If I was congress, I would be asking how a sole source contract on a design with very well known, huge problems was let -- and to a company that had no experience in doing the work. I would ask the HSF committee why, once again, the very viable option of man-rating either Delta or Atals is not being presented to congress for consideration. An example is the Aerospace report to the committee that punished the Delta design in cost, schedule and performance by, without analysis, assuming a new upperstage is needed -- once again a NASA generated myth. Even with all this stacked against it, the Delta matched Ares I in cost, schedule and performance. Why is this fact not presented to congress for your consideration? When the myth of a new upper stage being needed is removed, the Delta is the clear winner. Then the Atlas was not analyzed because it is an "immature design". But the single core Atlas if flying today and the 3 core detailed design is complete and ready to be built and tested -- today. Go ask ULA to sign a firm fixed price contact with cost, schedule, and performance clearly spelled out. Stop asking NASA what they think it would cost, how long they think it will take and what they the performance will be. Keep in mind the Aerospace Corp study was done under NASA contract under the direction of Mike Griffin, not under the direction of the HSF panel.

It troubles me that Mike Griffin refers to Norm Augustine as "a dear old friend". It was Dr. Griffin himself that approved an inappropriate sole source contract on a design that is now broken and was known to be broken at the time the contract was let.

More on vibration: In the summer of 2005 the ESAS report was released. It says very clearly vibration is a known problem with all designs that use a solid motor, but without any analysis the design was approved because ATK promised they could change the design later to reduce vibration. This is an impossible task, and I am certain they knew it. They have been selling large solids for decades.

If you wish, I can provide you with many pages of data NASA generated to make solids look better than they are and liquids worse than they are so the sole source contract could be "justified". I happened to keep a copy of my email for an unrelated mater. I also have an excellent memory and an unusual talent for explaining highly technical material to people. I also know the ends and outs of government procurement very well. I would be glad to speak to anyone on the committee informally or officially testify, under oath, if this would help.

The good news is, NASA is in great hands. I even think the team that is currently designing Ares I should be allowed to do the design of the needed heavy lift. General Bolden has already made 3 key personnel changes and the team is already functioning much better.

Danny Deger
Dedicated Civil Servant, Retired