The Strait of Gibraltar is one of the international straits with the busiest maritime traffic in the world; it is the key to communicate the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, Africa and Europe. Regarding the marine spaces proclaimed by the coastal States, it can be stated that most of the waters of the Strait are under the sovereignty of those States, as the waters of the Strait are part of their interior waters or their territorial sea. Due to these features, as well as the fact that Gibraltar connects the Spanish, Portuguese and Moroccan EEZ in the Atlantic Ocean with the Moroccan EEZ and offshore in the Mediterranean sea, the Strait of Gibraltar can be classified within the category of international straits regulated by the article 37 of the UNCLOS and it is thus under the regime of transit passage. Regarding the definition of the marine spaces, it is important to highlight that the situation of these waters is rather complicated, due to the different points of view that the implicated States have about the same reality. It is the case of the colony of Gibraltar with regard to the United Kingdom and Spain, and it is also the case of Ceuta and Perejil Island with regard to Spain and Morocco. Hence, there is a paradoxical situation: three States which have different points of view claim territorial waters, which causes the juxtaposition of their jurisdictions regarding their marine spaces. The United Kingdom defends its sovereignty over the north-eastern part, beyond the waters of the harbor, expanding its jurisdiction 3 NM around the Rock of Gibraltar and 2 NM inside the Algeciras Bay; the Spanish government does not consent this situation. Spain considers that there are only two coastal States in the Strait, and it does not approve of any delimitation of waters with any State but Morocco. Morocco, in turn, keeps on claiming the Spanish territories in the African coast and it does not recognize the existence of Spanish waters around these territories; in addition, Morocco does not take these waters into account for any delimitation. The lack of definition of frontiers that this situation creates does not affect navigation in the Strait. However, it is undeniable that the existence of delimitation agreements would contribute to a greater international cooperation in the area.

Ostensibly, friction between Spain and the UK since 1997, relates to the non-respect by Spanish fishing vessels of the territorial waters of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (CCG), actions taken by the British authorities to counteract this and the obstructionist policies of the Spanish in ...

If Spain and the UK both agree to submit the Gibraltar issue to the International Courts of Justice for an opinion, what might the ICJ decide? The information provided below will examine Spain’s claims. The attached information is based upon previous ICJ judgments, Advisory Opinions, UN resolutions and associated matters that might provide the answer to how the ICJ would deal with such a case.

The pending maritime delimitations between Spain and Morocco are highly complex and noteworthy due to the existence of diverse factors, namely the particularity that the delimitations shall be conducted in two different seas: the Alboran Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, various sovereignty issues must be addressed, such as the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, which are claimed by Morocco generating maritime entitlements, and the Western Sahara dispute and Morocco's intention to include the Western Sahara maritime areas under its jurisdiction. In terms of the latter issue, this article studies the fisheries agreements concluded between the European Union and Morocco and the recent decisions given by the Court of Justice of the European Union, declaring those agreements prohibited under international law in respect of Western Sahara waters. Other significant matters analyzed are the views of both countries, the existence of several overlapping maritime claims with third States and the negotiations that have been carried out thus far to reach an agreement delimiting the maritime boundaries. On this subject, it is crucial to determine whether a tacit agreement exists – on the basis of the hydrocarbon activities licensed by Spain and Morocco – establishing the maritime boundary between the Canary Islands and Morocco's Atlantic coast. For this purpose, the findings of recent international jurisprudence, particularly the judgement given by ITLOS on the Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire case, are considered.

The historical Anglo-Spanish dispute over the waters of Gibraltar is based on two separate and specific territorial disputes: one related to the conventional cession of Gibraltar by Spain in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the other related to the British occupation of the Isthmus. The Spanish government has used the cession in Article 10 of that Treaty as the legal basis in both cases, merely stating that it does not recognise British jurisdiction over any waters other than those expressly ceded by it. Ever since the Tripartite Forum of Dialogue on Gibraltar was created in 2004 by a soft law agreement among the governments of Spain, the United Kingdom and Gibraltar as a separate framework from the Brussels Process on Anglo-Spanish sovereignty claims, we believe that this Forum has become an appropriate institutional framework for addressing issues of practical cooperation related to the disputed waters as well, establishing safeguard clauses related to sovereignty issues.

Estudio del régimen jurídico de la navegación por el Estrecho de Gibraltar.

'The Gibraltar crisis and the measures, options and strategies open to Spain' Alejandro del Valle Gálvez. ARI 32/2013 (Translated from Spanish) - 30/9/2013 Theme: What options and strategies are open to Spain in its historical dispute with the UK over Gibraltar? A crisis again broke out with Gibraltar and the UK in July and August of 2013 over the sinking of an artificial reef in waters traditionally exploited by Spanish fishermen. Summary: The controversy over Gibraltar has flared up again following the Gibraltar government’s unilateral decision to create an artificial reef with concrete blocks in waters claimed by Spain. Beyond the issues of fishing rights and the environment, the controversy over the waters surrounding the Rock add an element of conflict to the sovereignty dispute within a general context of a deadlock in the negotiation process between Spain and the UK. After analysing Spain’s possible strategic options regarding Gibraltar today (reactivating the Brussels process and the Trilateral Forum, an international court ruling, a new international statute for Gibraltar and a low-profile reclamation to limit Gibraltarian abuses), the parcel of measures announced by Spain can be classified as being part of the traditional strategic option of displaying firmness in response to Gibraltar engaging in acts that are illegal or detrimental to Spain’s rights. Furthermore, although not aimed at resolving the controversy, the parcel of measures does have an important objective: the establishment of four-sided ad hoc working groups (the two States involved plus Gibraltar and the Junta de Andalucía –the regional government of Andalusia–). Nevertheless, some of the proposed measures are debatable, such as the proposed €50 levy on crossing the frontier, and might even further undermine the Gibraltarians’ trust in the medium-term. Subsequently, it has been revealed that there is a plan for an all-out offensive in international forums for Spain’s territorial claim which, in practice, contemplates all four options open to Spain. Nonetheless, the recovery of Gibraltar as a wide-ranging international political action requires the prior negotiation of a broad internal consensus, which should clearly define the medium and long term objectives that are being sought in addition to considering delicate issues connected to the security of the British military base on the Rock as well as the inevitable international political comparison with Ceuta and Melilla. _______________________________________ http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/spanishforeignpolicy/ari32-2013-delvalle-crisis-gibraltar-medidas-opciones-estrategias-espana#.U7gpupR_vE0

GIBRALTAR , THE BREXIT, THE SYMBOLIC SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE DISPUTE. A PRINCIPALITY IN THE STRAITS ? Alejandro del Valle Gálvez I. NEGOTIATION DEADLOCK AND CROSSBORDER COOPERATION II. GIBRALTAR AND BREXIT: CHANGES IN THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS III. THE NEED FOR A NEW STATUS IN THE EU AND THE KEY ROLE OF SPAIN IN TUE ART. 50 WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS IV. REMAINING IN THE EU: SCOTLAND AND THE ‘GREENLAND’ MODEL AND THE MICRO STATE-STYLE RELATIONSHIP V. IS JOINT SOVEREIGNTY A SOLUTION? VI. A PROVISIONAL MODUS VIVENDI VII. LOOKING FOR NEW IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS. A PRINCIPALITY IN THE STRAITS? THE SYMBOLIC SOVEREIGNTY FORMULA VIII. CONCLUSIONS Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports Número 2/Issue # 2, 2016-2017, pp. 67-96 ISSN 2444-7382 Abstract: The outcome of the United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum on leaving the European Union necessarily entails both a reconsideration of the status of Gibraltar and changes in Spain’s perspective on a solution to the dispute. Following Brexit, negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not only pave the way for a new European and international legal framework, but will also create a historic opportunity for Spain to redefine its relationship with Gibraltar, offering the possibility of new approaches to resolve this historical dispute. After the crisis of 2013, negotiations reached a stalemate, but the unexpected outcome of the Brexit referendum could have tragic consequences for Gibraltar because the obligation to negotiate the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will likewise oblige Gibraltar to redefine its legal status with the EU, which constitutes the legal framework of greatest practical daily application, together with two other international legal frameworks, namely the Treaty of Utrecht and the UN declaration on decolonisation. The European framework will continue to apply for at least the two years during which withdrawal negotiations are held, providing sufficient legal certainty concerning applicable law in the coming years. However, the effects of uncertainty could have a very negative impact on the economy of Gibraltar, whose population adopted a clear stance in favour of ‘Bremain’ in the referendum. Furthermore, a possible return to the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht has raised fears of the very probable legality of closing the border, at Spain’s instigation, if EU law ceases to be applicable in the future. The unavoidable renegotiation of the status of Gibraltar within the EU will inevitably involve Spain, which in 1986 did not question the status endowed in 1972. In the present context, however, Spain could leverage the requirement for unanimity at several crucial moments during the process of negotiating British withdrawal as regulated by Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); thus, various possible future scenarios for Gibraltar, such as the Norwegian or Swiss models or the antecedent of Greenland, will depend on Spain’s consent. In addition, solutions that seek to maintain application of the European Single Market to Gibraltar would in practice be unworkable in the international arena, because Gibraltar is not part of the British State and its only status under international law is that of a territory awaiting decolonisation in a process supervised by the United Nations. The unavoidable renegotiation of the status of Gibraltar within the EU will inevitably involve Spain, which in 1986 did not question the status endowed in 1972. In the present context, however, Spain could leverage the requirement for unanimity at several crucial moments during the process of negotiating British withdrawal as regulated by Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); thus, various possible future scenarios for Gibraltar, such as the Norwegian or Swiss models or the antecedent of Greenland, will depend on Spain’s consent. In addition, solutions that seek to maintain application of the European Single Market to Gibraltar would in practice be unworkable in the international arena, because Gibraltar is not part of the British State and its only status under international law is that of a territory awaiting decolonisation in a process supervised by the United Nations. At the same time, Brexit has opened a window of opportunity for resolving this historical dispute, which encompasses both peaceful coexistence between Spain and the small neighbouring community of Gibraltar just over the border, and the question of sovereignty that underlies the dispute with the United Kingdom. The acting Spanish Government took two important decisions in 2016: it announced the need to negotiate the status of Gibraltar outside the framework of TEU Art. 50, and it proposed joint sovereignty. This historic moment requires strategic decisions supported by broad domestic consensus in Spain, since it is a key issue strongly symbolic of Spanish foreign policy which may have important domestic and international consequences. Spain now has the opportunity to adopt a strategic approach that incorporates a new narrative and focus for Gibraltar, and which addresses the pending issue of regulating cross-border relations and coexistence with the people of Gibraltar. The unanimous support given in 2016 by all political parties for a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) with Gibraltar within the EU framework demonstrates that significant changes are possible for cross-border coexistence. Gibraltar and Campo could even adopt a common approach to Brexit and its consequences for Gibraltar and the region, enforcing this in their respective States and the EU as negotiations begin. Instead of Joint Sovereignty negotiations as the answer for the Gibraltar question, the article advocate a twofold approach in the current historical negotiating situation for the UK’s departure from the EU: a provisional Modus Vivendi for cross-border coexistence, and in parallel an agreement to seek a new international and European model for Gibraltar, trying to put an end to historical controversy. A provisional Modus Vivendi for the cross-border coexistence with Gibraltar could be an interim agreement to regulate the aspects that most urgently need the daily normalization. Especially the border crossing by the Border/Fence, but also others such as the issues of transparency and economic-financial collaboration, navigation and jurisdiction over Bay waters, or the use of the airport. This historic moment could be conducive to moving forwards in new and imaginative ways, with initiatives such as that of ‘symbolic sovereignty’ formula via the proposed Principality of Gibraltar or City of the British and Spanish Crowns linked to the EU, which offers sufficient constitutional and international margins for consideration. This proposal of the Two Crowns Principality, linked to the EU, would restore Gibraltar to the Spanish nation and sovereignty, in addition to incorporating it into the EU as part of the Kingdom of Spain, ensuring the maintenance of its current organisation and powers and entailing agreements on Gibraltar’s economic and financial regime and British retention of its military bases. http://catedras.uca.es/jean-monnet/revistas/cuadernos-de-gibraltar/abstracts/02/info002eng https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6037322 http://catedras.uca.es/jean-monnet/revistas/cuadernos-de-gibraltar/contenidos/02/cgib02-valle-principality.pdf http://catedras.uca.es/jean-monnet/revistas/cuadernos-de-gibraltar/abstracts/02/info002eng https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6037322

UNCLOS III , clearly emphasizes the rules of determination of maritime zones inter alia Breadth of territorial sea (BTS). The convention was signed and ratified by 168 states and 14 states have only signed it not ratified . However, there are 15 UN member and observer states that have not signed or acceded to the convention or agreement . On this basis, this academic paper examines the different practices of non-member and member states in determining the breadth of the territorial sea. It should be noted that prior to UNCLOS III, some state practices of declaring the BTS were transferred to the universally accepted accretion point of 12 nautical miles. On the other hand, some states are still making their own claims contrary to UNCLOS III. According to the above explanation, it is an academic necessary to examine the following characteristics in accordance with international law (IL) in order to determine BTS. 1. How to develop the doctrine of BTS. 2. Scope of BTS under UNCLOS III 3. Practices of various states before UNCLOS III on the determination of the BTS. 4. Legitimacy of claiming more than 12 nautical miles for BTS. 5. Contemporary Issues and suggestion