

Research Briefing

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Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion



Summary

- 1 Background – longstanding military assistance
- 2 Headline military assistance following the Russian invasion

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Summary

Defence and security links between Ukraine, NATO members and other allies and partners started soon after Ukraine's independence in 1991. They intensified when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, but primarily took the form of training and the bilateral provision of non-lethal military equipment.

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, bilateral military assistance has been significantly stepped up, with many allies supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine for the first time. For some countries such as Germany, and historically neutral countries such as Sweden, this has represented a significant reversal of their previous defence policies which ruled out providing offensive weapons.

As the conflict in Ukraine has evolved, so has the types of weaponry being provided. Ahead of the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, the focus was on providing Ukraine with the capability to both defend their territory and to enable them to retake ground under Russian control. There were fears that the provision of increasingly more sophisticated weaponry could escalate the conflict.

[Through winter, air defence and protection of Ukraine's critical national infrastructure have once again been a priority.](#) Allies have also increasingly turned their attention towards practical implementation of the [long term security guarantees](#) that were promised to Ukraine in July 2023. The continued provision of modern equipment, long term capability development and the strengthening of Ukraine's defence industrial base as a means of achieving greater self-sufficiency in weapons production, are at the centre of those plans.

Concerns remain, however, over the ability to maintain solidarity among Western nations and secure future military assistance, in particular from the United States.

This briefing paper sets out the headline military commitments to Ukraine by its largely Western allies and partners, and any potential issues in terms of ongoing support. It does not examine [the deployment of forces to the eastern flank of NATO](#), or wider humanitarian and economic support to Ukraine.

US support

The US is the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine. At the time of writing, [the total level of security assistance provided by the US since the start of the Biden administration stood at \\$44.9 billion](#), \$44.2 billion of which has

been provided since February 2022. In December 2023, the US announced what would be its [last package of assistance under previously authorised funding](#) (PDF).

However, on 12 March 2024, the US administration announced that a \$300 million package of extraordinary military assistance had been approved. That funding does not represent newly authorised funding by the US Congress but has been established from cost savings identified in earlier Ukraine weapons contracts.

An emergency bill to secure \$60 billion of future funding for Ukraine is still being considered in Congress.

UK assistance

The UK is one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany. [The UK has pledged almost £12 billion in overall support to Ukraine](#) since February 2022, of which £7.1 billion is for military assistance. £2.3 billion was provided in each of the financial years 2022/23 and 2023/24 and on 12 January 2024, the Government announced a further £2.5 billion of funding for 2024/25.

The UK is providing both lethal and non-lethal weaponry, including tanks, air defence systems and long-range precision strike missiles. While the UK has committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots, combat fighter aircraft will not be provided.

The UK is also hosting a training programme (Operation Interflex), which is supported by several allies. Over 30,000 Ukrainian personnel have been trained so far, with the aim of training a further 10,000 by mid-2024.

NATO and the EU

NATO, as an alliance, has been clear in its political support of Ukraine and fully supports the provision of bilateral military assistance by individual allies. NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian government and is supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. Ukraine is not a NATO member, however, and therefore isn't party to NATO's mutual defence clause under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. As such, NATO troops will not be deployed on the ground in Ukraine. Allies have also ruled out imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine because it would bring Russia into direct conflict with NATO forces. At the Heads of State and Government summit in Madrid at the end of June 2022 NATO allies agreed a new package of assistance for Ukraine that will provide long term, sustained, support. That multi-year programme was subsequently adopted at the Vilnius Summit in July 2023.

The European Union is also providing non-lethal and lethal arms and training through its [European Peace Facility](#) (EPF). This is the first time the bloc has, in its history, approved the supply of lethal weapons to a third country. To date, the EU has committed €11.1 billion of EPF funding for military support to Ukraine, including €5 billion for a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund which was agreed in March 2024. Reaching agreement on that fund has taken several months amid disagreements on the size of the fund and how it should operate.

Comparative data

This paper does not attempt to rank countries in terms of the military assistance they are providing to Ukraine or to make comparisons between individual countries and/ or the US and Europe.

Comparative data on the level of assistance being provided to Ukraine is available from organisations such as the Kiehl Institute through its [Ukraine Support Tracker](#).

However, such figures discuss assistance through a broad lens and include economic, financial and humanitarian assistance as well as military aid. They also include future commitments, which in some cases have been made to 2026/27 and do not just reflect assistance provided, or funds spent, to date. On this basis, the Kiehl Institute has reported that European assistance to Ukraine is far greater than that provided by the US. However, as the Institute itself acknowledges in its [16 February 2024 update](#), there is a significant gap between European funding that has been committed and funding that has actually been allocated or spent and that to fully replace US military assistance in 2024, Europe would need to double its current level of arms assistance.

Making comparisons is also complicated by the fact that many countries do not publish information on a consistent basis, and it is unclear where the distinction between certain sorts of assistance, such as mine clearance or non-lethal aid, may lie.

1 Background – longstanding military assistance

The UK and other Western allies have worked on security cooperation initiatives with Ukraine since its independence in 1991, focused on defence reform, defence planning and capacity building.

In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ukraine, and at the request of the Ukrainian Government, Western allies significantly stepped up their support. Reiterating their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, military assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces has been a key part of their overall approach.

This assistance, however, was largely in the form of training the Ukrainian military both through NATO-led programmes and bilateral programmes such as the UK’s Operation Orbital, and through the bilateral provision of non-lethal equipment.

In 2018 the US became the first Ukrainian ally to provide major defensive lethal weaponry, when the Trump administration approved the provision of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine.¹

The build-up of Russian military forces in Crimea and on the eastern Ukrainian border over the course of 2021 and early 2022 put further pressure on Western nations to increase support to the country. For the first time, several countries, including the UK and the Baltic nations started supplying defensive lethal weaponry to Ukraine.

Russia said Western military assistance to Ukraine was a provocation and accused the West of supporting Ukraine in militarising eastern Ukraine and dismantling the 2014 and 2015 Minsk Agreements, which had been the basis for a political solution to the conflict there.

Military assistance to Ukraine prior to the Russian invasion is examined in greater detail in House of Commons Library briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine 2014-2021](#).

¹ [“U.S. Confirms Delivery Of Javelin Antitank Missiles To Ukraine”](#), Radio Free Europe, 3 April 2018

2

Headline military assistance following the Russian invasion

The predominantly bilateral nature of military assistance to Ukraine has continued following Russia's invasion of the country. International efforts are being coordinated through Ukraine Defense Contact Group and the International Donor Coordination Centre.

NATO has been supportive of allies providing assistance, has helped coordinate efforts and has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid to the country. NATO does not, however, possess military assets of its own (with the exception of [a number of airborne early warning aircraft](#)) and has been clear that as a defensive alliance, bilateral defensive assistance by NATO allies is the more appropriate course of action. Ukraine is not a NATO member state and therefore NATO troops will not be deployed on the ground and NATO allies have ruled out imposing a no-fly zone as it would bring NATO forces into direct conflict with Russia.

The EU is providing military assistance, including lethal arms, through its European Peace Facility. It is the first time that the EU has directly financed military assistance to a third country using EU funds.

As the conflict in Ukraine has evolved, so has the types of weaponry being provided. Ahead of the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, the focus was on providing Ukraine with the capability to both defend their territory and to enable them to retake ground under Russian control. There were fears that the provision of increasingly more sophisticated weaponry could escalate the conflict.

Attention has also increasingly turned towards practical implementation of the [long term security guarantees](#) that were promised to Ukraine in July 2023.² The continued provision of modern equipment, long term capability development and the strengthening of Ukraine's defence industrial base as a means of achieving greater self-sufficiency in weapons production, are at the centre of those plans.

This section sets out headline commitments to Ukraine by its largely Western allies and partners and any potential issues going forward in terms of ongoing support.

² These guarantees are examined in greater detail in Library research briefing, [Security guarantees to Ukraine](#)

2.1

Coordination of support

The UK, US and Poland have taken a leading role in coordinating international military assistance to Ukraine.³

International Donor Coordination Centre

In April 2022 the UK, along with partner nations, established the [International Donor Coordination Centre](#) (IDCC) in Stuttgart, the Headquarters of US European Command, to “ensure the international community’s military aid to Ukraine is as coordinated and effective as possible”.⁴

The role of the IDCC, which comprises over a hundred troops from 30 countries, is to field Ukraine’s requests for weaponry, coordinate the response of allies and ensure the delivery of equipment into Ukraine.

Ukraine Defense Contact Group

Since late April 2022 the coordination of military assistance by the IDCC has been supported by the establishment of the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which is now the primary forum for discussion.

The Group has been meeting on an almost monthly basis to discuss Ukraine’s evolving military requirements and how best to respond. [The twentieth, and latest meeting of the group was held on 19 March 2024](#) and involved over 50 countries.

Through the Contact Group, allies have collectively committed more than \$88 billion in military assistance to Ukraine.⁵

Led by Ukrainian requirements

While allies are in discussion with Ukrainian officials on potential weapon systems and future requirements, it has been made clear that process is led by the requirements and priorities of the Ukrainian government.⁶

The Contact Group has, therefore, often been the focus for debates over the provision of specific capabilities, such as [tanks](#), [combat aircraft](#) and [long-range missiles](#), which have been viewed by the Ukrainian government as potentially game changing.

“The members of this Contact Group are standing up for a world where rules matter and where rights matter and where sovereignty is respected and where people can choose their own path, free from tyranny and aggression and I am confident that this group will remain united”.

[US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J Austin III](#), 20 January 2023

³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 April 2022

⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 April 2022

⁵ US Department of Defense, [Post- Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting Press Conference](#), 19 March 2024

⁶ HC Deb 11 May 2022, c133 and US Department of Defense, [Transcript](#), 15 June 2022

Long-term capability coalitions

Going forward, and in line with the [G7 Joint Declaration on security guarantees](#) set out in July 2023, securing Ukraine's long-term security has become an increasing focus of the group. To that end, several capability coalitions across the air, land and maritime domains have been established. Not only do they seek to address Ukraine's immediate priorities, but also to provide Ukraine with coherent future capability.

Work has also been progressing to address some of the defence industrial base challenges moving forward.⁷

1 Capability coalitions

Eight capability coalitions have been established so far under the auspices of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The purpose of each coalition is to [“create a greater and more coherent plan...which will further the options for future support and co-funding”](#). Oversight is provided by the Capability Coalition Leadership Group.

At the end of February 2024 President Macron announced that plans were underway for [a ninth capability coalition focused on deep strike](#).

Air Force

Centred around Ukraine's desire to build a future combat air force based on the US F-16 aircraft, [the coalition is being led by the US, Denmark and the Netherlands](#).

The coalition will initially support Ukraine in creating a complete F-16 capability through the training of pilots, the donation of aircraft and the provision of necessary infrastructure and maintenance within Ukraine. The longer-term objective is to build “a full-scale Ukrainian air force”.

Training on fourth generation aircraft, including the F-16, is being delivered collectively by a group of nations, including the UK [which has been delivering basic flight training](#). Advanced flight training has been taking place in Denmark and the US and in November 2023, an F-16 European training hub was also opened in Romania.

⁷ See White House, [New actions to strengthen cooperation and co-production between US and Ukraine's defence industrial bases](#), 6 December 2023; Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 18 December 2023; Center for Strategic and International Studies, [Europe needs a paradigm shift in how it supports Ukraine](#), 17 January 2024 and Institute for the Study of War, [Ukraine's long term path to success: Jumpstarting a self-sufficient defence industrial base with US and EU support](#) (PDF), 14 January 2024

Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway have all committed to the provision of F-16 aircraft and [the aim is to achieve an initial operating capability in 2024](#). Concerns remain, however, over [the ability to maintain the F-16 in theatre](#).

Ground based air defence

The intention is to create a NATO-compatible ground-based air defence system that will replace the ad-hoc systems that are currently in place across Ukraine. At the first meeting of the coalition in December 2023, [three working groups were established, focusing on command structure, systems and training](#).

Led by France and Germany, the integrated air and missile defence coalition comprises 20 nations in total.

Artillery

[France and the United States are leading a coalition of 23 nations](#), including the UK, to provide artillery and ammunition to Ukraine. Launched on 18 January 2024, the coalition aims to boost Ukraine's artillery capacity in the short term, whilst also looking for partners to co-finance the purchase of 72 Caesar howitzers over the course of 2024, including the costs of training, and ammunition. France has already committed to the purchase of 12 of those systems. Going forward, Ukraine is also expected to determine its artillery priorities for the medium to long term.

Maritime security

The [UK and Norway will lead a new Maritime Capability Coalition](#) that will develop Ukraine's naval capabilities and strengthen its ability to operate along its coastlines and into the Black Sea. It will include the provision of ships, vehicles, training and infrastructure.

De-mining

Led by Lithuania, and with a membership of 25 nations, [the coalition aims to harmonise and coordinate existing and future demining assistance](#). To support these goals, a dedicated demining fund is being established to allow for the purchase of relevant equipment and provide training.

Information security

Led by Estonia and Luxembourg, the IT coalition will focus on the development of a secure and resilient IT infrastructure for Ukraine's Ministry of Defence and its armed forces. [Funding to launch the initiative has already been announced](#)

[by Estonia and Luxembourg](#). Japan announced its intention to join the [coalition](#) in December 2023. [Eleven countries have joined the coalition so far](#).

Armour

Established at the [meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on 23 January 2024](#), Germany will lead a coalition to develop a long-term armour capability for the Ukrainian armed forces.

Drones

Announced in January 2024, the drone coalition aims to provide Ukraine with thousands of drones, including first-person view (FPV) drones which have been effective in providing greater situational awareness on the battlefield. [The coalition will be jointly led by Latvia and the UK](#). A further six countries signed [a letter of intent on participation](#) in February 2024; while Canada and Australia joined the coalition in March.

International Fund for Ukraine

Alongside the International Donor Coordination Centre and the Contact Group, in April 2022 several allies, led by the UK, established an [International Fund for Ukraine \(IFU\)](#) to coordinate the purchase and transport of military equipment to Ukraine from third countries and/or industry.⁸

Among agreements reached at an [international donor's conference in Copenhagen \(PDF\)](#) in August 2022, was the expansion of the IFU in order to finance the rapid purchase of military equipment for Ukraine, support Ukraine in the procurement process and to facilitate training. The longer-term intention is to facilitate a move away from donations by individual countries from their own stockpiles, to purchases directly from the defence industry.⁹

To date, over £900 million has been contributed to the IFU by the UK, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Lithuania, Iceland, Australia and New Zealand. The IFU is financing the urgent procurement of capabilities including ammunition, drones, air defence, maritime capabilities, electronic warfare, manoeuvre support and mine clearance equipment.¹⁰

⁸ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 27 April 2022

⁹ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Norwegian), 11 August 2022

¹⁰ Ministry of Defence, [International Fund for Ukraine](#) (accessed 22 March 2024)

2.2

UK military assistance

The following information sets out headline assistance to Ukraine. For more detailed information, see Library research briefing: [Detailed timeline of UK military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 – present\)](#).

Total funding so far

To date, the UK has pledged almost £12 billion in overall support to Ukraine, of which £7.1 billion is for military assistance.¹¹ £2.3 billion was provided in each of the financial years 2022/23 and 2023/24 and on 12 January 2024, the Government announced a further £2.5 billion of funding for 2024/25.¹²

All that funding is being met from the Treasury Reserve and will not come from the MOD's main budget.¹³ Spending on Ukraine does, however, appear in MOD spending figures towards the end of the financial year as part of the MOD Supplementary Estimates.¹⁴

Military equipment is gifted

Military aid to the Ukrainian armed forces is gifted by the UK. Equipment is either donated from existing UK defence stocks, rapidly purchased from the defence industry in both the UK and overseas or purchased from the surplus stocks of foreign governments. Such acquisition is either funded directly or coordinated through mechanisms such as the International Fund for Ukraine, to which the UK has committed money.¹⁵

What equipment has been provided?

The UK has provided lethal weaponry, including anti-tank missiles, artillery guns, air defence systems, armoured fighting vehicles, anti-structure munitions, and three M270 long-range multiple launch rocket systems. In January 2023 the UK announced a significant uplift in combat support, including the provision of 14 Challenger II main battle tanks. In May 2023, the Government announced that it would [provide Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles](#), which are a long-range precision strike capability, and [long-range](#)

¹¹ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 12 January 2024. Aside from military assistance, the Government has pledged humanitarian assistance (£365 million to 2025) and economic assistance through international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (approximately £4.7 billion).

¹² Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 12 January 2024

¹³ Funding provided from the Treasury reserve appears in the MOD Supplementary Estimates. Funding for military support to Ukraine for 2023-24 will be claimed from the Treasury Reserve at the Supplementary Estimates in February 2024.

¹⁴ Library research briefing, [Revised government spending plans for 2023/24](#) explains Supplementary Estimates in further detail.

¹⁵ Written Statement, [Military support to Ukraine](#), 20 July 2023

[attack drones](#). The UK was the first country to provide Ukraine with missiles with a range sufficient to strike targets anywhere in the country.

The UK has also provided £500 million to the [International Fund for Ukraine](#)¹⁶ which has provided air defence systems and mine clearance equipment so far,¹⁷ and is jointly leading two Capability Coalitions which aim to provide Ukraine with a long-term [drone](#) and [maritime capability](#). The UK has also joined the IT coalition being led by Luxembourg and Estonia (see [Long-term capability coalitions](#)).¹⁸

Over 200,000 items of non-lethal aid, including unmanned aerial systems, body armour, helmets, night vision equipment, mine detection equipment, medical equipment and winter clothing have also been provided. In November 2022, the MOD confirmed that the first of three retired Sea King search and rescue helicopters had also been delivered to Ukraine.¹⁹

Stockpiles and replenishment

The MOD has said that it keeps weapons stockpile levels and requirements under review, and that it remains engaged with industry, allies and partners to ensure “both the continuation of supply to Ukraine” and to ensure that all equipment and munitions granted in kind from UK stocks are replaced as soon as possible.²⁰

Long term training programme

The UK has established a long-term training programme for the Ukrainian armed forces (Operation Interflex). The initial the aim of training 30,000 new and existing Ukrainian soldiers by the end of 2023 was met in November 2023. A further 10,000 will now be trained by mid-2024.²¹ The Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Lithuania, New Zealand, Australia, Romania, Kosovo and Estonia participate in the training programme.

In February 2023, the Government confirmed that training would be expanded to include Ukrainian fast jet pilots and marines. An elementary flying course started in summer 2023.²²

¹⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 August 2022 and [Press release](#), 16 June 2023

¹⁷ Ministry of Defence, [International Fund for Ukraine](#) (accessed 5 December 2023).

¹⁸ Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

¹⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 23 November 2022

²⁰ Deposited Paper 2024-0156, [Letter from the Earl of Minto, Minister of State in the House of Lords to Lord Browne of Ladyton \(PDF\)](#), February 2024

²¹ PQ4038, [Ukraine: Armed forces](#), 4 December 2023

²² Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 8 February 2023

Long term security guarantees

On 12 January 2024, the UK became the first country to formalise a long-term security cooperation agreement with Ukraine.²³

2.3

United States

Total funding and future commitments

As of 27 December 2023, the total level of military assistance provided by the US since the start of the Biden administration stood at \$44.9 billion. \$44.2 billion of that funding had been provided since February 2022.²⁴ The package announced on 27 December was set out as the last assistance to be provided under previously authorised funding.

However, on 12 March 2024, the US administration announced that a \$300 million package of extraordinary military assistance had been approved to meet Ukraine's "most pressing security and defense needs", including air defence, artillery and anti-tank requirements.²⁵ That funding does not represent newly authorised funding by the US Congress (see below) but has been established from cost savings identified in earlier Ukraine weapons contracts.²⁶ The total level of US military assistance to Ukraine therefore remains at \$44.2 billion since February 2022.

Congressional funding crisis

An emergency bill to secure \$60 billion of future funding for Ukraine is still being considered in Congress.²⁷

In [a letter to the Congressional leadership](#) in early December 2023, the White House called on Congress to act, saying that the administration was "out of money - and nearly out of time".

In a press briefing on 23 January 2024, a Pentagon spokesperson said:

the continued lack of funding has forced us to pause drawing down additional items from our inventories, given the implications for our own military readiness. And this, of course, prevents us from meeting Ukraine's most urgent battlefield needs to include things like artillery rounds, anti-tank weapons, air defense interceptors.

Also, without additional funding, it prevents us from being able to provide systems and equipment to meet both their medium- and longer-term

²³ HM Government, [Agreement on Security Co-operation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine](#) (PDF), January 2024

²⁴ US Department of Defense, [Factsheet on US security assistance to Ukraine](#) (PDF), 27 December 2023.

²⁵ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 12 March 2024

²⁶ As above and US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 12 March 2024

²⁷ ["Ukraine aid back on US agenda - but still at mercy of unruly Republicans"](#), The Guardian, 25 March 2024

requirements and help them sustain systems that we've previously provided to them. [...]

we do continue to provide support, for example, training, and of course, leadership via the capability coalitions that I highlighted in the topper. But the point is, in order for us to provide the capabilities that Ukraine needs on the battlefield today, but also in the longer term, we would really appreciate the support of Congress.²⁸

Following the package of extraordinary assistance announced in March 2024, the Pentagon reiterated that “without supplemental funding, DoD will remain hard-pressed to meet Ukraine's capability requirements at a time when Russia is pressing its attacks against Ukrainian forces and cities”.²⁹ Following the passage of legislation securing funding for the US government, President Biden said that “Congress’s work isn’t finished. The House must pass the bipartisan national security supplemental to advance our national security interests”.³⁰

It has been reported that the House of Representative’s Speaker, Mike Johnson, intends to address funding for Ukraine when Congress returns from Easter recess in mid-April.³¹

What equipment has the US been providing?

In December 2021, the US began delivering additional defensive capabilities to Ukraine, above and beyond what it was already providing, as Russia built up its forces on Ukraine’s borders.³² The US also granted authorisation to US allies to provide Ukraine with US-origin military equipment from their own inventories,³³ although it ruled out the deployment of US forces on the ground.³⁴

Further significant tranches of lethal and non-lethal assistance have been provided over the last two years. The US has also continued to work with allies to facilitate the third-party transfer of US-origin equipment to Ukraine,³⁵ provide funding for the refurbishment of capabilities,³⁶ and provide Foreign

²⁸ US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 23 January 2024

²⁹ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 12 March 2024

³⁰ White House, [Statement from President Joe Biden on the Bipartisan Government Funding Bill](#), 23 March 2024

³¹ [“House leaves for two-week break – without addressing Ukraine aid”](#), NBC News, 23 March 2024

³² White House, [Press briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan](#), 7 December 2021 and US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 27 January 2022

³³ US Department of State, [Press briefing](#), 27 January 2022

³⁴ White House, [Remarks by President Biden before Marine One Departure](#), 8 December 2021 (accessed on 10 December 2021)

³⁵ US Department of State, [US Security Cooperation with Ukraine](#), 23 June 2022

³⁶ US Department of Defense, [Joint Statement by the United States Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defence of The Netherlands and the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic](#) (PDF), 4 November 2022

Military Financing to incentivise and backfill donations of military equipment to Ukraine by its allies and partners.³⁷

On 12 March 2024, the US Department of Defense outlined [the equipment that has been supplied, or committed, thus far](#) (PDF), including air defence systems, fires capabilities, anti-armour, ground manoeuvre, helicopters, unmanned aerial systems, and maritime capabilities.³⁸ Among the more high profile are advanced national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS), a Patriot air defence system, [high mobility artillery rocket systems \(HIMARS\)](#), and M1A1 Abrams tanks.

In July 2023 the US also said [it would provide Ukraine with cluster munitions](#).³⁹ Announcing the decision, the US Department of Defense said these munitions would “meet the urgency of the moment”, allowing Ukraine to continue its counteroffensive and target broad areas of entrenched Russian positions. Ukraine is reported to have provided written assurances that this capability will not be used in civilian populated urban environments and that it will engage in extensive mine clearance efforts once the conflict is over.⁴⁰

That decision was followed in October 2023 by the delivery of a small number of long-range ATACMs missiles (Army Tactical Missile System), which was only confirmed by the US administration after their use in theatre.⁴¹

The US is also participating in the Air Force Capability Coalition, although has not committed to the provision of F-16 aircraft. It is also jointly leading (with France) the new coalition on artillery (see Long-term capability coalitions).⁴²

Long term security guarantees

As a G7 member and signatory to the Joint Declaration on security guarantees, the US has committed to provide Ukraine with long term security assistance. Those commitments will be established on a bilateral basis and

³⁷ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 28 October 2022 and [Press release](#), 6 January 2023

³⁸ US Department of Defense, [Factsheet on US security assistance to Ukraine \(PDF\)](#), 27 December 2023

³⁹ Despite being prohibited by over 100 countries, the US, Ukraine and Russia are not party to [the Convention on Cluster Munitions](#), which prohibits their production, transfer, stockpile and use.

⁴⁰ [“DOD announces \\$800m security assistance package for Ukraine”](#), DOD News, 7 July 2023 and Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 7 July 2023. For a discussion of the military utility of these weapons see “Giving Ukraine cluster munitions is necessary, legal and morally justified”, RUSI Commentary, 10 July 2023; [“Cluster munitions: What are they and why is the United States sending them to Ukraine?”](#), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 July 2023 and [“Supplying Ukraine with cluster munitions sends the wrong message to the world”](#), Chatham House Expert Comment, 11 July 2023

⁴¹ [“US has provided Ukraine long-range ATACMs missiles, sources say”](#). CNN, 18 October 2023

⁴² The White House, [Remarks by President Biden in a Press Conference](#), 21 May 2023 and White House, [Press briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan](#), 20 May 2023

have been compared to the [security assistance that the US provides to Israel](#) (PDF).⁴³ Negotiations between the US and Ukraine began in August 2023.⁴⁴

2.4 Bilateral assistance from other NATO countries

NATO has a longstanding relationship with Ukraine and is providing non-lethal and logistical support (see NATO military assistance). Donations of weaponry are being conducted on a bilateral basis by individual NATO allies.

Albania

The Albanian government has confirmed its support for Ukraine but does not provide details of the military assistance that it provides.⁴⁵

Albania has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.⁴⁶

Belgium

Belgium's overall military assistance to Ukraine currently stands at €351.01 million.⁴⁷

It has provided both lethal and non-lethal weaponry including anti-tank weapons, machine guns, ammunition, armoured vehicles and air defence missiles.⁴⁸ Non-lethal equipment and supplies include portable CBRN laboratories, unmanned underwater vehicles capable of detecting mines and conducting underwater surveillance, fuel, winter clothing, ambulances and medical evacuation vehicles.⁴⁹ Belgium has also channelled non-lethal military assistance through NATO's a new Comprehensive Assistance Package.⁵⁰

Belgium is also part of the IT and air force capability coalitions. In October 2023 the Belgian Ministry of Defence confirmed that, from 2024, it will train F-

⁴³ White House, [Remarks by President Biden before Air Force One departure](#), 12 July 2023

⁴⁴ US Department of State, [Launch of negotiations on US-Ukrainian bilateral security commitments](#), 3 August 2023

⁴⁵ ["Albania sent military equipment to Ukraine"](#), Exit News, 17 March 2022; ["Albania to offer humanitarian, military aid to Ukraine"](#), Albanian Daily News, 13 January 2023 and President of Ukraine, [Joint Declaration by Ukraine and the Republic of Albania](#), 20 September 2023

⁴⁶ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

⁴⁷ Federal Government, [Belgian support for Ukraine: An overview](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

⁴⁸ [Alexander De Croo: @alexanderdecroo](#), X (formerly Twitter), 26 February 2022 (in French); ["Belgium to send new weapons to Ukraine"](#), Flanders News, 22 April 2022; Prime Minister of Belgium, [Press release](#), 28 January 2023; Prime Minister of Belgium, [Press release](#), 12 May 2023; ["Belgium approves 14th military aid package for Ukraine"](#), The Brussels Times, 10 June 2023

⁴⁹ ["Belgium to give €12 million in military aid to Ukraine"](#), The Brussels Times, 17 September 2022; ["La Belgique va envoyer des laboratoires mobiles et drones sous-marins en Ukraine"](#), La Libre, 26 November 2022 (in French)

⁵⁰ Minister of Foreign Affairs, [Press release](#), 25 August 2022

16 pilots and mission planners and that two Belgian companies will provide technical support to the existing Belgian F-16 fleet. From 2025, Belgium will supply F-16 aircraft to the Ukrainian armed forces as it migrates to the F-35 (see Long-term capability coalitions).⁵¹

In October 2023, the Belgian Prime Minister also announced the creation of a new €1.7 billion Ukraine Fund, using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets in the country, that will be used to aid Ukraine in 2024 and 2025. That fund is expected, in part, to purchase military equipment and support the European Peace Facility (see [EU military assistance to Ukraine](#)). In January the Belgian Defence Minister confirmed that €611 million of the fund would be spent on military aid over the next two years.⁵² Belgium has recently joined the Czech initiative to finance the purchase hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for Ukraine from third countries outside of the EU (see [Czech Republic](#) below).⁵³

Belgium has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.⁵⁴

Further reading:

- Federal Government, [Belgian support for Ukraine](#)

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian government initially ruled out sending weaponry to Ukraine directly, although did approve the provision of technical support, including the repair of Ukrainian military equipment.⁵⁵ The Government argued that it had “done enough” by supporting Ukrainian refugees, supplying humanitarian aid, and supporting Western-led sanctions against Russia.⁵⁶

At the beginning of November 2022, however, the Bulgarian Parliament voted in favour of providing lethal military aid to Ukraine and instructed the government to make proposals within the next month. One option put forward by the Parliament was for the transfer of Soviet-era equipment to Ukraine, in exchange for modernisation assistance from NATO allies.⁵⁷

On 9 December 2022 the Bulgarian Parliament approved a list of the first arms to be sent to Ukraine. Although classified, the list was thought to

⁵¹ [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023 and Belgian Minister of Defence, [Joint press release](#), 13 October 2023

⁵² [“Belgium to send 1.7 billion euros from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine’s support”](#), European Pravda, 11 October 2023 and Federal Government, [Belgian support for Ukraine: An overview](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

⁵³ [“Czech Republic to deliver thousands of extra artillery shells to Ukraine”](#), The Guardian, 19 March 2024

⁵⁴ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

⁵⁵ [“Bulgaria will not send fighters, troops to Ukraine”](#), Euractiv, 1 March 2022 and [“Bulgarian Parliament approves military-technical support for Ukraine”](#), Army Technology, 5 May 2022

⁵⁶ [“Bulgaria rejects Ukraine’s plea for heavy weaponry”](#), Balkan Insight, 7 June 2022

⁵⁷ [“In U-turn Bulgarian Parliament tells Sofia to send weapons to Ukraine”](#), Politico, 3 November 2022

include mainly light weaponry and ammunition. The Bulgarian defence minister reportedly said at the time that the country could not “afford to send its Russian-made anti-aircraft missile systems or MiG-19 and Su-25 fighter jets, which Kyiv wants”.⁵⁸

That package of assistance was delayed, however, after facing continued opposition from Bulgarian President Rumen Radev. In June 2023 the new Bulgarian government confirmed that a package of military support would be approved. Additional military aid was agreed in September 2023. Details remain classified, but it was thought to include defective air defence missiles which Ukraine has the capacity to fix or be able to use for spare parts, and discarded ammunition.⁵⁹

In December 2023 the Bulgarian parliament also approved the delivery of defective, or surplus, surface-to-air missiles and portable anti-aircraft missile systems.⁶⁰ It also overrode a Presidential veto on the provision of 100 armoured personnel carriers⁶¹ and instructed the Ministry of Defence to take the necessary measures to join the F-16 Air Force Coalition, including offering pilot training and the use of Bulgaria’s airspace.⁶²

An article in German newspaper Die Welt in January 2023, also alleged that the Bulgarian government had, from the outset of the war, been secretly providing Ukraine with arms, ammunition and fuel by allowing arms sales to intermediaries in third-party NATO countries.⁶³

In March 2024 Bulgarian Defence Minister, Todor Tagarev said that providing any further military assistance was now a decision for the executive.⁶⁴ Bulgaria has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.⁶⁵

Further reading:

- BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, [#Ukraine](#)

⁵⁸ [“Bulgaria to send its first military aid to Ukraine”](#), Reuters, 9 December 2022

⁵⁹ [“New Bulgarian government approves military aid for Ukraine”](#), Radio Free Europe, 26 June 2023 and [“Bulgarian parliament approves additional weapons to Ukraine to aid in its war against Russia”](#), Associated Press, 27 September 2023 and [“Bulgaria’s military aid for Ukraine in 2023”](#), BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, 31 December 2023

⁶⁰ [“Parliament resolves on providing anti-aircraft missile systems, SAMs to Ukraine”](#), BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, 8 December 2023

⁶¹ [“Parliament overrides Presidential veto on sending armoured vehicles to Ukraine”](#), BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, 8 December 2023. The decision to provide the APC had originally been taken in November 2023 but was vetoed by Bulgaria’s President in early December.

⁶² [“Parliament resolves on providing anti-aircraft missile systems, SAMs to Ukraine”](#), BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, 8 December 2023. Bulgaria cannot contribute aircraft as it does not possess the F-16.

⁶³ [“The country that secretly saved Ukraine”](#), Die Welt, 20 January 2023

⁶⁴ [“Sending armoured vehicles to Ukraine cost BGN170,000 plus”](#), BTA Bulgarian News Agency, 14 March 2024

⁶⁵ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

Canada

Since February 2022, Canada has committed over \$4 billion in military aid to Ukraine.

Government of Canada, [Donations and military support to Ukraine](#)

Canada has been providing non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine on a bilateral basis for several years and since 2015 Canada has had a training and capacity building mission in Ukraine ([Operation Unifier](#)).

On 14 February 2022, Canada announced it would, for the first time, provide Ukraine with lethal weaponry.⁶⁶

The Canadian government has continued to provide both lethal and non-lethal assistance, including anti-armour weapon systems, armoured combat support vehicles, howitzers and their associated munitions, the provision of satellite imagery, high-resolution drone cameras, winter gear, surveillance and communications equipment, fuel, and medical supplies.

Canada has provided eight Leopard 2 main battle tanks, participates in the Leopard 2 Tank Maintenance Centre that has been established in Poland,⁶⁷ and has also purchased a National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile system (NASAMS), and associated munitions, from the US to donate to Ukraine. Further donations of air defence missiles have been made from Canadian military stocks.⁶⁸

In September 2023, the government announced \$650 million in military assistance funding over the next three years. Immediate priorities include armoured vehicles, small arms ammunition, drones and air defence, contributing \$33 million to the air defence partnership led by the UK.⁶⁹ In March 2024 the government announced that it would also provide \$40 million to the Czech initiative to purchase large calibre ammunition for Ukraine (see [Czech Republic](#) below).⁷⁰

Canada has also extended Operation Unifier to March 2025.⁷¹ Personnel are deployed with the UK-led training programme Operation Interflex, and in Poland and Latvia to provide engineering, medical and junior officer training.⁷² The Government has also confirmed that it will contribute to several capability coalitions, including armour,⁷³ drones,⁷⁴ and the air force coalition, training fast jet pilots until 2025. Canada will also contribute \$60 million for the purchase of F-16 supplies and equipment, including spare

⁶⁶ Government of Canada, [Canada commits lethal weapons and ammunition in support of Ukraine](#), 14 February 2022.

⁶⁷ Canadian Armed Forces, [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 18 January 2024)

⁶⁸ Canadian Armed Forces, [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 18 January 2024)

⁶⁹ Government of Canada, [Donations and military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024) and [News release](#), 19 February 2024

⁷⁰ Government of Canada, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

⁷¹ Government of Canada, [Canada extends and expands military and other support for the security of Ukraine](#), 26 January 2022 and Government of Canada, [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#).

⁷² Government of Canada, [Donations and military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 18 January 2024)

⁷³ Government of Canada, [News release](#), 23 January 2024

⁷⁴ Government of Canada, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

parts, weapons stations, avionics and ammunition (see [Long-term capability coalitions](#)).⁷⁵

Canada has also been providing logistical support to allies and partners in Europe, delivering aid to Ukraine on their behalf.⁷⁶ Three Hercules C130J aircraft, along with a detachment of 60 Canadian personnel, are currently based in Prestwick, Scotland.⁷⁷

Canada, as a G7 member, has committed to provide Ukraine with [long term security guarantees \(PDF\)](#), including the provision of military assistance. An [Agreement on Security Cooperation between Canada and Ukraine](#) was signed on 24 February 2024.

To date, Canada has committed \$4 billion in military assistance.⁷⁸

Further reading:

- Government of Canada, [Canadian donations and military support to Ukraine](#)
- Prime Minister of Canada, [Press release](#), 24 February 2024

Croatia

As of January 2024, Croatia has provided €181 million in military assistance to Ukraine.⁷⁹

In January 2023 the Government confirmed that it would continue to give Ukraine military assistance but that it would not “publicise what we provide”.⁸⁰ However, in October 2023 it was revealed that Croatia had donated all its Mi-8 helicopters to Ukraine.⁸¹ Previous assistance has included small arms, ammunition and protective equipment.⁸²

Croatia is also assisting with mine clearance operations.⁸³

⁷⁵ Government of Canada, [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force \(PDF\)](#), July 2023; [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#), (accessed 21 February 2024) and [News release](#), 14 February 2024

⁷⁶ Government of Canada, [News release](#), 25 May 2023

⁷⁷ Government of Canada, [News release](#), 14 February 2024

⁷⁸ Canadian Armed Forces, [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 24 March 2024)

⁷⁹ Government of the Republic of Croatia, [Press release](#), 31 January 2024

⁸⁰ [“Croatian PM: We will continue military support for Ukraine”](#), Ukrinform, 13 January 2023

⁸¹ [“Austin says Croatia’s support for Ukraine is commendable”](#), DoD News, 19 October 2023

⁸² [“Croatia to send weapons to Ukraine, provide health care to refugees”](#), Euractiv, 1 March 2022.

⁸³ [“Ukraine and Croatia sign agreement on cooperation in mine clearance”](#), Ukrainska Pravda, 11 October 2023

Czech Republic

Military assistance to Ukraine is valued at approximately €250 million.⁸⁴

In November 2023 the Ministry of Defence published [a declassified list of equipment provided to Ukraine between February 2022 and October 2023](#) (PDF, in Czech).

Consisting of both lethal and non-lethal aid, donated equipment includes tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles, four Mi-24 combat helicopters, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, air defence systems and associated munitions, anti-tank missiles, small arms and ammunition, protective equipment, medical supplies and fuel.⁸⁵

In May 2022, the Czech Republic was the first NATO country to supply tanks to Ukraine, receiving a donation of German tanks in return.⁸⁶ In November 2022 the United States, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic also announced a partnering agreement that would see the US and Netherlands jointly fund the refurbishment of 90 T-72 tanks (45 apiece) from the Czech defence industry.⁸⁷

As a signatory to [the Tallinn Pledge](#) in January 2023, the Czech government has said that it will continue to support Ukraine with the delivery of military equipment, and that a key component of future support would be the maintenance, repair and overhaul of already delivered equipment.⁸⁸ The Czech Republic is also supporting the F-16 air force coalition (see Long-term capability coalitions).⁸⁹

As Czech military supplies have dwindled, the government has been looking at other ways to support Ukraine, including long-term support for the Ukrainian defence industry,⁹⁰ and providing export licences to enable third party acquisition from Czech industry. In September 2023, the Czech Republic signed a Letter of Intent with Denmark and the Netherlands for the supply of mainly Czech weaponry to Ukraine, with their financial support.⁹¹ That was followed in October 2023 with the Czech Republic and Denmark signing agreements that will enable Denmark to purchase tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition and other materiel for Ukraine from Czech defence

⁸⁴ [“Czech Republic issues licenses to supply €4.7 billion worth of military equipment to Ukraine”](#). Ukrinform, 12 December 2023

⁸⁵ [“Military aid to Ukraine: Czech Republic declassifies some data”](#). Ukrainian Military Center, 10 November 2023

⁸⁶ [“Czechs to get German tanks as it arms Ukraine”](#). Deutsche Welle, 18 May 2022

⁸⁷ [Joint Statement by the United States Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic \(PDF\)](#). 4 November 2022

⁸⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#). 19 January 2023

⁸⁹ Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, [@P_Fiala](#), [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#). 7 July 2023 (accessed 18 January 2024)

⁹⁰ Czech Ministry of Defense, [New release](#). 29 September 2023

⁹¹ Czech Ministry of Defense, [News release](#). 19 September 2023

companies.⁹² A subsequent Memorandum of Understanding was signed in January 2024.⁹³

In February 2024, the Czech government also launched an initiative to provide Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of artillery shells sourced from suppliers outside of the EU and US.⁹⁴ That initiative has been joined by eighteen countries who have all jointly financed the project. In early March Czech President Petr Pavel said the ammunition would arrive in Ukraine in a matter of weeks.⁹⁵

The Czech Republic has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.⁹⁶

Further reading:

- Government of the Czech Republic, [Support during the first year of the invasion](#), 23 February 2023

Denmark

As of March 2024, military support for Ukraine since February 2022 stands at €5.3 billion.⁹⁷ An additional €2.9 billion (22 billion DKK) has also been allocated to military assistance for 2023 and 2024 through the Ukraine Assistance Fund, which also administers humanitarian and economic aid.⁹⁸ At the end of November 2023, the Danish parliament agreed to allocate a further €3.1 billion to the fund for 2025-2027.⁹⁹ Denmark also contributes to the International Fund for Ukraine.

Denmark has provided both lethal and non-lethal military equipment, including anti-tank weapons, artillery systems, BMP-2 and modernised T-72 tanks and associated munitions, air defence missiles, ammunition, protective equipment, bomb disposal robots, medical supplies and fuel.¹⁰⁰ The latest package of assistance announced in December 2023 includes ammunition, drones and tanks.¹⁰¹ In February 2024, and amid concerns over the shortage of munitions, the Danish Prime Minister also announced that Denmark would donate its entire artillery to Ukraine saying:

⁹² Czech Ministry of Defense, [News release](#), 16 October 2023

⁹³ Czech Ministry of Defense, [News release](#), 23 January 2024

⁹⁴ [“Czechia could send 800,000 ammunition units to Ukraine as funding secured”](#). Euractiv, 19 February 2024

⁹⁵ [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#). Politico, 7 March 2024

⁹⁶ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, [Danish support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 24 March 2024)

⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, [Danish support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 18 January 2024)

⁹⁹ Danish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 November 2023

¹⁰⁰ Danish Authority Information, [Military contributions](#) (accessed 7 December 2023); Danish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Danish), 15 March 2023

¹⁰¹ [“Danish MP: Denmark prepares new Ukraine aid package worth \\$1 billion”](#). The Kyiv Independent, 13 December 2023

I'm sorry to say friends, there is still ammunition in stock in Europe. This is not only a question about production because we have weapons, we have ammunition, we have our defences that we don't have to use at the moment, that we should deliver to Ukraine. We have to do more.¹⁰²

Denmark has also joined the Czech initiative to procure ammunition for Ukraine from third parties outside of the EU.¹⁰³ Since early 2022 Denmark has financed several weapons procurement projects from third countries.¹⁰⁴ It is also a signatory to [the Tallinn Pledge](#).

Alongside Germany and the Netherlands, in early 2023 Denmark established the Leo 1 A5 initiative, that has provided Ukraine with over 100 refurbished Leopard 1 A5 battle tanks, maintenance support and training.¹⁰⁵ Together with the Netherlands, Denmark will also provide 14 Leopard 2 tanks, which are expected to enter theatre in early 2024.¹⁰⁶ In December 2023, the Danish government confirmed that it would also co-finance Sweden's ongoing commitment to provide CV-90 light tanks, including ammunition, spare parts and maintenance.¹⁰⁷

Denmark is also leading, alongside the US and the Netherlands, on the F-16 Air Force coalition (See Long-term capability coalitions).¹⁰⁸ In August 2023, the Danish Government confirmed that it would provide 19 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine. Those aircraft will be transferred to Ukraine over the next three years once pilot training is complete.¹⁰⁹ Denmark also joined the drone capability coalition and the IT coalition in February 2024.¹¹⁰

Denmark contributes to the UK-led training programme for Ukrainian personnel (Operation Interflex),¹¹¹ and has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.¹¹² On 23 February 2024, Denmark became one of the first non-G7 countries to sign [a 10-year security cooperation agreement \(PDF\)](#) with Ukraine.¹¹³

¹⁰² [“Why Denmark is sending all its artillery to Ukraine”](#). The Spectator, 19 February 2024

¹⁰³ [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#). Politico, 7 March 2024

¹⁰⁴ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 14 October 2022; Czech Ministry of Defense, [News release](#), 16 October 2023 and Estonian Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 21 March 2024

¹⁰⁵ Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 7 February 2023 and Danish Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 19 September 2023 (in Danish)

¹⁰⁶ Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 20 April 2023

¹⁰⁷ [“Denmark will join Sweden in tank donation to Ukraine for over 240 million euros”](#). Euronews, 18 December 2023

¹⁰⁸ Danish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 October 2023

¹⁰⁹ [“Netherlands and Denmark to donate up to 61 F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine”](#). The Guardian, 20 August 2023 and Danish Authority Information, [Military contributions](#) (accessed 7 December 2023)

¹¹⁰ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024) and Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

¹¹¹ Danish Ministry of Defence [Press release](#), 10 August 2022

¹¹² US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

¹¹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, [News release](#), 23 February 2024

Further reading:

- Danish Authority Information, [Denmark's contribution to support for Ukraine](#) and [Military contributions](#) (Correct to beginning of November 2023 but no longer being updated).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Danish support for Ukraine](#)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Denmark in Ukraine](#)

Estonia

Estonia was one of the first countries to provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance as Russia built up its forces on Ukraine's borders.¹¹⁴

Further military aid has included, self-propelled artillery, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft munitions, armoured vehicles, patrol boats, small arms, ammunition, counter drone capabilities and air defence systems, as well as ration packs, winter clothing, medical supplies, demining equipment and protective equipment.¹¹⁵ Estonia is a signatory to [the Tallinn Pledge](#) and has also provided three field hospitals in cooperation with both Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.¹¹⁶ The latest package of assistance announced in March 2024, includes anti-tank guns and artillery ammunition.¹¹⁷ Estonia is also leading the long term capability coalition on information security, in conjunction with Luxembourg (see [Long-term capability coalitions](#)) and joined the drone capability coalition in February 2024.¹¹⁸

The Estonian government has been criticised for allegedly providing old equipment to Ukraine and replacing it with modern equipment, partly financed with EU money from the European Peace Facility.¹¹⁹ The government has denied the allegations, saying it has followed EPF rules on reimbursement. In a statement issued by the Ministry of Defence in March 2023, it said that supporting Ukraine “is not a competition and its core rationale is not about an EU reimbursement scheme”.¹²⁰

Total military aid stands at approximately €500 million.¹²¹ In January 2024, the Estonian President, Alar Karis, pledged to allocate a further €1.2 billion for Ukrainian military assistance to 2027.¹²²

¹¹⁴ “[U.S. clears Baltic states to send U.S.-made weapons to Ukraine](#)”, Reuters, 20 January 2022.

¹¹⁵ Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#) (accessed 7 December 2023) and Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023

¹¹⁶ Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#) (accessed 7 December 2023)

¹¹⁷ Estonian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 21 March 2024

¹¹⁸ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

¹¹⁹ Government of the Republic of Estonia, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023 and “[Brussels playbook: Estonia games the system](#)”, Politico, 28 March 2023

¹²⁰ Estonian Ministry of Defence, [Statement on claims published in Politico](#), 28 March 2023

¹²¹ Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#) (accessed 24 March 2024)

¹²² “[Estonia pledges \\$1.3 billion in long-term support for Kyiv as Zelenskyy tours Baltics](#)”, The Kyiv Independent, 11 January 2024 and President of Ukraine, [Joint Press Conference](#), 11 January 2024

Estonia has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.¹²³ Negotiations on an agreement began in March 2024.¹²⁴

Further reading:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#)

Finland

Finland joined NATO on 4 April 2023. Prior to this date Finland was providing extensive military assistance to Ukraine.

Military assistance, to date, totals approximately €1.8 billion.¹²⁵ Initially focused on non-lethal equipment such as protective gear and medical supplies,¹²⁶ Finnish support has evolved to the provision of lethal aid.

Twenty-two packages of military aid have been approved so far. Details have largely been withheld for security reasons, although recent packages of aid have included anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition.¹²⁷ The Finnish government has revealed that six Leopard 2 mine clearing tanks have also been committed to Ukraine, along with training.¹²⁸

Finland is also deploying 20 personnel, until the end of 2023, to the training programme for Ukrainian personnel that is being hosted by the UK (Operation Interflex).¹²⁹

Finland has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.¹³⁰ Negotiations on that agreement are currently underway.¹³¹

Further reading:

- Ministry of Defence, [Russian attack on Ukraine and Finland's support](#)
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs, [Finland's support to Ukraine](#)

¹²³ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

¹²⁴ President of Ukraine, [Ukraine and Estonia started negotiations on a bilateral security agreement](#), 19 March 2024

¹²⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Russia's attack on Ukraine and Finland's support](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

¹²⁶ Finnish Government, [Press release: Finland sends additional aid to Ukraine](#), 27 February 2022.

¹²⁷ Finnish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 25 May 2023 and [Press release](#), 6 July 2023

¹²⁸ Finnish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 23 March 2023

¹²⁹ Finnish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 8 August 2022

¹³⁰ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

¹³¹ President of Ukraine, [Ukraine held another round of negotiations with Finland on a bilateral security agreement](#), 13 March 2024

France

Before Russia's invasion of Ukraine France had only provided humanitarian aid and budgetary support to the country.

The day after Russian military action was launched, President Macron told the French Parliament that the country would now provide defensive equipment to the country.¹³² Such assistance has included Javelin and Milan anti-tank missile systems, Mistral air defence systems, drones, armoured vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, radar and AMX-10 armoured fighting vehicles, which the French government also describe as light tanks.¹³³ A proposal to send the Leclerc main battle tank was also initially under consideration, although there has been little comment since.¹³⁴

At the NATO summit in July 2023, President Macron announced the decision to send [long-range SCALP \(Storm Shadow\) missiles](#) to Ukraine.¹³⁵ Further deliveries were also announced in January 2024.¹³⁶ This capability is also being provided to Ukraine by the UK.

In early 2023, France also announced a €200 million fund to allow Ukraine to purchase equipment directly from French manufacturers.¹³⁷ That fund is expected to receive a further €200 million for 2024 as France seeks to move away from direct equipment donations to Ukrainian acquisition directly from French industry.¹³⁸ France has also signed agreements with Ukraine to establish a framework for the joint production of spare parts and the maintenance of equipment.¹³⁹ France has also recently joined the Czech initiative to finance the purchase hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for Ukraine from third countries outside of the EU (see [Czech Republic](#) above). France had previously expressed its opposition to procuring ammunition from outside the EU bloc (see [EU military assistance to Ukraine](#))¹⁴⁰

¹³² [“France will provide defensive equipment to Ukraine”](#), CNN, 25 February 2022.

¹³³ [“Arms for Ukraine: who has sent what?”](#), France 24, 1 June 2022; President Emmanuel Macron, @EmmanuelMacron, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 30 June 2022 (accessed 25 January 2024); [“France to supply air defence systems to Ukraine after wave of Russian strikes”](#), France 24, 12 October 2022; “France to send ‘tank killer’ armoured vehicles to Ukraine”, The Financial Times, 4 January 2023 French embassy in London, [France pledges further military support to Ukraine](#), 15 May 2023 and [“Ukraine signs security pacts with Germany, France”](#), Politico, 16 February 2024

¹³⁴ [“Minister: Germany won’t block Poland giving Ukraine tanks”](#), Associated Press, 22 January 2023

¹³⁵ [“A strong gesture: French delivery of SCALP missiles to Ukraine marks shift in Western strategy”](#), France 24, 13 July 2023

¹³⁶ [“France to give Ukraine more cruise missiles, plans security pact”](#), Defense News, 17 January 2024

¹³⁷ [“French defence minister promises more military support for Ukraine”](#), Euronews, 28 December 2022; “France to send ‘tank killer’ armoured vehicles to Ukraine”, The Financial Times, 4 January 2023 and [“France organises long term military support for Ukraine”](#), Le Monde, 1 February 2023

¹³⁸ [Politico Morning Defense](#), 8 November 2023 and Ministry of the Armed Forces, [Press release](#), 2 October 2023 (in French)

¹³⁹ Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2021-2023), @olekksiireznikov, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 11 July 2023 (accessed 14 July 2023)

¹⁴⁰ [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#), Politico, 7 March 2024

French personnel are contributing to the UK training programme for Ukrainian marines.¹⁴¹ France has also indicated its intention to train Ukrainian fighter pilots, although, like the UK, it is not providing aircraft.¹⁴² It is also jointly leading the capability coalitions that have been established on ground based air defence and artillery, in conjunction with Germany and the US respectively (see Long-term capability coalitions).

France has been criticised by some commentators for seemingly “not pulling its weight” in the provision of military assistance to Ukraine, an accusation that French lawmakers have denied.¹⁴³ [A ten-year agreement](#) on security guarantees which was signed on 16 February 2024, showed that French military assistance had amounted to €3.9 billion in 2022-2023, and a further €3 billion had been earmarked for 2024.¹⁴⁴ Such figures are far below the level of military assistance reported by the Kiehl Institute, which suggests that French commitments so far amount to €635 million.¹⁴⁵

To support its figures, on 4 March 2024 the French Ministry of Defense published [a detailed list of the equipment and support it has provided to Ukraine up to the end of 2023](#) (in French).

At a meeting of European leaders and senior officials in Paris at the end of February 2024, President Macron also caused controversy after suggesting that deploying boots on the ground in Ukraine should not be ruled out.¹⁴⁶ He also announced a ninth capability coalition focused on deep strike (long range missiles), although did not indicate whether France would lead that initiative.¹⁴⁷

Further reading:

- French Embassy in Washington, [France’s assistance to Ukraine](#) (PDF), February 2023

Germany

After initial reluctance to provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance, amid concerns that it would provoke Russia and hamper the diplomatic

¹⁴¹ [UK-France Joint Leader’s Declaration](#), 10 March 2023

¹⁴² [“France to train Ukrainian fighter pilots”](#), Politico, 15 May 2023

¹⁴³ [“France spins its Ukraine aid”](#), Politico, 9 November 2023

¹⁴⁴ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation between Ukraine and France](#), 16 February 2024. The agreement built upon the [G7 Declaration on long term security guarantees \(PDF\)](#) that allies had concluded in July 2023.

¹⁴⁵ Kiehl Institute for the World Economy, [Ukraine Support Tracker](#) (accessed 24 March 2024)

¹⁴⁶ [“Macron wants to lead Europe on Ukraine. France may not let him”](#), Politico, 27 February 2024; [“War in Ukraine: Macron’s metamorphosis from dove to hawk”](#), Le Monde, 14 March 2024 and [“Macron says Russian defeat in Ukraine vital for security in Europe”](#), BBC News, 27 February 2024

¹⁴⁷ French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, [Extract from a Press Briefing](#), 25 March 2024

process,¹⁴⁸ in late February 2022 the German Government announced an abrupt change of policy. In addition to allowing other EU countries, such as the Netherlands and Estonia, to transfer German-origin lethal equipment, the government announced that it would itself supply lethal weapons to Ukraine.¹⁴⁹

Germany is one of the largest donors of military aid. In February 2024 the government said that military aid worth €28 billion had either been provided so far or has been earmarked over the next few years.

That assistance has steadily increased, in terms of both quantity and the weaponry provided. Although occasionally beset by internal domestic arguments over the provision of increasingly sophisticated weaponry (such as the Leopard 2 tank),¹⁵⁰ Germany is now one of the largest donors of military assistance, after the United States. At the end of February 2024, the German Ministry of Defence said that military aid worth €28 billion had either been committed since February 2022 or had been earmarked to support Ukraine over the next few years.¹⁵¹

By the end of 2023 Germany is reported to have provided almost €15 billion in military aid to Ukraine:

- €1.6 billion in military assistance in 2022 and €5 billion in 2023.
- €2.9 billion that was earmarked for military equipment to be delivered between 2025 and 2028.
- €5.2 billion worth of equipment from the stores of the German armed forces.
- €282 million for the training of Ukrainian personnel.¹⁵²

A doubling of funding in 2024

In early November 2023 the German Defence Minister said that Germany would double its military aid to Ukraine in 2024 to around €8 billion.¹⁵³ That decision was approved by the Bundestag on 2 February 2024,¹⁵⁴ and includes Germany's contribution to the EU's European Peace Facility.¹⁵⁵

The total value of authorised funding for security capacity building in Ukraine over the next few years currently amounts to €13.1 billion (€7.1 billion in 2024 and €6 billion over the next few years). This funding includes replacing

¹⁴⁸ [“Why Germany isn’t sending weapons to Ukraine”](#), BBC News, 29 January 2022 and [“Why Germany refuses weapons deliveries to Ukraine”](#), Deutsche Welle, 19 January 2022. Germany also refused to grant permits to other EU countries such as Estonia to export German-origin weapons, as well as vetoing Ukraine's purchase of anti-drone rifles and anti-sniper systems via the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (See “Germany blocks Estonia from exporting German-origin weapons to Ukraine -WSJ”, Reuters, 21 January 2022 and “Ukraine blames Germany for ‘blocking’ Nato weapons supply”, Financial Times, 12 December 2021)

¹⁴⁹ [“Germany to send Ukraine weapons in historic shift on military aid”](#), Politico, 26 February 2022.

¹⁵⁰ [“Why Germany delayed sending Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine”](#), BBC News, 25 January 2023

¹⁵¹ The Federal Government, [Military support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

¹⁵² As above

¹⁵³ [“Ukraine updates: Germany to double 2024 military aid to Kyiv”](#), Deutsche Welle, 11 November 2023

¹⁵⁴ [“Bundestag approves budget for 2024”](#), European Pravda, 2 February 2024

¹⁵⁵ The Federal Government, [Military support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

inventory sent to Ukraine from the stores of the German armed forces and Germany's contributions to the European Peace Facility.¹⁵⁶

Chancellor Scholz has also called on other EU nations to increase their support, suggesting that planned military assistance “by the majority of EU member states are by all means too small” in order to guarantee Ukraine's security in the long term.¹⁵⁷

What equipment is being provided?

According to the German government [equipment delivered or committed to Ukraine so far](#) has included anti-tank weapons, autonomous surface vessels, air defence systems (Iris-T and Patriot), man-portable air defence systems (Stinger and Strela), Marder infantry fighting vehicles, Leopard 1¹⁵⁸ and [Leopard 2 main battle tanks](#), MARS multiple rocket launchers,¹⁵⁹ self-propelled howitzers,¹⁶⁰ bunker buster missiles, armoured vehicles, mobile ground surveillance radar, reconnaissance drones, mine clearance vehicles, medical supplies, winter clothing, a field hospital, and over 47 million rounds of small arms ammunition.¹⁶¹

In January 2024, Germany committed to the provision of six decommissioned multi-purpose military helicopters, the first equipment of this type to be donated to Ukraine by the German government,¹⁶² and in February announced a €1.1 billion support package including further air defence systems, artillery and ammunition.¹⁶³

Germany is also leading the long-term capability coalitions on ground-based air defence (jointly with France) and armour, which was announced on 23 January (see [Long-term capability coalitions](#)) and joined the drone capability coalition in February 2024.¹⁶⁴

The government has, for the time being however, ruled out the provision of Taurus long-range missiles.¹⁶⁵ A Parliamentary motion calling on the government to supply the missiles to Ukraine was defeated in the Bundestag

¹⁵⁶ The Federal Government, [Military support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

¹⁵⁷ [“Germany's Scholz badgers EU countries to boost military aid for Ukraine”](#), Politico, 8 January 2024

¹⁵⁸ The Netherlands, Denmark and Germany created the Leo 1 A5 Initiative in February 2023 that will see the provision of 100 refurbished Leopard 1 A5 battle tanks, maintenance support and training (Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 7 February 2023)

¹⁵⁹ In tandem with moves by the US and UK to provide Ukraine with a defensive long-range artillery capability ([Joint Statement by UK MOD, US DOD, and German Defence Ministry](#), 15 June 2022)

¹⁶⁰ Alongside Norway and Denmark, Germany is also investing in Slovakia's indigenous production of howitzers for transfer to Ukraine (US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 14 October 2022)

¹⁶¹ The Federal Government, [Military support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 8 December 2023)

¹⁶² [“Germany to transfer military helicopters to Ukraine for first time”](#), The Kyiv Independent, 24 January 2024

¹⁶³ [“Ukraine signed security pacts with Germany, France”](#), Politico, 16 February 2024

¹⁶⁴ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

¹⁶⁵ [“German Ambassador: No supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine for now”](#), The Kyiv Independent, 19 October 2023

on 17 January 2024. However, as the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported at the time, the vote had been linked to other domestic matters.¹⁶⁶

The German government has also been working with allies in eastern and southern Europe to facilitate the delivery of their Soviet-era equipment to Ukraine, in exchange for German equipment (see [Czech Republic](#), [Greece](#) and [Slovakia](#)). Germany has also recently joined the Czech initiative to finance the purchase hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for Ukraine from third countries outside of the EU (see [Czech Republic](#) above).¹⁶⁷

Long term security guarantees

Germany, as a member of the G7, also committed to provide Ukraine with [long security guarantees \(PDF\)](#). A [ten-year agreement](#) on security assurances was signed on 16 February 2024.

Further reading:

- Federal Government, [Military support for Ukraine](#)
- Federal Foreign Office, [For as long as it takes: Germany's support for Ukraine](#), January 2024

Greece

Greece has said it will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes”, and has provided lethal weaponry including ammunition, assault rifles, missile launchers, Soviet-era infantry fighting vehicles, Stinger surface-to-air missiles and rocket launched anti-tank grenades.¹⁶⁸ replace those infantry fighting vehicles with newer German variants.¹⁶⁹

The government has, however, been reluctant to provide Leopard 2 tanks or the S-300 air defence system to Ukraine saying that they are necessary for Greece’s own defence.¹⁷⁰ However, in late January 2024 the Greek government said it was preparing a military aid package for Ukraine of weapons and equipment no longer in use by the Greek armed forces, including potentially air defence systems. The package is reportedly being formulated at the request of the United States, which in exchange has offered to gift older surplus military equipment to Greece under US [Excess Defense Articles](#)

¹⁶⁶ [“Traffic light votes against Taurus delivery to Ukraine”](#), Der Spiegel, 17 January 2024

¹⁶⁷ [“Czech Republic to deliver thousands of extra artillery shells to Ukraine”](#), The Guardian, 19 March 2024

¹⁶⁸ [“Greece sending military, civilian aid to Ukraine”](#), Ekathimerini, 27 February 2022; [“Greece announced large-scale supply of weapons to Ukraine”](#), Ukrainian News, 6 June 2022 and [“Greece to send more arms to Ukraine but sets limits”](#), Associated Press, 6 April 2023

¹⁶⁹ [“Germany announces new deal with Greece to send tanks to Ukraine”](#), Politico, 31 May 2022

¹⁷⁰ [“PM: Greece won’t send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine”](#), Kyiv Independent, 31 January 2023 and [“Greece denies S-300 to Ukraine because it doesn’t want to risk the country’s defense”](#), Defense Express, 6 February 2024

[provisions](#), which bypass Congress. Such equipment includes transport aircraft and Bradley armoured fighting vehicles.¹⁷¹

Greece has also given the US priority access to the Port of Alexandroupolis to facilitate the US' provision of military assistance to Ukraine,¹⁷² and has joined the F-16 training coalition (see Long-term capability coalitions).¹⁷³

Greece has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.¹⁷⁴

Hungary

Hungary has said that it will not send weapons to Ukraine. Hungary, which borders Ukraine, has also said it will not allow lethal weapons to transit its territory “as such deliveries might become targets of hostile military action” and that Hungary should not get involved in the war between Ukraine and Russia.¹⁷⁵

Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, has previously rejected proposals to provide further tranches of military assistance under the EU's European Peace Facility and for a dedicated Ukraine defence fund to be established under the auspices of that funding mechanism, although such measures were subsequently agreed in March 2024 (see [EU military assistance to Ukraine](#)).¹⁷⁶

At the European Council in December, Mr Orbán also vetoed a wider EU financial assistance package for Ukraine worth €50 billion,¹⁷⁷ although that deal was subsequently approved at [an extraordinary meeting of the Council in early February 2024](#).

Following the meeting of European leaders in Paris at the end of February 2024, Hungary once again stated that it was not willing to provide Ukraine with military assistance with the Foreign Minister, Peter Szijjarto, arguing that “the war in Ukraine must be finished, not expanded”.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷¹ [“Joe Biden is arming Greece so Greece can arm Ukraine – and pro-Russia Republicans can't stop him”](#), Forbes, 30 January 2024 and [“Blinken's letter to Mr Mitsotakis on the F-35 and defense cooperation”](#), Kathimerini, 27 January 2024

¹⁷² DoD news, [“Strategic port access aid support to Ukraine, Austin tells Greek Defense Minister”](#), 18 July 2022

¹⁷³ [“Greece promises support for F-16s, Ukraine reconstruction during Zelenskyy visit”](#), Radio Free Europe, 21 August 2023

¹⁷⁴ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

¹⁷⁵ [“Hungary will not allow lethal weapons for Ukraine to transit its territory – FM”](#), Reuters, 28 February 2022.

¹⁷⁶ [“Kyiv removes Hungary's OTP Bank from blacklist in bid to unlock EU aid”](#), Politico, 30 September 2023 and [“EU tables reform proposal for Ukraine weapons fund”](#), Euractiv, 23 January 2024

¹⁷⁷ [“EU leaders seek workaround after Orbán blocks Ukraine aid”](#), Politico, 13 December 2023

¹⁷⁸ [“Macron says Russian defeat in Ukraine vital for security in Europe”](#), BBC News, 27 February 2024

Iceland

Iceland does not have its own armed forces and is not, therefore in a position to donate military equipment. It has however, been assisting in the delivery of equipment to Ukraine from other allies, has provided winter clothing and supplies, contributes to the International Fund for Ukraine and NATO's A new Comprehensive Assistance Package and is involved in work to establish a demining training and capacity building programme for Ukrainian personnel.¹⁷⁹

Iceland is also contributing to a combat medical training programme, in conjunction with the UK and the Netherlands, and has provided three field hospitals to Ukraine, one in collaboration with Estonia.¹⁸⁰ In early 2024, Iceland joined the IT capability coalition (see Long-term capability coalitions).¹⁸¹ Iceland has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.¹⁸²

Iceland's military assistance, to date, is estimated at €18 million.¹⁸³

Further reading:

- Government of Iceland, [War in Ukraine – Iceland's response](#)

Italy

Successive Italian governments have expressed their long-term support for Ukraine, providing a range of lethal and non-lethal weaponry including anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, machine guns, ammunition, counter-IED systems, armoured vehicles, and self-propelled artillery.¹⁸⁴ In early 2023, Italy and France also agreed to transfer the SAMP-T air defence system and provide requisite training.¹⁸⁵ In December 2023 the Government approved military assistance for a further year.¹⁸⁶ In early 2024, Italy joined the IT capability coalition (see Long-term capability coalitions).¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁹ ["Iceland charters freight aircraft for transporting equipment to Ukraine"](#), Iceland Monitor, 1 March 2022; ["Western fund hits €1.5bn in pledges to boost Ukrainian defense"](#), Politico, 11 August 2022 and Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Norwegian), 11 August 2022

¹⁸⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 June 2023; Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, [@MoD_Estonia, X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 22 June 2023 (accessed 14 July 2023) and ["Size is of no importance: Lionhearted Iceland is helping Ukraine defend Europe too"](#), Euronews, 17 July 2023

¹⁸¹ Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

¹⁸² US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

¹⁸³ Government of Iceland, [War in Ukraine – Iceland's response](#) (accessed 24 March 2024)

¹⁸⁴ ["Italy joins growing list of weapon donors to help Ukraine's defense"](#), Defense News, 28 February 2022 and Center for European Policy Analysis, ["Italy's unwavering support for Ukraine"](#), 22 June 2022

¹⁸⁵ "Italy to join forces with France in supplying air defences to Ukraine", The Financial Times, 1 February 2023

¹⁸⁶ ["Cabinet approves extension of military aid to Ukraine"](#), ANSA, 19 December 2023

¹⁸⁷ Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

While remaining committed to the defence of Ukraine, the Meloni government has, however, warned of limited defence stocks and resources, while also highlighting a change in public mood toward the conflict.¹⁸⁸ In early January, Italy's Defence Minister, Guido Crosetto, suggested that continuing military aid should be accompanied by greater diplomatic effort toward achieving a peace agreement.¹⁸⁹

Italy, as a member of the G7, has committed to provide Ukraine with long term security guarantees and signed [a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine \(PDF\)](#) on 24 February 2024.

Further reading:

- [Italy support of Ukraine – Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale](#)
- [Joint Declaration by Ukraine and Italy](#), 13 May 2023

Latvia

Latvia began providing lethal weapons in January 2022, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¹⁹⁰

Further support has included small weapons, individual equipment, dry food rations, ammunition, anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, helicopters and fuel.¹⁹¹ As a signatory to [the Tallinn Pledge](#), in January 2023 the Latvian government confirmed that it was preparing to send additional Stinger man-portable air defence systems, helicopters, machine guns, unmanned aerial vehicles and spare parts for M109 howitzers.¹⁹² The latest package of assistance was announced in January 2024.¹⁹³

Latvia has also pledged to lead the drone coalition, in partnership with the UK, that has been formed as part of the capability coalitions supporting Ukraine's long term security development. In early 2024, Latvia also joined the IT coalition (See [Long-term capability coalitions](#)).¹⁹⁴

The Ministry of Defence has also been working in partnership with the NGO, Entrepreneurs for Peace, to provide Ukraine with further assistance over the

¹⁸⁸ [“Italy confirms long-term support for Ukraine despite limited resources”](#), Euractiv, 3 October 2023; [“Italian official warns of war fatigue, limited resources for Ukraine”](#), Defense News, 5 October 2023 and [“Europe can’t afford to get war fatigue Ukrainians tell Meloni”](#), Politico, 3 November 2023

¹⁸⁹ “Italy links Ukraine aid to ‘negotiated settlement’ efforts”, The Financial Times, 10 January 2024

¹⁹⁰ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia delivers “Stinger” anti-aircraft missile system to Ukraine](#), 23 February 2022.

¹⁹¹ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 August 2022

¹⁹² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023

¹⁹³ [“Latvia announces new aid for Kyiv, including artillery, munitions, helicopters”](#), The Kyiv Independent, 11 January 2024 and President of Ukraine, [Press conference](#), 11 January 2024

¹⁹⁴ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024 and Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

winter, including the provision of military vehicles, body armour, armoured ambulances, and night vision equipment.¹⁹⁵

In February 2024, the Ministry of Defence said that total military assistance was an estimated €390 million so far.¹⁹⁶ Latvia has pledged a further €112 million of military assistance in 2024.¹⁹⁷ Of that funding, at least €10 million has been earmarked in support of the drone capability coalition.¹⁹⁸

Latvia has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.¹⁹⁹ Negotiations on an agreement began in March 2024.²⁰⁰

Further reading:

- Ministry of Defence, [Support for Ukraine](#)
- Cabinet of Ministers, [Latvia supports Ukraine](#)

Lithuania

Lithuania began providing lethal weapons to Ukraine in January 2022.²⁰¹

The total value of Lithuanian military assistance to Ukraine to mid-2023 was approximately €500 million.²⁰² Capabilities provided to Ukraine include Stinger missiles, anti-tank weapons, armoured personnel carriers, mine clearance vehicles, rifles, ammunition, drones, maritime surveillance radar, NASAMS missile launchers, anti-drone systems, personal equipment, and winter clothing.²⁰³

Ahead of the Ramstein meeting January 2023, and as part of [the Tallinn Pledge](#), Lithuania announced that it would provide anti-aircraft guns and two Mi-8 helicopters, along with drones and thermal visual devices, jamming equipment, and ammunition.²⁰⁴ Lithuania has also provided repair and maintenance assistance for Ukrainian military equipment,²⁰⁵ and has committed €2 million to the International Fund for Ukraine that will allow for

¹⁹⁵ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 August 2022

¹⁹⁶ Republic of Latvia, Cabinet of Ministers, [Latvia supports Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

¹⁹⁷ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

¹⁹⁸ As above

¹⁹⁹ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²⁰⁰ President of Ukraine, [Ukraine started negotiations with Latvia on a bilateral security agreement](#), 14 March 2024

²⁰¹ “[U.S. clears Baltic states to send U.S.-made weapons to Ukraine](#)”, Reuters, 20 January 2022

²⁰² Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, [Press release](#), 30 June 2023

²⁰³ Ministry of National Republic of Lithuania, [Lithuania renders military assistance to Ukraine](#), 24 February 2022; “[Lithuania among top 15 of Ukraine’s military donors](#)”, LRT, 25 May 2022; “[Lithuania to provide more military aid for Ukraine](#)”, The Kyiv Independent, 31 July 2022; “[Lithuania has provided €200 million in military aid to war torn Ukraine](#)”, LRT, 14 September 2022; Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, [Press release](#), 24 August 2023 and [Press release](#), 20 December 2023

²⁰⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023

²⁰⁵ See “[First Leopard 2 tanks repaired in Lithuania to return to Ukraine](#)”, The Kyiv Independent, 15 December 2023

the purchase of artillery systems and armoured fighting vehicles.²⁰⁶ In early 2024, Lithuania also joined the Czech initiative to finance the purchase hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for Ukraine from third countries outside of the EU (see [Czech Republic](#) above).²⁰⁷

Lithuania has also been providing training to Ukrainian military instructors in anti-tank weaponry and at the beginning of September 2022, 15 Lithuanian military instructors deployed to the UK to participate in the basic training programme.

At the end of June 2023, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence announced a three-year plan of assistance for the Ukrainian armed forces. That plan will focus on three main issues: continuous military assistance, the rehabilitation of injured personnel and consultations on defence reform. In January 2024, the Lithuanian government confirmed that €200 million will be provided to support these objectives between 2024 and 2026. Most of that funding is earmarked for the demining capability coalition, which is being led by Lithuania.²⁰⁸ Lithuania also joined the drone capability coalition and the IT coalition in February 2024 (See [Long-term capability coalitions](#)).²⁰⁹

Lithuania has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine,²¹⁰ and expressed concern over a “slowing down of urgency” in western support for Ukraine and called on allies to provide Ukraine with long-range missile capability.²¹¹

Luxembourg

Since the end of February 2022 Luxembourg has provided Ukraine with €150 million in military assistance,²¹² accounting for 16% of Luxembourg’s total defence expenditure.²¹³ Spending in 2024 has been set at €69 million, although this has been described by Luxembourg’s Defence Minister as “a minimum and not a ceiling”.²¹⁴

That assistance has focused mainly on ammunition, anti-tank missiles, jeeps, rocket propelled grenades, 600 rockets for the BM-21 multiple launch rocket system, Humvee light vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, machine guns and

²⁰⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023

²⁰⁷ [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#), Politico, 7 March 2024

²⁰⁸ Ministry of National Defence, [Press release](#), 10 January 2024

²⁰⁹ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia’s support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024) and Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

²¹⁰ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²¹¹ [“Lithuanian Foreign Minister seeks more military aid for Ukraine”](#), Center for European Policy Analysis, 28 September 2023

²¹² [“Luxembourg’s military aid to Ukraine soars past €150 million”](#), The Luxembourg Times, 20 September 2023

²¹³ NATO, [Press conference](#), 7 December 2023

²¹⁴ [“Luxembourg to provide €69m military aid to Ukraine in 2024”](#), Luxembourg Chronicle, 20 March 2024

non-lethal protective equipment.²¹⁵ In March 2024 it was reported that Luxembourg will procure additional drones for Ukraine, in collaboration with Belgium and the Netherlands.²¹⁶

Luxembourg has joined the F-16 air force training coalition, the artillery coalition and is jointly leading the coalition on information security with Estonia (See Long-term capability coalitions).²¹⁷ It also supports Ukraine through NATO's A new Comprehensive Assistance Package.

It has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²¹⁸

Montenegro

Since March 2022, Montenegro has donated both non-lethal and lethal military equipment to Ukraine, primarily mortars, anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition.²¹⁹ In February 2023 that assistance had been estimated at €10 million.²²⁰ which the Government said accounted for 11% of the defence budget in 2022.²²¹

The new coalition government in Montenegro, which was formed in October 2023 with [the support of an alliance led by pro-Russian Andrija Mandić](#), has made no further comment on ongoing military assistance to Ukraine, although the new Prime Minister, Miloško Spajčić, has said membership of the EU and “credible membership of NATO” are foreign policy priorities.²²² Montenegro contributes to NATO's A new Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine and has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²²³

Netherlands

As of December 2023, the Netherlands has provided €2.63 billion in military aid to Ukraine since February 2022, including a financial contribution of €100 million to the International Fund for Ukraine.²²⁴ The Dutch government has

²¹⁵ Luxembourg Government, [Press release: François Bausch announces military assistance and support measures for Ukraine](#), 28 February 2022 and [“Luxembourg to provide Ukraine more military aid”](#). The Luxembourg Times, 15 February 2023

²¹⁶ [“Luxembourg joins artillery coalition, commits to drone purchases for Ukraine”](#), RBC-Ukraine, 19 March 2024

²¹⁷ [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023 and [“Luxembourg to provide €69m military aid to Ukraine in 2024”](#), Luxembourg Chronicle, 20 March 2024

²¹⁸ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²¹⁹ [“Montenegro joins EU sanctions against Russia, moves to send aid to Ukraine”](#), N1, 2 March 2022

²²⁰ [“Montenegro has provided €10 mln in military aid to Ukraine”](#), Rubryka, 10 February 2023

²²¹ Government of Montenegro, [Press release](#), 5 December 2022

²²² [“Montenegro's new Government eyes EU membership as it finally takes power”](#), Al Jazeera, 31 October 2023

²²³ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²²⁴ Ministry of Defense, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (in Dutch) (accessed 22 January 2024) and Government of the Netherlands, [Press release](#), 10 November 2022

said that it will reserve a further €2 billion for aid to Ukraine in 2024, most of which will go towards military assistance.²²⁵

Dutch assistance to Ukraine began just prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as Russian military forces built up on Ukraine's borders.²²⁶ Further tranches of assistance have included anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank weapons, artillery, armoured vehicles, air defence missiles, ammunition, radar and medical supplies.²²⁷ In January 2023 the Netherlands also signed [the Tallinn Pledge](#). As part of that commitment the Netherlands will provide armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns and two Patriot air defence missile systems to Ukraine.

The Netherlands has also partnered with allies to provide refurbished T-72 tanks (with the US and Czech Republic),²²⁸ over 100 refurbished Leopard 1 A5 battle tanks, maintenance support and training (with Denmark and Germany)²²⁹ and 14 Leopard 2A tanks (with Denmark).²³⁰ The Netherlands has also recently joined the Czech initiative to finance the purchase hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for Ukraine from third countries outside of the EU (see [Czech Republic](#) above).²³¹

The Dutch Defence Minister announced in March 2023 that the Netherlands intended to provide two Akmaar-class minehunters to Ukraine from 2025. In the shorter-term, drone detection radar systems and bridge laying capabilities will also be provided.²³²

The Netherlands is jointly leading the F-16 training coalition,²³³ and in August 2023, confirmed, in conjunction with Denmark, that it would provide 42 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine, out of a total of 61. Eighteen of those aircraft have been made available for training in Romania. The remaining 24 aircraft will be transferred to Ukraine once pilot training is complete (see Long-term capability coalitions).²³⁴ In March 2024, the government confirmed that it is purchasing €150 million worth of ammunition for the F-16.²³⁵ The Netherlands

²²⁵ Government of the Netherlands, [Press release](#), 17 November 2023

²²⁶ Government of the Netherlands, [Press release](#), 18 February 2022

²²⁷ A full list is available at: Ministry of Defense, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (in Dutch) (accessed 22 January 2024)

²²⁸ [Joint Statement by the United States Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic \(PDF\)](#), 4 November 2022

²²⁹ Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 7 February 2023

²³⁰ Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 20 April 2023

²³¹ [“Czech Republic to deliver thousands of extra artillery shells to Ukraine”](#), The Guardian, 19 March 2024

²³² Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 14 March 2023

²³³ [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023 and Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#) (in Dutch), 14 June 2023

²³⁴ [“Netherlands and Denmark to donate up to 61 F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine”](#), The Guardian, 20 August 2023

²³⁵ Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#) (in Dutch), 20 March 2024

has also joined the IT and drone capability coalitions established in early 2024.²³⁶

The Netherlands is also participating in the UK's basic training programme for Ukrainian personnel (see above) and is working, in conjunction with the UK and Iceland on the delivery of combat medical training to Ukrainian personnel.²³⁷

The Netherlands has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine,²³⁸ and on 23 February 2024, became [one of the first non-G7 countries to sign a security agreement](#) with Ukraine.²³⁹

Further reading:

- Ministry of Defense, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (in Dutch)
- Ministry of Defense, [What is the Netherlands doing? From day to day](#) (in Dutch)
- Government of the Netherlands, [Dutch aid for Ukraine: from day to day](#).

North Macedonia

At the beginning of March 2022, the Government announced that it would donate military materiel and equipment to Ukraine.²⁴⁰ In August 2022, the Government said it had also donated several Soviet-era T-72 tanks, although did not confirm media reports that four fighter aircraft had also been sent to Ukraine.²⁴¹

In March 2023 the Government confirmed that four non-airworthy Su-25 aircraft had been previously transferred to Ukraine, presumably for parts or refurbishment, and that, pending government approval, 12 Mi-24 attack helicopters which were due to reach the end of their service life would also be transferred.²⁴²

In December 2023 the Government reportedly refused further Ukrainian requests for military donations, saying that the equipment was required for its own armed forces. It did confirm, however, its willingness to extend its

²³⁶ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024) and Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

²³⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 June 2023

²³⁸ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²³⁹ Government of the Netherlands, [Press release](#), 23 February 2024

²⁴⁰ Government of North Macedonia, [Press release](#), 2 March 2022

²⁴¹ ["Ukrainians thank North Macedonia for supply of Soviet-era tanks"](#), Radio Free Europe, 6 August 2022 and ["North Macedonia maintains silence over jet donation to Ukraine"](#), Balkan Insight, 4 August 2022

²⁴² ["North Macedonia's military backs sending Mi-24 helicopters to Ukraine"](#), Radio Free Europe, 26 March 2023 and ["North Macedonia confirms transfer of Su-25s to Ukraine, Mi-24 attack helicopters may follow"](#), Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 March 2023

training programme for Ukrainian soldiers, that had, until November 2023, remained confidential.²⁴³

North Macedonia has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²⁴⁴

Norway

Norway had a longstanding principle of not supplying weapons and ammunition to conflict zones, originating in a Parliamentary decision from 1959.²⁴⁵

On 28 February 2022, however, and in a change of policy, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre announced Norway would send both defensive and offensive weapons to Ukraine. While acknowledging Norway's "restrictive policy with regard to exporting defence-related products", he added "Ukraine is now in a desperate and extraordinary situation".²⁴⁶

Funding

In 2022 the total value of Norwegian military support to Ukraine was NOK4.4 billion (approximately €384 million), of which NOK400 million is a contribution to the International Fund for Ukraine (see above).²⁴⁷

In February 2023 the Norwegian government approved a multi-year support programme for Ukraine to 2027. Of the NOK75 billion agreed over 5 years (NOK15 billion per year), approximately half will be used to provide military support, although exact allocations will be determined each year depending on the situation.²⁴⁸

For 2023, NOK10 billion was allocated for military assistance.²⁴⁹ The government has not yet determined the exact allocation for military support for 2024, although it is expected to be in the region of NOK7.5 billion (€641 million).

On 25 July 2023 the Norwegian government also announced that it would contribute a further €22 million to the EU's European Peace Facility.²⁵⁰

²⁴³ "North Macedonia completes training first batch of Ukrainian soldiers", Balkan Insight, 22 November 2023 and "[North Macedonia will not donate military equipment to Ukraine](#)", The Geopost, 29 December 2023

²⁴⁴ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²⁴⁵ Norwegian Church Aid & Amnesty & Amnesty International Norway, [Bullets Without Borders: Improving control and oversight over Norwegian arms production, exports and investments](#) (pdf 2,38 MB), 2006, See Box 2.1.

²⁴⁶ Norwegian Government, [Press release: Norway to provide weapons to Ukraine](#), 28 February 2022, accessed 21 March 2022.

²⁴⁷ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 27 April 2022

²⁴⁸ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 16 February 2023

²⁴⁹ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 24 August 2023

²⁵⁰ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 25 July 2023

Equipment

To date, Norway has provided anti tanks weapons, [NASAMS air defence systems](#), self-propelled artillery and associated munitions, multiple launch rocket systems, ammunition, radar, armoured vehicles, tracked vehicles, and non-lethal aid such as mine clearance equipment, medical supplies, protective equipment and winter kit.²⁵¹

After Germany approved their re-export in January 2023, Norway also donated eight Leopard 2 main battle tanks, four support vehicles, and associated munitions and spares.²⁵²

Norway has also been working with partners to either provide, or co-finance the production of, equipment including howitzers (alongside Denmark, Germany, and Slovakia),²⁵³ long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Black Hornet micro-drones (with the UK),²⁵⁴ artillery shells (with Denmark and Sweden) and NASAMS air defence systems (with the US).²⁵⁵ Norway has also recently joined the Czech initiative to finance the purchase hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for Ukraine from third countries outside of the EU (see [Czech Republic](#) above).²⁵⁶

Training

Norway also contributes personnel to the UK-led basic training programme for Ukrainian personnel, the EU training mission, and is leading (alongside the UK) the new maritime capability coalition (See Long-term capability coalitions).²⁵⁷

Norway has also joined [the coalition on fast jet training](#) and in August 2023 announced that it would donate a number of F-16 aircraft to Ukraine, although provided no further details on numbers and timeframe for delivery.²⁵⁸

Norway has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²⁵⁹ Negotiations on an agreement began at the end of February 2024.²⁶⁰

²⁵¹ Norwegian government, [Norwegian support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries](#) (accessed 23 January 2024)

²⁵² [“Norway to send eight Leopard tanks to Ukraine”](#), The Local, 14 February 2023

²⁵³ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 14 October 2022

²⁵⁴ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 29 June 2022 and [Press release](#), 24 August 2022

²⁵⁵ Government of Norway, [Norwegian support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 23 January 2024)

²⁵⁶ [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#), Politico, 7 March 2024

²⁵⁷ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 11 December 2023

²⁵⁸ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 24 August 2023 and [Press release](#), 3 January 2024

²⁵⁹ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²⁶⁰ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 26 February 2024

Further reading:

- Government of Norway, [Norwegian support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries](#)
- [The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine White Paper](#), February 2024 (in Norwegian) and associated [press release](#) (in English).

Poland

Poland has been supplying defensive lethal weaponry to Ukraine since the end of January 2022.

In September 2023 former Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, said that Poland would no longer provide military assistance to Ukraine as it focused instead on “arming Poland with more modern weapons”.²⁶¹ That decision was linked in the media to [a disagreement between Ukraine and a number of EU countries, including Poland, over the export of Ukrainian grain](#). The Polish President subsequently said that the Prime Minister’s comments had been misinterpreted “in the worst possible way” and that it was only new Polish weapons that would not be sent.²⁶²

The election of a new government in late 2023 has once again shifted the debate on military assistance. In a visit to Kyiv on 22 January 2024, the new Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced a new military package of assistance for Ukraine, including a loan for larger arms purchases by Ukraine and a commitment to exploring joint weapons production.²⁶³

What equipment has Poland been providing?

Poland has been the main supplier of heavy weaponry to Ukraine, including 200 T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery (howitzers).²⁶⁴ In January 2023 the government confirmed it would complement that heavy weaponry with [Leopard 2 main battle tanks](#) and [PT-91-Twardy tanks](#).²⁶⁵ It has also established a Leopard 2 tank maintenance centre in Poland to support the sustainment of Leopard 2 tanks in theatre in Ukraine.

In January 2023, and as part of [the Tallinn Pledge](#), Poland committed to further military assistance including anti-aircraft guns and over 70,000 pieces of ammunition. Poland has also supplied anti-aircraft missiles, grenades, mortars and reconnaissance drones.

In March 2023, Poland also indicated its intention to transfer four MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine, making it the first NATO country to provide combat

²⁶¹ [“Poland will no longer send weapons to Ukraine, says PM, as grain dispute escalates”](#), The Guardian, 21 September 2023

²⁶² [“Poland no longer supplying weapons to Ukraine amid grain row”](#), BBC News, 21 September 2023

²⁶³ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 22 January 2024

²⁶⁴ Notes from Poland, [“Poland has given Ukraine military aid worth at least \\$1.7bn, expects allies to fill the gaps”](#), 15 June 2022

²⁶⁵ [“Polish PM applauds West for sending tanks to Ukraine”](#), CTV News, 27 January 2023

aircraft. Ten additional MiG-29 aircraft have since been handed over.²⁶⁶ Poland has also joined the coalition on fast jet training (see [Long-term capability coalitions](#)).²⁶⁷

Poland has been acting as a logistical hub for the transfer of military equipment from other allies into the western part of Ukraine not occupied by Russian forces,²⁶⁸ and has been a main partner in the International Donor Coordination Centre.

Poland has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²⁶⁹

Portugal

Portugal has been providing lethal and non-lethal military aid since the early phases of the conflict, although detail has been minimal.

Assistance is thought to include armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, medical vehicles and ammunition.²⁷⁰ Portugal has also donated three Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine, in return for which Germany will finance the maintenance and modernisation of 14 Leopard 2 tanks of the Portuguese armed forces.²⁷¹

In May 2023 the Portuguese Foreign Minister said that Portugal would join the F-16 training coalition, although could not send any of its F-16 aircraft to Ukraine “for the time being”.²⁷²

The country takes part in the EU’s training mission and has also offered to train Ukrainian personnel in demining and unexploded ordnance disposal.²⁷³ It has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²⁷⁴

Romania

On 27 February 2022, Romania announced it would send provisions and equipment worth €3 million to Ukraine and offered to care for the wounded in

²⁶⁶ [“Poland transfers 10 fighter jets ahead of expected counteroffensive”](#), Radio Free Europe, 8 May 2023

²⁶⁷ [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023

²⁶⁸ [“Poland ‘key’ in Western weapons supplies to Ukraine”](#), Euractiv, 1 March 2022.

²⁶⁹ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²⁷⁰ [“Portugal’s to contribute €8-10 million to EU’s arms package to Ukraine”](#), Euractiv, 1 March 2022; [“Portugal to send another 160 tonnes of military aid to Ukraine”](#), Euractiv, 18 May 2022; [“Portugal sends armoured vehicles to Ukraine”](#), Portugal Resident, 21 January 2023; Portuguese Ministry of Defense, @defesa_pt, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 16 June 2023 (accessed 18 July 2023)

²⁷¹ Republic of Portugal, [Press release](#), 4 February 2023 and Ministry of National Defence, [Letter of Intent](#). (in Portuguese), 13 December 2023

²⁷² [“Portugal offers Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilots training, no jets”](#), Euractiv, 23 May 2023

²⁷³ Government of Portugal, [Press release](#), 15 June 2022

²⁷⁴ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

military and civilian hospitals.²⁷⁵ In April 2022 amendments were also made to the country's statute book to allow arms to be supplied not just to NATO allies, but also to partner countries.²⁷⁶

While [military assistance has been ongoing](#), details are scarce.

Romania is also acting as a transit country for military equipment and supplies from allies and has been assisting in training Ukrainian forces, including offering its military bases for instructors from allied countries.²⁷⁷ Romania has joined the coalition on fast jet training,²⁷⁸ and in November 2023 opened an F-16 European training hub at an airbase in the southeast of the country.²⁷⁹

In October 2022 Romania allocated \$400,000 to the NATO Trust Fund for Ukraine.

Romania has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²⁸⁰

Slovakia

Slovakia has been a significant supplier of military equipment to Ukraine, having provided €671 million in military aid between February 2022 and October 2023.²⁸¹

Equipment has included artillery, ammunition, anti-tank missiles, mortars, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, winter supplies and fuel.²⁸² Slovakia has also supplied Soviet-era infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine, in exchange for older Leopard 2 tanks from Germany,²⁸³ provided its S-300 air defence system and transferred its fleet of 13 Soviet-era MiG-29 combat aircraft to Ukraine, becoming the second NATO country to do so. In making the announcement, former Slovakian Prime Minister Eduard Heger said the country was “on the right side of history”.²⁸⁴ The country is reported, however, to be receiving \$745

²⁷⁵ [“Romania to send fuel, ammunition to Ukraine”](#), Reuters, 27 February 2022.

²⁷⁶ [“Romania to modify its laws to deliver weapons to Ukraine”](#), Prensa Latina, 19 April 2022

²⁷⁷ [“Intel leak: Romania plays ‘key role’ in the war in Ukraine”](#), The European Conservative, 16 April 2023

²⁷⁸ [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023 and [“Romania, the silent ally avoiding entanglement in Ukraine’s war”](#), El País International, 7 September 2023

²⁷⁹ In November 2022, Romania bought 32 F-16 aircraft from Norway and will use the hub to train both domestic pilots and those of the Ukrainian air force ([“Romania opens F-16 pilot training hub for NATO allies, Ukraine”](#), Reuters, 13 November 2023 and [“Romania inaugurates F-16 pilot training hub for NATO allies and Ukraine”](#), Radio Free Europe, 14 November 2023

²⁸⁰ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²⁸¹ [“Slovakia enables arms exports to Ukraine as Fico completes backflip”](#), Politico, 16 January 2024

²⁸² [“Czech, Slovak governments increase military aid to Ukraine”](#), Reuters, 27 February 2022; [“Zuzana howitzers off to Ukraine”](#), Slovak Spectator, 2 June 2022; [“Slovakia approves new military aid package for Ukraine”](#), Ukrinform, 8 December 2022

²⁸³ [“Slovakia to send combat vehicles to Ukraine in exchange for German tanks”](#), Euractiv, 24 August 2022

²⁸⁴ [“Slovakia, after Poland, agrees to give Ukraine Soviet jets”](#), Associated Press, 17 March 2023

million in arms from the US to backfill those capabilities, including 12 attack helicopters, associated munitions and training.²⁸⁵

Slovakia also signed [the Tallinn Pledge](#) in January 2023 under which it committed to continuing discussions over further possible donations of heavy weaponry, artillery and air defence systems.²⁸⁶

Slovakia has also been operating a repair hub for damaged Ukrainian military vehicles.

Election of Prime Minister Robert Fico

Following his election victory in September 2023, Slovakia's new pro-Russian Prime Minister, Robert Fico, fulfilled one of his campaign pledges and ended military assistance to Ukraine.²⁸⁷ More recently he said that Slovakia would also veto any Ukrainian membership of NATO.²⁸⁸

Ahead of a meeting with the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal on 24 January 2024, Mr Fico reiterated his stance that no further military aid would be provided from state supplies,²⁸⁹ although it has been confirmed that the repair hub will remain operational.²⁹⁰ However, arms deliveries are still expected to continue after the government confirmed in November 2023 that it would not prevent the Slovakian defence industry from producing and exporting arms to Ukraine. Defence manufacturers have been granted €100 million in subsidies and in January 2024 the Slovakian Parliament relaxed the rules on arms exports.²⁹¹ A Joint Statement issued after the meeting between Prime Ministers Fico and Shmyhal reiterated "the importance of developing a military-technical cooperation on a commercial basis".²⁹²

Slovenia

Slovenia has provided both lethal and non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine since the end of February 2022. While details remain largely classified, that equipment has included drones, large numbers of Soviet-era M-84 and M-55 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Those latter donations

²⁸⁵ ["US offers helicopters to Slovakia for giving jets to Ukraine"](#), Defense News, 22 March 2023

²⁸⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023

²⁸⁷ ["Slovakia shift, elections in Poland dampen support for Ukraine"](#), Defense News, 3 October 2023

²⁸⁸ ["Slovakia would veto Ukrainian membership in NATO, PM says ahead of visit"](#), Radio Free Europe, 22 January 2024

²⁸⁹ ["Slovak PM claims Ukraine is not a sovereign country"](#), Euractiv, 21 January 2024

²⁹⁰ NATO, [Press release](#), 14 December 2023

²⁹¹ "Slovakia's Prime Minister u-turns on Ukraine support during visit", The Financia Times, 24 January 2024 and ["Slovakia enables arms exports to Ukraine as Fico completes backflip"](#), Politico, 16 January 2024

²⁹² Government of Ukraine, [Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and the Slovak Republic](#), 24 January 2024

have reportedly been made in exchange for German tanks, armoured personnel carriers and military transport vehicles.²⁹³

Increasingly there has been a shift in focus toward the provision of humanitarian aid, and in particular de-mining assistance.²⁹⁴ In March 2024, the Slovenian Ministry of Defense confirmed that it had joined the Czech initiative to supply Ukraine with ammunition, donating €1 million towards the joint procurement effort.²⁹⁵

Slovenia has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²⁹⁶

Further reading:

- Government of Slovenia, [We remain in solidarity with Ukraine](#), February 2023

Spain

On 28 February 2022, the Spanish government said that Spain would be prepared to send defensive military equipment to Ukraine, but ruled out sending offensive weapons, in part due to opposition from within the ruling coalition. However, after criticism from opposition parties the government changed course, confirming on 2 March 2022 that Spain would now send offensive weapons.²⁹⁷

Military assistance has included machine guns and ammunition, anti-tank grenade launchers, Hawk air defence systems (and requisite training), armoured vehicles, artillery munitions, communications equipment, protective equipment, medical supplies, fuel and winter kit.²⁹⁸

Following the decision by Germany to approve the re-export of Leopard 2 main battle tanks, the Spanish government indicated that it was open to providing Ukraine with this capability “in coordination with Western allies”.²⁹⁹ Ten Leopard 2 tanks have since been delivered.

In June 2023, the Spanish Defence Minister provided an update on military assistance to Ukraine. She confirmed that a further four Leopard 2 tanks

²⁹³ [“Slovenia sending tanks to Ukraine in weapons swap with Germany”](#), Slovenia News, 21 April 2022 and [“Slovenia to supply 28 M-55S tanks to Ukraine”](#), TASS, 20 September 2022 and [“Slovenian firm quietly provides surveillance drones to Ukraine”](#), Defense News, 26 October 2023

²⁹⁴ Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 4 December 2023

²⁹⁵ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, [@MO_RS, X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 15 March 2024 (accessed 26 March 2024)

²⁹⁶ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²⁹⁷ [“Spanish coalition split over decision to deliver weapons to Ukraine”](#), Euractiv, 3 March 2022.

²⁹⁸ [“Spain to send anti-aircraft battery, armoured vehicles to Ukraine”](#), Kyiv Post, 25 August 2022; NATO, [Press conference by the NATO Secretary General](#), 13 October 2022; [Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union: 2023](#) (accessed 23 January 2024) and Government of Spain, [Press release](#), 14 February 2024

²⁹⁹ [“Ukraine updates: Germany approves sending of Leopard 2 tanks”](#), Deutsche Welle, 25 January 2023

would be delivered to Ukraine, in addition to a military hospital and a further 20 armoured vehicles.³⁰⁰ Six additional Hawk air defence systems were also announced in October 2023.³⁰¹

Spain also [supports the EU Training Mission for Ukraine](#), has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine and has indicated its intention to join six of the capability coalitions established under the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (maritime security, artillery, ground-based air defence, IT, drones and demining).³⁰²

Negotiations on a long-term security agreement began in early March 2024.³⁰³

Turkey

Until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Turkey was the only country other than the US to provide Ukraine with lethal arms.

In 2019, Ukraine purchased a number of Bayraktar drones from Turkey. Used primarily for reconnaissance, in October 2021 Ukrainian armed forces used them for the first time to strike targets in the Donbas, which provoked severe criticism from Russia.³⁰⁴

On 1 March 2022, giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK, Vadym Prystaiko, confirmed that Ukraine needs more Bayraktar drones and “Turkey is supplying [them], but we are still far from being able to use them effectively”, he also confirmed that more Ukrainian drone operators were being trained in Turkey itself.³⁰⁵

The Turkish government has, however, referred to the drone shipments as “private sales” rather than military aid as it seeks to maintain a balancing act between Russia and the West.³⁰⁶

In June 2023 it was reported by the Turkish media that Ankara has approved the necessary licensing permits for the Turkish company Baykar, which produces Bayraktar drones, to build a drone production plant in Ukraine. The plant is predicted to be operational in 2025.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁰ Spanish Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#) (in Spanish), 15 June 2023

³⁰¹ [“Spain announces additional Hawk air defence systems for Ukraine”](#), The Defense Post, 9 October 2023

³⁰² US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023 and Government of Spain, [Press release](#), 23 January 2024

³⁰³ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 4 March 2024

³⁰⁴ [“Putin criticises Ukraine’s use of Turkish drones in Erdogan call”](#), Alarabiya News, 3 December 2021

³⁰⁵ Foreign Affairs Committee, [Oral evidence: Ukraine - 01 Q3 22](#), HC 1089, Q43.

³⁰⁶ [“Turkey, balancing Russia ties, says drones to Ukraine are sales not aid”](#), Reuters, 3 March 2022

³⁰⁷ [“Turkey Grants Ukraine License to Produce Bayraktar Drones”](#), Kyiv Post, 23 June 2023 and [“Turkey’s Baykar to spend \\$100 million on Ukraine drone production”](#), Defense News, 10 October 2023

Turkey is also reported to have provided 50 mine-resistant armoured vehicles, with further deliveries expected.³⁰⁸

2.5

Other allies and partners

Austria

In line with its long-standing neutrality policy,³⁰⁹ Austria will not send lethal aid to the Ukrainian military. Austria has however provided non-lethal aid in the form of helmets, protective vests, fuel winter supplies and provides substantial [humanitarian assistance](#).

Cyprus

Cyprus will not send military aid to Ukraine, though it is participating in the European Peace Facility,³¹⁰ and has been providing de-mining training and assistance, in conjunction with the US and Ireland, under the auspices of the EU training mission for Ukraine.³¹¹

Cyprus has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.³¹²

Ireland

In line with its traditional policy of military neutrality, Ireland's contributions (€122 million) to the EU's European Peace Facility (EPF) will go towards providing non-lethal materials such as medical supplies, fuel, helmets and vests. Irish Defence Force personnel are also contributing to the EU training mission for Ukraine.³¹³

When asked in February 2022 whether anti-tank missiles held by Ireland's Defence Forces could be sent to Ukraine, the then Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin said he believed "what we're doing is sufficient", and that it wasn't an issue now the EPF was activated, as that was providing lethal weapons.³¹⁴

³⁰⁸ ["Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine"](#), Defense News, 22 August 2022

³⁰⁹ In 1955 it passed a [constitutional law on the neutrality of Austria](#), that bars Austria from joining any military alliances and from allowing any foreign military bases on its territory (New Austrian Information, Dr. Helmut Tichy, [Austria's Permanent Neutrality](#), 2015-16)

³¹⁰ ["Cyprus to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine, not military equipment"](#), KNews, 28 February 2022.

³¹¹ ["Ukrainian deminers get training in Cyprus from US, Irish experts"](#), Associated Press, 12 May 2023

³¹² US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

³¹³ ["Ireland rethinks neutrality in wake of Ukraine war"](#), Deutsche Welle, 15 April 2023

³¹⁴ ["Taoiseach says Ireland's non-lethal military support for Ukraine is 'sufficient' as EU members are sending weapons"](#), The Journal, 28 February 2022.

Ireland has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.³¹⁵

Sweden

Sweden has had a longstanding policy of military non-alignment. On 27 February, however, the Prime Minister announced that “Sweden is now proposing direct support for Ukraine’s armed forces”. That initial package of support included field rations, helmets, body shields and 5,000 anti-tank weapons”.³¹⁶ In addition, Sweden would also provide 500 million Swedish Krona, (approximately €47 million) of financial support to Ukraine’s Armed Forces.³¹⁷

Over the last two years, further military assistance has included both lethal and non-lethal equipment. Additional anti-tank weapons, personal protective equipment, infantry support weapons, ammunition, mine clearance equipment, combat rations, winter supplies, all-terrain vehicles, small arms, and anti-ship missile systems have been provided, along with parts for advanced air defence systems (Hawk and Iris-T), underwater weapons, boats, CV-90 infantry fighting vehicles and the Archer artillery system.³¹⁸ The Swedish government has also donated Leopard 2 main battle tanks.³¹⁹ In early 2024 the government announced that it would also join the Czech initiative to procure ammunition from the global market. Sweden has provided €30 million to help finance the project.³²⁰

Sweden is also deploying a number of military instructors to the UK to participate in the basic training programme for Ukrainian personnel (see above). It also takes part in the EU Assistance Mission for Ukraine, supports demining training in Lithuania,³²¹ and has also joined the coalition on fast jet training and the capability coalition on drones established in January 2024 (see [Long-term capability coalitions](#)).³²²

Swedish military assistance, to date, totals SEK30 billion (approximately €2.6 billion).³²³ Sweden contributes to the [International Fund for Ukraine](#) and the NATO [A new Comprehensive Assistance Package](#).

³¹⁵ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

³¹⁶ “[Sweden to send military aid to Ukraine - PM Andersson](#)”, Reuters, 27 February 2022.

³¹⁷ Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde, @AnnLinde, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 27 February 2022 (accessed 25 January 2024)

³¹⁸ Government of Sweden, [Press release](#), 1 July 2022; [Press release](#), 30 August 2022; [Press release](#), 16 November 2022; “[Sweden to send more weapons to Ukraine, including Archer system](#)”, Euractiv, 20 January 2023 and Government of Sweden, [Press release](#), 20 February 2024

³¹⁹ Government Office of Sweden, [Press release](#), 24 February 2023

³²⁰ Government of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

³²¹ Government Office of Sweden, [Press release](#), 16 November 2022 and Government Office of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 23 January 2024)

³²² [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023 and Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia’s support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

³²³ Government Office of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 22 February 2024)

Sweden has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.³²⁴

Further reading:

- Government Office of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#)
- Government Office of Sweden, [Sweden's support to Ukraine](#)

Switzerland

Historically neutral Switzerland has offered to train Ukrainian specialists in the removal of landmines, cluster munitions and other explosives remnants of war as part of their established training course conducted in collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.³²⁵

The Swiss Government has, however, come in for criticism over its refusal to allow Germany to re-export Swiss-made anti-aircraft ammunition to Ukraine and to allow Swiss company RUAG to re-export a number of Leopard 1 tanks that are in storage in Italy.³²⁶ In May 2022 Switzerland also refused a request from Denmark to allow the re-export of 24 Swiss-made Piranha armoured personnel carriers to the Ukrainian armed forces. The Swiss government believes that the re-export of weaponry would jeopardise its political neutrality.³²⁷

There have been calls for Switzerland to revisit its neutral status within the context of arming Ukraine.³²⁸

Australia

Australia has provided over AUD \$780 million in military assistance to Ukraine since February 2022.³²⁹

That assistance includes Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles and other armoured vehicles, de-mining equipment and unmanned aerial systems. In June 2023, the Government announced that further assistance would be provided in the form of military vehicles and artillery ammunition.³³⁰ An Australian E7-A Wedgetail early warning aircraft also deployed to Germany in

³²⁴ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

³²⁵ Swiss Government, [Press release](#) (in French), 18 July 2022

³²⁶ [“Federal Council rejects export request for Leopard 1 A5 tanks destined for Ukraine”](#), Global Security, 28 June 2023

³²⁷ [“Swiss veto of weapons re-exports to Ukraine angers Germany”](#), The Financial Times, 31 October 2022

³²⁸ [“Switzerland rethinks neutrality, considers weapons exports amid Ukraine crisis”](#), Politico, 2 February 2023

³²⁹ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024

³³⁰ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 26 June 2023

October 2023, along with up to 100 crew and support personnel, to help secure the route for humanitarian and military assistance into Ukraine.³³¹

Australia has also donated AUD \$24 million to NATO's [A new Comprehensive Assistance Package](#) and AUD \$50 million to the [International Fund for Ukraine](#).³³²

At the end of October 2022, the government announced that up to 70 Australian Defence Force personnel would join the UK training programme for Ukrainian soldiers (Operation Interflex), from January 2023.³³³ In December 2023 the number of personnel deployed on each rotation was increased to 90, while training was expanded to also include a junior leadership training programme.³³⁴

In March 2024, Australia also joined the drone capability coalition that is being led by the UK and Latvia.³³⁵

Further reading:

- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, [Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#)

New Zealand

New Zealand has donated both non-lethal military equipment and \$22.9 million for the purchase of non-lethal military equipment for Ukraine.³³⁶

A number of intelligence, logistics and liaison personnel have also deployed to the UK, Germany and Belgium to assist in the coordination of support.

An Air Force C130 transport aircraft which had deployed to Europe to assist allies with transport and logistics returned to New Zealand at the end of June 2022. An artillery training team from the New Zealand Defence Force deployed in the UK, also returned in July 2022.³³⁷

Since September 2022, 120 military personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force have deployed to the UK to participate in the basic training programme for the Ukrainian armed forces.³³⁸ The mandate for that operation was extended at the beginning of 2024 until June 2025.³³⁹ The New Zealand

³³¹ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 10 July 2023

³³² Australian Government, [Press release](#), 4 July 2022 and Australian Government, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024

³³³ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 27 October 2022

³³⁴ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 14 December 2023

³³⁵ ["Australia joins drone coalition agreement to aid in Ukraine war effort"](#), The Guardian, 21 March 2024

³³⁶ New Zealand Government, [Press release](#), 13 July 2023

³³⁷ New Zealand Government, [Press release](#), 28 June 2022

³³⁸ New Zealand Defence Force, [Press release](#), 15 November 2023

³³⁹ New Zealand Defence Force, [Press release](#), 24 February 2024

Government has also announced a \$6.5 million contribution to the [International Fund for Ukraine](#).³⁴⁰

Further reading:

- [Support to Ukraine - New Zealand Defence Force \(nzdf.mil.nz\)](#)

Japan

On 8 March 2022, the Japanese government announced that it had sent non-lethal military aid to Ukraine, with the assistance of the US air force, although it confirmed there were no plans to send lethal aid.³⁴¹ This step was still regarded, however, as significant for Japan, which has been tentatively [pushing the bounds of its pacifist constitution](#) over the last several years.

Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo [introduced looser restrictions on exporting military equipment abroad in 2014](#),³⁴² but there were questions as to whether the transfer of military equipment to Ukraine met even these more relaxed rules, as they are supposed to bar providing defence supplies to a country "party to a conflict".³⁴³

The Japanese government has taken the view that the "party to a conflict" term which is defined in the export rules as "a country against which the UN Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack," does not apply to Ukraine.³⁴⁴

A further loosening of arms export rules in December 2023 will also allow the export of military equipment produced under foreign licence, to the countries of origin.³⁴⁵ That decision has allowed Japan to provide Patriot air defence missiles to the United States in order to replenish its stocks. While those missiles cannot be transferred to a third country without Japan's permission, the decision has been regarded as inadvertent support for Ukraine as it allows the US more freedom to send US-manufactured air defence systems to the country.³⁴⁶

In December 2023, Japan also extended its support to the demining and information security coalitions being established by Ukraine's partners (See Long-term capability coalitions).³⁴⁷

³⁴⁰ New Zealand Defence Force, [Press release](#), 22 February 2024

³⁴¹ ["US begins flying Japanese non-lethal military aid to Ukraine"](#), Reuters, 16 March 2022

³⁴² ["UPDATE 2-Japan relaxes arms export regime to fortify defence"](#), Reuters, 1 April 2014

³⁴³ ["Japan sends bulletproof vests from defense forces to Ukraine"](#), Kyodo News, 8 March 2022.

³⁴⁴ ["Japan sends bulletproof vests from defense forces to Ukraine"](#), Kyodo News, 8 March 2022.

³⁴⁵ ["Japan to allow arms exports to patent holder nations"](#), Nikkei Asia, 14 December 2023

³⁴⁶ ["Japan's Patriot missile transfer to US stuns Indo-Pacific watchers"](#), Nikkei Asia, 23 December 2023

³⁴⁷ Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 1 December 2023

As a member of the G7, Japan has also committed to provide Ukraine with [long term security guarantees \(PDF\)](#), including the provision of military assistance. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement began in October 2023.³⁴⁸

Japan has also contributed \$30 million to the NATO Trust Fund that underpins the A new Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.³⁴⁹

2.6

NATO military assistance

NATO, as an alliance, has been clear in its political support of Ukraine and fully supports the provision of bilateral military assistance by individual allies to enable it to “uphold its right of self-defence”.³⁵⁰ NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian government (see above) and is supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid.³⁵¹

Ukraine is not a NATO member, however, and therefore isn’t party to NATO’s mutual defence clause under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. As such, NATO troops will not be deployed on the ground in Ukraine. Allies have also ruled out imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine because it would bring Russia into direct conflict with NATO forces.³⁵²

A new Comprehensive Assistance Package

NATO military support prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was primarily provided through a [Comprehensive Assistance Package \(CAP\) that had been agreed in 2016](#).

At the Heads of State and Government summit in Madrid at the end of June 2022 NATO allies agreed a new package of assistance for Ukraine that will provide long term, sustained, support. One of the longer terms aims of the alliance has been to assist Ukraine in moving away from Soviet-era equipment and bring Ukrainian forces and equipment up to NATO standards.

According to the Madrid Summit Declaration, the package will “accelerate the delivery of non-lethal defence equipment, improve Ukraine’s cyber defences and resilience, and support modernising its defence sector in its transition to strengthen long-term interoperability”. In the longer term, NATO will also assist Ukraine in any future post-war reconstruction and reform.³⁵³

“The Alliance will always maintain its full support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders”.

NATO, Relations with Ukraine

³⁴⁸ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 7 October 2023

³⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, [Press release](#), 30 March 2023

³⁵⁰ NATO, [Relations with Ukraine](#) and [NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

³⁵¹ NATO, [NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

³⁵² NATO, [NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

³⁵³ NATO, [Madrid Summit Declaration](#), 29 June 2022

Speaking at a press conference on 29 June 2022, the NATO Secretary General provided further detail of the non-lethal equipment that will be provided:

Allies will continue to provide major military and financial help. And today, leaders agreed to strengthen our support by agreeing a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.

This includes secure communications, fuel, medical supplies, and body armour. Equipment to counter mines and chemical and biological threats. And hundreds of portable anti-drone systems.

Over the longer-term, we will help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era equipment to modern NATO equipment. Boost interoperability. And further strengthen its defence and security institutions.

All of this shows our commitment to Ukraine's future, and that our commitment is unshakeable. A strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.³⁵⁴

Following a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on 5 April 2023, the NATO Secretary General said that the CAP would be developed into a new strategic multi-year assistance programme that would “assist Ukraine on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration”.³⁵⁵ That programme was agreed at the Vilnius Summit in July 2023.³⁵⁶

Donations of lethal weaponry will continue, on a bilateral basis.

2.7

EU military assistance to Ukraine

Historical support

Historically, the EU had only provided limited [support for civilian security sector reform](#). Military reform has largely been the focus of NATO and bilateral cooperation with individual allies.

However, in December 2021 the EU announced a package of measures to help strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces. Established under the EU's new [European Peace Facility](#),³⁵⁷ the package was worth €31 million over three years and would finance military medical units, including field hospitals, engineering, mobility and logistics units and support on cyber.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁴ NATO, [Press conference by the NATO Secretary General](#), 29 June 2022

³⁵⁵ NATO, [NATO Foreign Ministers wrap up meetings with focus on China and support to Ukraine](#), 5 April 2023

³⁵⁶ NATO, [Vilnius Summit Communiqué](#), 11 July 2023

³⁵⁷ The [European Peace Facility \(EPF\)](#) was established in March 2021 as an “off budget” instrument that allows the EU to finance operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications. It replaces the previous Athena Mechanism through which the common costs of EU military operations were financed.

³⁵⁸ Council on the European Union, [Press release](#), 2 December 2021

Discussions were also held over the possible establishment of an EU military training assistance mission to Ukraine, which would focus on military education reform.³⁵⁹ This proposal never came to fruition however following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Support since Russian military operations began

At the time of writing, the EU has mobilised €11.1 billion in military assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 27 February 2022 EU High-Representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, announced that the EU would directly finance lethal military assistance to Ukraine. The EPF will be used to fund two emergency assistance measures: “to finance the supply of lethal material to the Ukrainian army, as well as urgently needed fuel, protective equipment and emergency medical supplies”.³⁶⁰

Mr Borrell said that a “taboo has fallen”, and that this will be the first time in history that the EU will be providing lethal equipment to a third country.³⁶¹

Irish Foreign and Defence Minister Simon Coveney said that under the EPF mechanism, countries uncomfortable with supplying lethal aid such as Ireland, would have the option of putting their contributions to the EPF towards alternative forms of assistance, such as medical supplies and protective armour. Austria and Malta are said to be following a similar approach.³⁶²

€11.1 billion has been mobilised in military support for Ukraine under the EPF since 2022:

- Seven individual tranches of military assistance (approximately €500 million apiece).
- The establishment of a €5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund.
- Two industry assistance measures (collectively worth €2 billion) for the joint procurement of ammunition and missiles.
- Financial support for the EU Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine (€362 million).³⁶³

Tranches of EPF Funding

Seven tranches of military assistance to Ukraine have been announced in total (approximately €500 million each). The last package was announced on

³⁵⁹ EU External Action Service, [Foreign Affairs Council: Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell](#), 24 January 2022

³⁶⁰ EU External Action Service, [Further measures to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine: Press statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell](#), 27 February 2022.

³⁶¹ EU External Action Service, [Further measures to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine: Press statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell](#), 27 February 2022.

³⁶² [Irish PM: Non-lethal aid to Ukraine not against military neutrality](#), Euractiv, 1 March 2022.

³⁶³ Council of the European Union, [EU solidarity with Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

23 January 2023.³⁶⁴ An eighth package of EPF support worth €500 million has been under discussion for several months following disagreements on the size of the fund, how it should be administered and from opposition by Hungary.³⁶⁵ Following its meeting in March 2024, the European Council called on EU ministers to work on that eighth package of support, while at the same time welcoming the adoption of a long-term Ukraine Assistance Fund under the auspices of the EPF.³⁶⁶

Ukraine Assistance Fund

Since it was established in 2021, the EU has made several changes to the financial ceiling of the EPF to accommodate the financing of military assistance to Ukraine.³⁶⁷

On 18 March 2024 EU Ministers approved a further €5 billion increase for the EPF, taking the total fund to €17 billion for the period 2021-2027. That additional funding will, however, be ring-fenced within the EPF specifically for military support to Ukraine. The Ukraine Assistance Fund will provide for the longer-term funding of both lethal and non-lethal military assistance and training.³⁶⁸

Collective procurement of ammunition

In March 2023, EU Member States agreed several measures to help alleviate the urgent shortfalls in artillery ammunition required by Ukraine.³⁶⁹

A three-pronged approach was adopted:

1. €1 billion would be provided from the European Peace Facility to reimburse Member States who immediately supply ammunition, and missiles if requested, from national inventories, or from pre-existing orders. Approval of EPF funding to meet this first element of the EU package was given on 13 April 2023.³⁷⁰
2. A further €1 billion has been set aside to reimburse joint procurement of ammunition, and missiles, from European industry and Norway³⁷¹ to both

“We are in war times, and we have to have – I am sorry to say – a war mentality”.

EU High Representative Josep Borrell, 8 March 2023

³⁶⁴ European External Action Service, [Informal videoconference of Foreign Affairs Ministers: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the press conference](#), 27 February 2022; Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 23 March 2022, [Press release](#) 13 April 2022, [Press release 24 May 2022](#), [Press release](#), 22 July 2022, [Press release](#), 17 October 2022 and Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by the High Representative, 23 January 2023

³⁶⁵ [“Franco-German brake delays Ukraine arms”](#), Politico Brussels Playbook, 21 February 2024

³⁶⁶ European Council, [Meeting conclusions, FUCO 7/24](#) (PDF), 21 March 2024, para.3

³⁶⁷ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 12 December 2022; Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 14 March 2023; Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 26 June 2023 and Council of the European Union, Press release, 18 March 2024

³⁶⁸ Council of the European Union, Press release, 18 March 2024

³⁶⁹ EU External Action Service, [Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell at the press conference](#), 20 March 2023 and European Council, [European Council meeting conclusions \(PDF\)](#), 23 March 2023

³⁷⁰ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 13 April 2023

³⁷¹ Norway is a [partner nation of the European Defence Agency](#).

replenish national stocks and to support Ukraine. Joint procurement projects are either being managed by the European Defence Agency or through a lead nation framework led by France and Germany. So far [24 member states, plus Norway, have entered into administrative project arrangements with the EDA](#). By procuring jointly, the aim is to reduce unit price and delivery time. However, talks are ongoing over the role of non-EU companies in these joint procurement projects.

3. To increase the capacity of the European defence industrial base, on 3 May 2023 the European Commission presented the [Act in Support of Ammunition Production \(ASAP\)](#), which was subsequently adopted on 20 July 2023. Under the legislation, financial support (in the form of grants) will be provided to EU industry involved in the production of ammunition and missiles (including their supply chains), to increase production capacity and tackle identified bottlenecks. A mapping exercise will also be undertaken to identify and continuously monitor the availability of ammunition and missiles, and their components, to guarantee security of supply. The Commission also proposes to introduce measures that will temporarily allow Member States to prioritise certain orders and companies and speed up administrative processes at the national level.³⁷²

The aim of the Commission's three-track approach was to provide one million munitions within one year, although the EU has acknowledged that it will now fall short of that target.³⁷³

The EU High Representative has made clear that any joint procurement proposals do not preclude EU member states from also pursuing a national approach saying that “nothing excludes the other”.³⁷⁴ However, disagreements initially arose over the sourcing of ammunition, with France, Greece and Cyprus pushing for a “buy European” approach that would preclude using EPF funds to procure from outside of the EU.³⁷⁵ In response, the leaders of Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Estonia and the Netherlands called, in an open letter to the Financial Times, for accelerated efforts to deliver the promised artillery rounds to Ukraine, arguing that “the ways are less important. The ends and means are critical”.³⁷⁶ As outlined above, in early 2024 the Czech Republic subsequently established an independent initiative to procure up to 800,000 artillery shells from the global market, securing the requisite finance from partners and allies (see [Czech Republic](#)).

³⁷² European Commission, [Act in Support of Ammunition Production](#), 3 May 2023

³⁷³ EU External Action Service, [Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell](#), 31 January 2024

³⁷⁴ EU External Action Service, [Foreign Affairs Council: Press remarks upon arrival](#), 20 March 2023

³⁷⁵ [“Why the West is losing Ukraine”](#), Politico, 21 February 2024

³⁷⁶ [Letter: Call for a collective effort to arm Ukraine for the long term](#), The Financial Times, 31 January 2024

An EU training mission for Ukraine

At the end of August 2022 EU Defence Ministers agreed to begin preparatory work on a possible [EU military training mission to Ukraine](#) that would complement existing bilateral and multilateral efforts.³⁷⁷

Approval for that training mission was given in October 2022 and it launched in November 2022.³⁷⁸ Initially mandated for two years, it has the aim of providing specialised training to 30,000 Ukrainian armed forces personnel. Training is taking place at various locations across the EU, and it is open to participation by third states.³⁷⁹ €362 million has been provided to the training mission through the European Peace Facility so far.³⁸⁰

The UK Government welcomed the original announcement, saying that it would work with the EU to ensure the mission remains “complementary” to its own training programme in the UK (Operation Interflex).³⁸¹

³⁷⁷ EU External Action Service, [Informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers: Press remarks by EU High Representative](#), 30 August 2022

³⁷⁸ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 15 November 2022

³⁷⁹ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 17 October 2022

³⁸⁰ Council of the European Union, [EU solidarity with Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

³⁸¹ PQ65592. [Ukraine: Armed forces](#), 25 October 2022

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