OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1700 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1700

AUG 0 9 2016

OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: Achieving Full Combat Capability with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is at
Substantial Risk
While the Air Force recently declared Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with "basic"
Block 3i capabilities, most of the limitations and deficiencies for the F-35A with Block 3i
discussed in my FY15 Annual Report and Congressional testimonies remain and will adversely
affect mission effectiveness and suitability. In fact, the program is actually not on a path toward
success, but instead on a path toward failing to deliver the full Block 3F capabilities for which
the Department is paying almost $400 billion by the scheduled end of System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) in 2018. If Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) were
conducted today on the aircraft in the Block 3i configuration - with which the Air Force recently
declared IOC -the system would likely be evaluated as not effective and not suitable across the
required mission areas and against currently fielded threats. If used in combat, the F-35 in the
Block 3i configuration, which is equivalent in capabilities to Block 2B, will need support to
locate and avoid modem threats, acquire targets, and engage formations of enemy fighter aircraft
due to outstanding performance deficiencies and limited weapons carriage available (i.e., two
bombs and two air-to-air missiles). Unresolved Block 3i deficiencies in fusion, electronic
warfare, and weapons employment continue to result in ambiguous threat displays, limited
ability to effectively respond to threats, and, in some cases, a requirement for off-board sources
to provide accurate coordinates for precision attack. Although the program recently addressed
some of the Block 3i deficiencies, many significant deficiencies remain and more are being
identified by operational test and fielded units, many of which must be corrected if the program
is going to provide the expected "full warfighting capability" described in the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD).
Although the F-35 program reached an interim milestone with the Air Force IOC
declaration, it is not on track to deliver the full Block 3F capabilities by the planned end of SDD
in 2018. In fact, it is running out of time and money to complete the planned flight testing and
implement the required fixes and modifications. Flight test is making progress, but has fallen far
behind the planned rate to complete SDD within the remaining time and funding. The final,
most complex, required Block 3F capabilities are just now being added to the mission systems
software builds and new problems requiring fixes and regression testing continue to be
discovered at a substantial rate. Also, despite needing to continue developmental testing at full
capacity for at least another year to complete the planned testing of the new capabilities and
attempted fixes for the hundreds of remaining deficiencies, the program is already beginning to
reduce the number oftest personnel and defer required fixes to beyond SDD due to funding

0

 constraints. Also, progress toward meeting several key requirements to start IOT&E has
stagnated because the required modifications for the operational test aircraft and essential
upgrades to the U.S. Reprogramming Laboratory (USRL) for mission data are still not on
contract, some of which will take at least two years to complete after the contracts are signed.
Whether the F-35 will achieve operational effectiveness and suitability relative to its full set of
approved requirements will not be known until the IOT&E of the F-35 system, including
properly modified test aircraft equipped with Block 3F software, the full complement of
weapons, and the Autonomic Logistics Information System, is conducted, beginning sometime in
2018, at the earliest.
This assessment of the capability of the F-35A in the Block 3i configuration, and
challenges the program faces to complete SDD, is based on observations and data from
developmental testing, limited operational test activities and fielded operations. The assessment
of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) is based on observations and data from
deployment demonstrations with ALIS hardware in the Standard Operating Unit (SOU), Version
2 (V2) configuration supporting Block 2B and Block 3i aircraft, cybersecurity testing and
program office projections for completing development of the remaining required capabilities for
ALIS. Additionally, this assessment is fully consistent with the findings contained in the Air
Force’s own IOC Readiness Assessment (IRA) report.
System Overview
Block 3i is an interim set of capabilities, designed to run on newer “TR-2” processors in
production F-35 aircraft beginning in Lots 6 and later, which is equivalent to the Block 2B set of
capabilities fielded on earlier production lot aircraft. Block 3i also includes the newer
Generation III (Gen III) Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS), which began deliveries with
Lot 7 aircraft. The Gen III HMDS was designed to address significant deficiencies in the Gen II
HMDS fielded with earlier lot aircraft. F-35 aircraft in the Block 3i configuration can carry a
combination of two AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and either two GBU-12 laser guided bombs or
two GBU-31 (on the F-35A/C) or GBU-32 (on the F-35B) Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM).
ALIS version 2.0.1 software supports both Block 2B and Block 3i aircraft. The next
iteration of capability, ALIS version 2.0.2, was planned for release prior to Air Force IOC, but is
continuing to fall behind schedule due to problems integrating the propulsion system and data.
As a result, ALIS 2.0.2 was divided into incremental releases to provide an update without
integration of propulsion data, now expected in October 2016 at the earliest, followed by another
release that integrates propulsion data in late 2016. Although the Air Force had previously stated
ALIS version 2.0.2 should be fielded prior to the IOC declaration, the delays in development and
testing of that version of ALIS prevented that from occurring. As a result, the Air Force, along
with all other F-35 operators, must continue to use time-consuming work-arounds to mitigate the
limitations and deficiencies in ALIS 2.0.1. The delays in developing and testing ALIS 2.0.2 are
also adding more schedule risk to completing ALIS 3.0, the currently planned version of ALIS
meant to provide full capability, by the end of SDD.
Full F-35 combat capability, compliant with the ORD, is planned to be delivered in Block
3F, which is still in development as it undergoes flight testing, and ALIS version 3.0, which is
incomplete and has not yet begun testing due to the delays with ALIS 2.0.2. Despite the
2 

 continued delays with F-35 development and testing, the production rate of the F-35 continues to
ramp up, requiring the Services to accept and field production aircraft in the Block 3i
configuration at a steadily increasing rate, most of which will require significant and costly
modifications. As of the end of July, the Air Force had accepted 48 aircraft in the Block 3i
configuration, which are in addition to the 44 aircraft delivered in the earlier Block 2B
configuration. The Air Force will accept another 35 aircraft in the Block 3i configuration before
the program plans to start delivering aircraft in the Block 3F configuration in Lot 10, starting in
January 2018.
Assessment of Block 3i Capabilities
Because Block 3i is an interim capability based on Block 2B, it has numerous inherent
limitations that will reduce operational effectiveness and require workarounds if the F-35A in the
Block 3i configuration is used in combat. These limitations, which were also a factor during the
Air Force IRA, affect the following mission areas discussed below.
Close Air Support (CAS). The F-35A in the Block 3i configuration has numerous
limitations which make it less effective overall at CAS than most currently-fielded fighter
aircraft like the F-15E, F-16, F-18 and A-10 in a permissive or low-threat environment, which is
where CAS is normally conducted. The following observations are consistent with the Air Force
IRA report:


The limited weapons load of two bombs (along with two missiles for self-defense)
constrains the effectiveness of the Block 3i F-35A for many CAS missions. Compared to
a legacy fighter with multiple weapons on racks, and multiple weapons types per aircraft,
the limited Block 3i load means that only a limited number and type of targets can be
effectively attacked.



No gun capability. An aircraft-mounted gun is a key weapon for some CAS scenarios
when a bomb cannot be used due to collateral damage concerns or when the enemy is
“danger close” to friendly troops. The gun can also be an effective weapon for attacking
moving targets. However, even though an internal gun is installed in the Block 3i F-35A,
it cannot be used until significant modifications to both the gun system and aircraft are
completed, along with a version of Block 3F software that supports weapons delivery
accuracy (WDA) testing with the gun. For these reasons, gun WDA testing, with the
required modifications and software, has slipped to the fall of 2016, at the soonest.



Limited capability to engage moving targets. Even though the Block 3i F-35A does not
have a functioning gun, it can carry the GBU-12 laser guided bomb which can be used
against moving targets. However, Block 3i does not have an automated targeting
function with lead-laser guidance (i.e., automatically computing and positioning the laser
spot proportionately in front of the moving target to increase the likelihood of hitting the
target) to engage moving targets with the GBU-12, like most legacy aircraft that currently
fly CAS missions. Lead-laser guidance is currently not planned for Block 3F. Instead, F35 pilots can only use basic rules-of-thumb when attempting to engage moving targets
with the GBU-12, resulting in very limited effectiveness. Also, limitations with cockpit
controls and displays have caused the pilots to primarily use two-ship “buddy lasing” for

3 

 GBU-12 employment, which isn’t always possible during extended CAS engagements
when one of the aircraft has to leave to refuel on a tanker.


Voice communications are sometimes required to validate digital communications.
Problems with Variable Message Format (VMF) and Link-16 data link messaging –
including dropped/hidden information or incorrect formats – sometimes require pilots to
use work-arounds by validating or “reading back” information over the radio that prevent
them from conducting digital (only) CAS, a capability that is common in most legacy
CAS aircraft.



Limited night vision capability. Although Lot 7 and later aircraft are fielded with the
Gen III HMDS, which has shown improvement to the deficiencies with the earlier Gen II
HMDS, limitations with night vision capability remain. Pilots using the Gen III helmet
for night operations report that visual acuity is still less than that of the night vision
goggles used in legacy aircraft, which makes identification of targets and detecting
markers more difficult, if not impossible. Also, “green glow” – a condition where light
leakage around the edge of the display during low-light conditions makes reading the
projected information difficult – is improved over the Gen II HMDS, but is still a concern
during low ambient illumination conditions. Finally, accuracy testing of the gun with the
HMDS has not yet been completed, although the testing is planned for late CY16.
Hence, the aiming accuracy of the combined HMDS and windscreen are still unproven
for both air-to-air and air-to-ground gun employment.



Lack of marking capability – a key capability for both Forward Air Controller-Airborne
(FAC-A) and CAS missions. Legacy CAS platforms can mark targets with rockets,
flares, and/or infrared (IR) pointers, none of which are currently available on the F-35.
The F-35 has a laser designator as part of its Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS),
but the laser is used for targeting from ownship when using the GBU-12 laser guided
bomb or to “buddy-guide” a weapon from another aircraft. This limitation is not planned
to be fixed during SDD.



Reduced on-station time and greater reliance on tanker aircraft. Although this limitation
is not unique to the Block 3i configuration, the F-35has high fuel burn rates and slow air
refueling rates that extend air refueling times and decrease overall on-station time which
may impact mission effectiveness.



The Air Force IRA had similar observations on CAS limitations and concluded that the
Block 3i F-35A does not yet demonstrate equivalent CAS capabilities to those of 4th
generation aircraft.

Other mission areas. In addition to the Block 3i limitations listed above that affect the
CAS mission area, the following inherent Block 3i limitations will also affect the capability of
the F-35A in other mission areas:


Poor geolocation capability against certain types of emitters and threat laydowns.

4 

 

No standoff weapon. With only direct attack bombs, the F-35 in the Block 3i
configuration will be forced to fly much closer to engage ground targets and, depending
on the threat level of enemy air defenses and acceptable mission risk, it may be limited to
engaging ground targets that are defended by short-range air defenses or none at all.



The limited weapons loadout of the Block 3i F-35 makes effective prosecution of many
expected types of targets in a typical theater a challenge.



Pilots report that inadequacies in Pilot Vehicle Interfaces (PVI) and deficiencies in the
Tactical Situation Display (TSD) continue to degrade battlespace awareness and increase
pilot workload. Workarounds to these deficiencies are time-consuming and detract from
the efficiency and effectiveness of mission execution.

Block 3i has significant deficiencies that must still be addressed. In addition to the
limitations listed above, Block 3i also has hundreds of other deficiencies, the most significant of
which must be fixed in Block 3F to realize the full warfighting capability required of the F-35.
These deficiencies include, but are not limited to the following:






Avionics sensor fusion performance is still unacceptable.
-

Air tracks often split or multiple tracks are created when all sensors contribute to
the fusion solution. The workaround during early developmental testing was to
turn off some of the sensors to ensure multiple tracks did not form, which is
unacceptable for combat and violates the basic principle of fusing contributions
from multiple sensors into an accurate track and clear display to gain situational
awareness and to identify and engage enemy tracks.

-

Similarly, multiple ground tracks often are displayed when only one emitter threat
is operating. In addition, tracks that “time out” and drop from the display cannot
be recalled, causing pilots to lose tactical battlefield awareness.

-

Sharing tracks over the Multi-Aircraft Data Link (MADL) between aircraft in the
F-35 formation multiplies the problems described above.

-

The Air Force IRA report also identified deficiencies with fusion in Block 3i.

Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities, including electronic attack (EA), are inconsistent
and, in some cases, not effective against required threats.
-

Although the details of the deficiencies are classified, effective EW capabilities
are vital to enable the F-35 to conduct Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air
Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) and other missions against fielded threats.

-

The Air Force IRA report also identified significant EW deficiencies in Block 3i.

Datalinks do not work properly. Messages sent across the MADL are often dropped or
pass inaccurate off-board inter-flight fusion tracks based on false or split air tracks and
inaccurate ground target identification and positions.
5 

 



Mission data development, optimization, and operationally-representative testing are
inadequate.
-

As DOT&E has highlighted on numerous occasions, the F-35 relies on mission
data loads in order to be effective in detecting, identifying, geo-locating, and – if
necessary – responding to threats. These data loads are a compilation of mission
data files that drive sensor search parameters and provide the data required to
identify and correlate sensor detections of threat emissions, as well as files that
drive automatic or pilot-directed responses to threat engagements. The mission
data files (MDF) are developed by the USRL, which is tasked to provide them to
the Services, tailored for various geographic regions and multiple aircraft
configurations (i.e., Block 2B, Block 3i, and Block 3F).

-

Significant deficiencies in the USRL preclude efficient development and testing
of the mission data files, but the program has yet to take adequate action to
address many of these deficiencies. Key hardware upgrades needed to develop
and verify Block 3F mission data files for detecting and identifying emissions
from current threat systems are still not on contract, despite the requirement being
identified and funding provided in 2012. It will take at least two years after
ordering the equipment, so the required equipment will not be in the lab in time to
support MDF development for IOT&E. Also, the software tools used for
developing, modifying and testing the files continue to be plagued by significant
usability shortfalls and a lack of adequate technical data.

-

Consistent with these observations, the Air Force IRA report emphasized the need
for adequate resourcing for upgrades and sustainment of the USRL and
operationally-representative testing of mission data files.

Block 3F mission systems software required multiple corrections to deficiencies before
weapons delivery accuracy testing could begin. However, despite DOT&E asking the
program office for information on the extent to which these deficiencies exist in Block 3i,
this information is apparently still unknown.

The Air Force identified seven “Must Fix” deficiencies from Block 2B for the program to
fix in Block 3i to meet their IOC requirements. The program was able to adequately address four
of these seven deficiencies. Two of the remaining three showed improvement, but were not fully
resolved, and one remains unresolved. The status of these seven deficiencies is summarized in
the table below.

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 Deficiency

Status

Inability to Positively Confirm the
Next-to-Shoot Designated Coordinates
and Elevation
Radar Azimuth Field of Regard Not
Properly Displayed to Pilot
No Pilot Indication of Fusion Tactical
Situation Model (TSM) Failure

No Pilot Indication of Integrated Core
Processor (ICP) Failure or Degradation

Resolved.
Partially Resolved.
Improvements in stability of the TSM and
indications have reduced the effect of this
problem; the AF considers this deficiency
satisfactorily addressed.
Improvements in stability of the ICPs and
indications have reduced the effect of this
problem; the AF considers this deficiency
satisfactorily addressed.

Weapon Quality Track Indications to
Pilot

No Pilot Indication of Radar Failure

Mission Debrief Time is Excessive due
to Long Download Time of Post Flight
Data

Not Fully Resolved.
The AF assessed the correction to this
deficiency as MARGINAL (not fully
resolved) due to limited use of the final
Block 3i software version (3iR6.21), but
expects the improvement in stability to
negate the need for pilot indications of
radar failure.
Not Resolved; although the newer
“Generation III” ground data receptacle has
shown improved (shorter) decrypting
capability, problems with certification have
delayed fielding. The program is
considering whether a redesign will be
needed.

The program was also able to improve stability of the mission systems software to
support the Air Force’s plan to declare IOC. The program office reported improvements in
Mean Flight Hours Between Instability Events (MFHBSE) for both start-up and in-flight of
Block 2B and Block 3i. These data, depicted in the table below, show that stability has improved
with the last build of Block 3i software to the level seen in the most recent build of Block 2B
software.

7 

 Flight Hours

Mean Flight Hours Between
Instability Events*

72.6

9.1

136.8

5.07

3iR6.21 (AF IOC build)

128.3

25.66

Early 3i software in flight
testing

181.3

6.97

Last Block 2B software load

28.5

28.5

Software Version
3FR5.03 (a build for
developmental flight testing)
Early 3F software in flight
testing

*Note: Does not include subsequent failures of the same system and associated system failures
The operational effect of mission systems instabilities on the F-35 is still not well
understood. One of the objectives of the Air Force IRA was to examine the frequency and
mission effect of these instability events as well. The Air Force defined and scored instability
events during the IRA in the same way as the program office and the contractor for comparison
purposes and observed similar trends. An instability event is generally the initial failure, or the
primary system failure, and does not account for subsequent failures of the same system or
failures of subsystems. In addition, the Air Force collected data on instability occurrences,
which includes a broader set of instabilities. An instability occurrence accounts for all failures of
systems and associated subsystem failures, even though each of these subsequent failures could
have affected the mission capability of the aircraft. The Air Force collected data on instability
occurrences with F-35A aircraft flying the most current Block 3i software and counted 25
occurrences in 34.1 flight hours, resulting in a mean flight hours between instability occurrences
of 1.4 hours. During IOT&E, all relevant stability events and occurrences, on the ground or in
the air, including repeat events (unless attributed to a hardware failure) will be counted, to better
characterize the impact on mission effectiveness and suitability.
Testing of Block 3i Capability
Block 3i began with re-hosting the immature Block 2B software and capabilities into new
avionics processors (referred to as Technical Refresh-2 or TR-2). Because of the extreme
overlap of development and production, combined with delays in software development, the
program was forced to create a Block 3i capability to support delivery of Lot 6 and later aircraft,
as they were being delivered with the new processors before the planned Block 3F software was
ready. Although the program originally intended that Block 3i would not inherit technical
problems from earlier blocks, this occurred, which has resulted in severe, ongoing problems with
Blocks 3i and 3F, including avionics stability, fusion, and other unresolved deficiencies.
When Block 3i developmental flight testing began in May 2014, six months later than
planned in the program’s integrated master schedule (IMS), the combination of re-hosted
immature software and new processors resulted in avionics stability problems that were
significantly worse than Block 2B. Continued delays in completing Block 2B software
development and testing in support of the Marine Corps IOC, which was a priority over Block 3i

8 

 for the program and the test centers, combined with the severe stability problems with the early
versions of Block 3i software, caused several pauses in early Block 3i flight testing. Block 3i
flight testing resumed again in March 2015 and completed, for the first time, in October 2015,
eight months later than planned in the IMS. Despite the continued problems with avionics
stability, sensor fusion, and other inherited issues from Block 2B, the program terminated Block
3i developmental flight testing in October 2015, and released Block 3i software to the fielded
units. This decision was made, despite the unresolved Block 3i deficiencies, in an attempt to
meet the program’s unrealistic schedule for completing development and flight testing of Block
3F mission systems.
The program created Block 3F by adding the final required capabilities and weapons to
the problematic Block 3i software. However, when the program attempted developmental
testing of Block 3F mission systems, the Block 3F software had become so unstable, and there
were so many deficiencies that productive flight testing could not be accomplished. As
previously stated, the Air Force insisted on fixes for seven (five identified in 2014 and two more
in 2015) of the most severe deficiencies inherited from Block 2B, called the “Must Fix”
deficiencies, as a prerequisite to use the final Block 3i capability in the Air Force IOC aircraft.
Consequently, in February 2016, the program decided to return to Block 3i development and
testing in another attempt to address key unresolved software deficiencies, including the avionics
instabilities troubling both Block 3i and Block 3F. A new version of mission systems software,
Block 3iR6.21, was quickly developed and tested which showed improvement to several “Must
Fix” deficiencies identified by the Air Force and in-flight stability, so it was released to the
fielded aircraft in late May 2016. Data collected on start-up and inflight stability of Block
3iR6.21 show that both have improved over earlier versions of Block 3i, and are approximately
equivalent to final version of Block 2B software. The Air Force collected data during the IRA as
well, which also show improvement in stability over the previous version of Block 3i.
The Air Force IOC decision was informed by a schedule-driven and limited series of
events, referred to as an IRA, which was completed prior to their pre-determined IOC declaration
window of August through December 2016. The Air Force conducted the assessment with six
Block 3i-configured aircraft at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, using four different
versions of Block 3i mission systems software and various data collection capabilities (i.e., two
of the aircraft were “orange-wired” with flight test instrumentation for recording detailed data
messages; the other four aircraft had the less-capable Quick Reaction Instrumentation Package
(QRIP)), which is designed to work on production aircraft with limited “orange wire”
modifications. The Air Force IRA report highlighted a lack of documentation for configuring
the instrumentation and accessing the collected data, which limited their ability to analyze the
results.
The IRA team at Nellis AFB flew a total of 18 mission scenarios (72 aircraft sorties)
covering the mission sets of CAS, Air Interdiction (AI), and SEAD/DEAD. The missions were
flown over the western test ranges from March 1 through April 29, 2016. Additionally, the
assessment included observations from an Air Force-led deployment to Mountain Home AFB,
Idaho with six F-35A aircraft from Edwards, supported by an ALIS SOU V2 with software 2.0.1.
Although the Air Force has determined that the F-35A with Block 3i mission systems software
provides “basic” capabilities for IOC, many significant limitations and deficiencies remain. In
fact, the detailed results of the IRA, as reported by the Air Force, are consistent with the

9 

 assessments in the DOT&E Annual Report, with the exception of recent corrections to some of
the deficiencies which were identified by the Air Force to be fixed before IOC, and restoration of
the in-flight stability of mission systems back to levels comparable to Block 2B.
Autonomic Logistics Information System
The program has delivered a more deployable version of the ALIS SOU, known as
version 2 (or SOU V2). As has been shown during deployment demonstrations by both the Air
Force and the Marine Corps, although the modular set of hardware is easier to deploy and set up
than the bulky, original version of the SOU, deploying to support combat operations with the F35 in the Block 3i configuration still requires multiple days before flight operations can
commence. The time consuming activities include:


Aircraft data from home station must be transferred to the deployed ALIS SOU and
checked for accuracy to ensure the files will support the fielded operations. If the aircraft
data are “new” to the SOU – i.e., have not been loaded on the SOU previously – each
aircraft have to be inducted into the SOU, a process that takes approximately 24 hours for
each aircraft and can only be done serially (one at a time).



Network security protocols may have to be lowered (i.e., be less secure) to allow
maintenance personnel to access the local base network structure with the ALIS hardware
components to transfer and validate aircraft data to the deployed ALIS SOU V2.



Setting up the large logistics footprint for fielded operations. The ALIS hardware must
be housed in a Special Access Program Facility (SAPF), which may consist of one or
multiple Deployable Debrief Facilities (DDF).

Deploying with ALIS SOU V2 and software version 2.0.1 will also require additional
contractor support than what is planned for later software versions. Lockheed-Martin
administrators are needed to set up and check out the SOU V2 at the deployed location. They
are also needed to transfer aircraft data files from home station to the deployed SOU. Pratt and
Whitney field service representatives are also needed to download engine data from the aircraft
during the post-flight maintenance process.
Post-mission debriefings are delayed by the current version of the ground data receptacle
(GDR), which is used to decrypt and transfer data from the portable memory device (PMD). The
PMD records data – including video of the cockpit displays – during flight, to the Off-board
Mission Support (OMS) stations where pilots can review, play back, and debrief flight events.
During the Mountain Home AFB deployment, the GDR decrypting time averaged 1.1 minutes
for each minute of video and the missions averaged 55 minutes of video time. Hence, the postmission debriefs were delayed by approximately an hour due to waiting for the video to become
available which limited debrief time and delayed analyses and reporting of mission results.
Although the program has developed a new GDR (version III) which has displayed faster
decrypting times, certification problems have delayed fielding and the program is considering the
need for another redesign.

10 

 Challenges Remaining to Complete Development
It appears as though the program is running out of time and out of money to deliver the
required full F-35 combat capability in Block 3F before the completion of SDD. Observations
that support this hypothesis are as follows:


The program is behind in flight testing of Block 3F mission systems and flight sciences
testing, and is still not catching up due to a combination of factors (e.g., aggressive
schedule, new discoveries, regression testing, and normal attrition for reasons like ground
aborts, weather and airspace), as indicated in the program office test point completion
progress charts for 2016 shown below:

11 

 How the program will be able to accomplish the balance of required test points remaining
in the time and budget allotted, given historic rates and ongoing personnel reductions, is
unclear.


Several remaining required Block 3F capabilities continue to have deficiencies or are still
not ready for flight test. Recent program estimates show that many of these Block 3F
capabilities are behind the delivery plan to flight test or carry schedule risk, including:
-

Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) functions

-

Ground Moving Target Tracking (GMTT) with the radar

-

Infrared Search and Track (IRST)

-

Variable Message Format (VMF) communications are still not fully operational

-

Basic Link 16 transmit/receive capability for specific messages

-

Health Reporting capability within Prognostic Health Management

-

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) for the F-35C

-

Radio frequency countermeasures capability

-

P5 Combat Training System

-

EOTS Forward Looking Infrared capability

-

Internal gun for the F-35A and gun pods for the F-35B and F-35C

-

Synthetic Aperture Radar, Automatic Target Classification

-

MADL capability to share imagery

-

Enhanced Geo-location

-

Small Diameter Bomb-I (SDB-I) integration

How the program will be able to address the schedule risk and delivery these critical
Block 3F capabilities is not known.


Contractor staffing at the test centers has already started to draw down at a critical time
when flight testing must continue at a high rate. The test centers experience
approximately a 20 percent turnover of personnel annually, but recent turnovers are not
being backfilled. In addition, actual layoffs have started, including maintenance
personnel, engineers, analysts, and other personnel supporting flight sciences, mission
systems and weapons testing. The steady loss of personnel is accelerating as other key
personnel are looking for jobs and voluntarily leaving before they are eventually laid off.

12 

 How the program will be able to complete the volume of work remaining at the
integrated test centers while the staffing begins to ramp down is not known.


Discovery of deficiencies with Block 3i continues from both operational test and fielded
units. For example, the Air Force recently identified a Category 1 HIGH deficiency (the
most severe category possible) for failures and degradations of the Stores Management
System (SMS) which controls the inventory and status of weapons on the aircraft, and the
Fuselage Remote Interface Unit (FRIU), which is the electronic interface between the
aircraft and weapons. These failures and degradations would severely impact mission
effectiveness in combat and must be fixed, although the program may not have the time,
budget, or a plan to address such new deficiencies, which are to be expected with so
much flight testing remaining.



Recent flight testing of the AIM-9X air-to-air missile, which is mounted externally on the
outermost wing stations and is planned to be fielded on all variants, produced load
exceedances during F-35C landings and up-and-away maneuvers that caused buffet. The
program conducted a review of the margins of safety of the wing substructure and
determined that flight limitations for AIM-9X carriage or a redesign of the supporting
wing structure may be needed. The path ahead for AIM-9X carriage on the F-35C in
Block 3F is not known.



All variants of the F-35 gun are at risk of not having a functioning and accurate gun
system in time for IOT&E, which would also affect fielded aircraft. Significant
deficiencies discovered during initial testing of the F-35A’s internal gun in 2015 require
multiple modifications to the aircraft and gun system before weapons delivery accuracy
testing of the F-35A gun system can begin for the first time later this year. Until then, it
is unknown if the F-35 gun system, aimed by the Gen III HMDS, will meet accuracy
requirements for air-to-air and air-to-ground gun employment. In addition, flight
sciences testing of the F-35A recently revealed that the small doors that open when the
gun shoots induce a yaw (i.e. sideslip), resulting in gun aiming errors that exceed
accuracy specifications. As a result, additional software changes to the flight control
laws, very late in the flight test program, may be needed to cancel out the yaw when the
gun doors are open. These control law changes, if required, and the resulting regression
testing, would delay the start of gun accuracy flight testing on mission systems test
aircraft, currently planned for this fall, due to the time required for development,
regression testing and integration into a late or unplanned version of Block 3F software.
The program may not have adequate funding or time remaining to implement and test the
required F-35A gun fixes prior to the planned start of IOT&E. The most recent program
office schedule estimates that gun modifications will not be completed on the IOT&E
aircraft until 2020. Of note, the F-35B and F-35C gun pods are farther behind in testing,
so new discoveries requiring late fixes and additional modifications are likely. Therefore,
the program’s ability to deliver gun capability with Block 3F is at risk.



ALIS development and testing continue to fall further behind the planned schedule. As
mentioned previously, the program had planned to field ALIS 2.0.2 to support the Air
Force IOC declaration, but progress in development prevented that from happening.
More recently, the program cancelled a logistics test and evaluation (LT&E) of the ALIS

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 software build 2.0.2 that was planned for August and is now planning to combine it with
another test event and move planned testing at the developmental test center at Edwards
AFB, California to the operational test unit at Nellis AFB, Nevada. This move to test a
new software version of ALIS for the first time at an operational unit is high risk, as
problems will inevitably be discovered and will likely affect flight operations at the unit.
Also, the program had developed an ALIS test venue – referred to as the Operationally
Representative Environment (ORE) – but apparently has elected not to use it to conduct
the LT&E of this next version of ALIS software. The rationale for pushing an untested
version of ALIS to the field without a complete LT&E, in light of the severe problems
discovered with the previous version of ALIS 2.0.2, is not known, other than possibly
time or funding constraints. Also, the final required delivery of ALIS capabilities,
version 3.0, continues to slip due to the ongoing problems with ALIS 2.0.2.


Prognostics Health Management (PHM) functions, which support required capabilities
for reliability and maintainability, are mostly being deferred or are immature. The
program planned to include 128 PHM algorithms in ALIS by the end of SDD. To date,
no PHM algorithms have been fielded with any of the ALIS software builds. The
program now plans to include only 16 algorithms – 8 in ALIS 2.0.2 and 8 in ALIS 3.0 –
before the end of SDD. To work around the lack of PHM capability, the Services have
accepted aircraft with additional inspection requirements (referred to as Production
Aircraft Inspection Requirements, or PAIRs), along with the added maintenance burden
these inspections bring.



Program office plans and support for preparing for an adequate IOT&E have stagnated,
as indicated by the following---

To date, the program has no executable plan to provide aircraft for IOT&E in the
proper Block 3F configuration which is representative of the full-rate production
aircraft, as required by the F-35 Lightning II Test and Evaluation Master Plan
(TEMP), Fourth Revision, and as mandated by Title 10. Due to the lengthy
program delays and discoveries during developmental testing, extensive
modifications are required to bring the OT aircraft, which were wired during
assembly to accommodate flight test instrumentation and produced in Lots 3
through 5, into the production-representative configuration required. Over 155
modifications are currently required for the 23 IOT&E aircraft, some of which are
not on contract yet.

-

Despite program office assurances, an accredited simulator environment is not on
track to be delivered in time to start IOT&E in 2018.

-

The OT aircraft require an instrumentation pod (the Data Acquisition Recording
and Telemetry or DART pod) to be mounted on one of the weapons stations. The
DART pod must be tested and cleared for a flight envelope that permits weapons
to be simulated from that station – including the weapons bay doors opening and
closing within the envelope cleared for the actual weapon – during operational
testing. Currently the program does not have a plan for ensuring the DART pod
gets cleared to the same envelope as the weapons.

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 -

IOT&E will require integration of Air-to-Air Range Infrastructure (AARI) and
associated range threat emitters with the fusion processing within the F-35.
Within the aircraft, the Embedded Training (ET) function supports
live/virtual/constructive training using a mixture of real and virtual entities (e.g.,
missiles, ground systems, and aircraft). To avoid intermingling data from real and
virtual entities, as it may cause performance issues within the F-35, Lockheed
Martin developed a separate model, referred to as the Fusion Simulation Model
(FSM), to emulate fusion functionality for virtual entities within ET. However,
the current FSM implementation has significant deficiencies that make the model
so inaccurate that some required capabilities will likely not be usable for IOT&E.
Although a properly functioning FSM is required for IOT&E, the program
recently informed the JSF Operational Test Team that it currently has no funding
or plans to correct the FSM deficiencies within SDD and prior to IOT&E.

Recommendations
The F-35 program appears to be focused on starting to close out SDD within the current
schedule and budget at a critical time for the program when flight testing must continue at a high
rate and required fixes must be implemented. Therefore, the program should immediately be
provided the resources in FY17 required to adequately complete development, testing, required
fixes, and fielding of the full Block 3F capabilities. Specifically, the program should be provided
adequate resources to complete the following actions:
1. Continue addressing the deficiencies in fusion that currently affect tactical situational
awareness, as presented on the cockpit displays to the pilot;
2. Ensure adequate funding is available to properly complete Block 3F development,
including a plan for correcting and verifying deficiencies which will be discovered
during IOT&E, prior to Block 4;
3. Fund and complete the contracting actions to complete all necessary modifications for
all the IOT&E aircraft prior to the start of IOT&E, as required in the approved
TEMP;
4. Ensure funding is available and contracting actions are completed as soon as possible
for the necessary upgrades to the USRL, which are several years late to need;
5. Complete full development and testing of ALIS 3.0;
6. Ensure the planning, resourcing, and execution of adequate testing to assure the
required DART pod envelope and data collection capability are provided in time for
entry into IOT&E;
7. Plan, resource and execute a supportable test schedule to adequately integrate and
characterize the JSF gun systems on all three variants prior to certification for entry
into the OT pilot spin-up phase prior to formal IOT&E;

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 8.

Address the current and emerging critical deficiencies in mission systems, ALIS, and
mission planning that have been identified by the combatant commands and
operational test teams.

A. 1Jt., aJ2-__
d
Michael Gilmore
Director

cc:
Director, CAPE

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